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F o r e w o r d  
 
 
 
 
 
For decades, Korean housing policy makers were absorbed in promoting 
housing construction to mitigate housing shortage problem. As the result, 
housing policies were focused on the supply side while the demand side was 
rather ignored.  Success of policies was determined often by the number of 
units constructed for a given period. Such a principle was extended to the 
housing polices for low-income households including the squatter policy.  
 
The urban housing renewal has been the main source of housing supply in 
large metropolitan areas and most of original residents were replaced by 
middle-income people. In late 1980’s, the Residential Improvement Program 
was introduced additionally and, to some extent, reduced financial burden of 
low-income residents to resettle by providing public grants. However, the 
affordability problem still remains. Another critical issue is that current 
programs do not address the social and economic problems of the 
underprivileged residents in deprived areas. 
 
Once, Britain had a reputation for progressive social housing policies even 
though a large portion of social units is now privatized. Britain also has a 
long policy experience with unfit housing and urban deprived areas. The 
concept of ‘Fitness Standard’ born in Britain was later applied to define 
 iv
substandard housing in many countries including the United States and 
Korea.  
 
A series of the Korea-U.K. workshop was prepared to learn such British 
experiences and also to provide British partners with opportunities of mutual 
learning. Although the policy settings such as the government structure, 
social environment, housing conditions and the characteristics of deprived 
areas in two countries are not identical, I believe, we can draw good policy 
implications from the workshops. 
 
We held the first and the second workshops in Korea in year 2001 and 
year 2002 respectively.  Last year in 2003, the third workshop was held in 
Britain. In the first workshop of 2001, participants presented the history of 
urban regeneration policies and general frameworks of related programs. 
More detailed aspects of the programs were discussed with the case studies 
of implemented projects in the following two years.  
 
Wrapping up the workshop series at this fourth workshop in 2004, the 
participants presented eight papers, four from Korean participants and other 
four from British partners. Two papers overviewed the British and Korean 
policies and programs again while the rest of papers dealt with some specific 
aspects of the programs that were not introduced in the previous workshops. 
In particular, governance of housing renewal and urban regeneration was 
analyzed extensively in several papers. The local partnership between local 
authorities and local private corporations, local banks, CBOs and NGOs as 
well as residents was discussed with case examples. From these interesting 
 v
papers, I believe that we can take meaningful implications. 
 
I would like to thank all the participants of the Korea-UK Workshop, all 
paper presenters and discussants. I give special thanks to Dr. Mina Kang and 
Dr. Soon-Suk Bae who organized this workshop. And also I want to express 
my warm gratitude to Professor Christopher Watson and Richard Groves 
who played leading roles throughout the series of the Korea-U.K. Workshop 
from the British side. 
 
 
 
Kyu-Bang Lee 
President, KRIHS 
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S U M M A R Y  
 
 
 
 
 
This report is an outcome of the third workshop, which was held during 7-
11 July, 2003 in Birmingham, United Kingdom. The scholars and 
government officials of Korea and UK participated in the workshop and 
discussed the process of redevelopment projects, success-case study of 
regeneration programmes and the more developmental housing policies for 
the future.   
The main purpose of the workshop was to figure out and present a more 
effective and realistic direction in re-housing policies for native residents in 
redevelopment areas, through the 3rd UK-Korea workshop.  
 
 
● Estate Regeneration in Lee Bank, Birmingham 
 
This paper is about the regeneration of a group of council estates in the 
City of Birmingham.  Like all local authorities, Birmingham was affected 
by changing policies for council housing from the early 1980s onwards.  
The sale of council houses to sitting tenants led to the ‘residualisation’ of the 
council housing sector.  Later policies encouraged the transfer of housing 
estates to new landords such as housing associations.   
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Lee Bank and its neighbouring estates, known as ‘The Central Estates’, 
were built from the 1950s to the 1970s.  The area was in poor condition and 
had social and economic problems.  When one funding programme, the 
Estates Action Programme, came to an end in 1994, local residents 
demanded the council find a way to continue improving their housing.  
They felt neglected, especially when they saw the investment going into the 
regeneration of the city centre, less than one mile away. 
 
Working with the residents, the city applied for a grant under the new 
Estates Renewal Challenge Fund.  This government funded programme 
was intended to achieve regeneration in big, run-down local authority estates.  
The application was successful but residents had to agree to transfer their 
housing into the ownership of a new landlord.  Sixty two per cent voted in 
favour.  A grant of GBP 56 million was made.  The transfer of 2,800 
dwellings to Optima Community Association, a new community-led housing 
association, took place in 1999.  The area was renamed ‘Attwood Green’. 
 
A programme of refurbishment, clearance and new building has been 
taking place.  A developer was appointed to implement an approved 
development plan and nearly 1,000 new dwellings, many for owner-
occupation, are being built.  Income from the sale of land is being re-
invested to refurbish and replace houisng in other parts of Attwood Green. 
 
A social and economic programme for the area deals with employment, 
community enterprise, crime and community safety, education, health and 
family support, young people, empowering communities and the arts.  
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Optima has funds to assist these projects and helps to publicise them. 
 
Much progress is taking place in Attwood Green and the work is seen as 
successful. The transfer of the estates from the local authority released funds 
for regeneration but the decision was a political choice based on a belief, not 
shared by everyone,  that local authority housing management  and long-
term state funding were not the best way to deal with the problems of the 
Central Estates.  Other issues concern the future for those who leave the 
estates during refurbishment.  Will they return?  Will problems be moved 
on to other areas? 
 
● Emergence of Planned Development in Urban Renewal from 
Piecemeal to Comprehensive Planning 
 
It has been a long time to recognize that urban residential renewal is one 
of important aspects in providing splendid landscape and systematic urban 
planning.  Until the new millennium, the urban and residential renewal is 
just another sector that the private party should be concerned.  Hence, it is 
not excessive to state that the renewal was out of public control and its 
attention.  Current changes in urban and residential renewal prove that we 
are in the transition period that the renewal trend moves from piecemeal 
development to comprehensive planning to balance the renewal site with the 
surroundings and to lessen social costs attributed from unplanned 
redevelopment. 
 
Current new legislations attempt to accommodate these past trial errors 
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and to suggest new ways such as provision of balanced landscapes with 
surrounding areas, preservation of sound living environments, and 
systematic blending of housing provision and urban planning.  These 
changes come from the retrospect that the urban residential renewal was not 
performed by the thorough preparation of housing provision in the urban 
planning.  Urban renewal was not the only sector that fails to consider 
whole planning system in a simultaneous way.  Because of that, we created 
urban sprawl and urban sprawl gave us unbearable increase of housing prices 
and deprivation of decent living conditions.  It should be understood in the 
planning stage that the urban renewal moves and responses spontaneously to 
our system by the market mechanism. 
 
This paper attempts to investigate what circumstances contributed to the 
failure and success of urban residential redevelopment programs.  It pays 
more attention to the historical development, financial strategy, payment 
body, protection of low-income households.  In the final chapter, 
emergence of new renewal policies targeting planned development in urban 
residential renewal is discussed.  It enables us to show that planning in 
renewal is essential to the sustainable living of urban residents. 
 
● The Roles of NGOs in Squatter Redevelopment: Korean cases 
 
This paper examines the case of Yongdu squatter redevelopment project in 
Daejeon City and Nangok project in Seoul in order to see how NGOs 
influence squatter redevelopment in Korea.  
The examination shows that national NGOs is contributing to the reform 
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of the institutional system of squatter redevelopment by continually bringing 
forward social problems associated with it. They were mostly ideologically 
or politically motivated and primarily concern the reform of the whole 
institutional and social system that conditions squatter redevelopment. They 
make redevelopment works very difficult by demanding the government to 
realize hoped-for values such as equity, equality, human dignity, etc., often 
without considering the ability of our society to afford them, In relation to 
this, they expose limitations in responding to the specific needs of individual 
resident in a particular project although they advocate the interests of the 
most vulnerable section of squatter residents that are otherwise likely to be 
disrespected. In addition, their active intervention as external agents taking 
initiative in negotiation with the authorities and development agencies make 
the squatter residents dependents. 
This is contrasted to the case of Nangok in Seoul in which the residents 
through CBOs have had initiative in the whole process of redevelopment. 
CBOs act for the interests of their communities. They are more practical in 
helping the residents to cope with squatter redevelopment. But they act for 
the interests of the majority or the main-stream faction of residents. Those 
who are excluded from the main-stream are treated as a group to be 
persuaded to cooperate with the majority and to be appeased with some cash. 
An implication is that both the direct involvement of national NGOs in a 
specific redevelopment project and CBOs without the support of outside 
NGOs have certain limitations in helping people in squatter redevelopment; 
hence a need to study the possibility of cooperation between CBOs and 
national NGOs(or city-wide NGOs that have not direct interests in a 
particular area). 
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●  Governance as a New Model for Maintenance of Residential 
Improvement  
 
Nowadays the main concepts of Maintenance of Residential Improvement 
(hereinafter MRI) are sustainable development, growth management, and 
people's participation. MRI should pursue development and preservation of 
neighborhood at the same time. It also aims at improving residential 
environment and activation of community. On the other hand, the role of 
players that encompass MRI has been changed with maturing of civil society 
and the change of MRI paradigm. Until now the major MRI program, CHR 
(Cooperative Housing Redevelopment) and RA (Reconstruction Apartment) 
have tried clearance and newly built apartment. Therefore these projects 
have caused collapse of existing community and breakdown the history of 
community. MRI projects are seriously considered as a means of land supply 
rather than original purpose. 
However new changes, such as declining of FAR in MRI, enactment of 
Act for Urban and Housing Improvement, and making REI program as 
regular base show the shift of paradigm in MRI. These changes show 
strengthening of publicity in MRI. In addition, the Participatory 
Neighborhood Planning (hereinafter PNP) has been done actively in some 
cities, and citizen organizations, which deal with the housing problem, have 
been formed. It shows changes in the role of residents who recognize their 
responsibility. Regarding these changes, major development for the 
formation of governance in MRI was already started 
The characteristics of the target area, which require MRI has changed 
from illegal urban squatter areas to legally developed and dilapidated 
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neighborhoods. Participatory model between the government and residents is 
more required rather than leading role of public in these areas. Also the 
focus of housing policy should be changed to maintenance, repair and 
management of housing stock, maintenance of urban district from supply 
promotion.  
For new MRI, coordination of players such as the central government, 
local governments, residents, civil organizations is necessary. The central 
government provides funds through the MRI Fund, which is managed by 
them. Local governments plans, adjusts and manages local MRI initiatives. 
Local governments adjust the relations of various interested parties, and 
ensure that the development by land plot and business area is pursued within 
the context of the consistent blueprint of the city. Residents should play the 
role of the leader taking responsibility for the issues of the neighborhood. 
Non-profit organizations like the United States' CDC (Community 
Development Corporation) have been created to handle the issue of MRI in a 
certain neighborhood. The neighborhood's responsibility for the local issues 
should be emphasized. Nonprofit organizations should access MRI as a 
whole urban environment as well as from resident's standpoints. Cooperation 
between different players is one of the most important factors. 
Detail strategies are as follows: MRI must switch to neighborhood or 
community-focused upgrading from designated area. Coalition of residents 
and improved local identity is important. Basic self-reliance by maintaining 
the economic basis in the local community is secured. Creation of Proper 
Urban Management System is necessary. Also combination of project and 
program approach is necessary. At last organization and specialization of 
residents are important.  
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● Nonprofit Organizations and Housing Rights in Urban Redevelopment 
in S. Korea: 
 
This research assumes that in today's democratic society of S. Korea 
people expect to be partners in negotiations on issues affecting their interest. 
Thus, the failure to incorporate concepts of local community, common good 
(especially, here, the concept of housing rights), and fairness into the urban 
redevelopment law allows the projects to become more contentious and even 
violent.  
In this research the author has chosen for analysis three case studies where 
voluntary nonprofit organizations intervened in urban redevelopment 
projects to promote housing rights.  The case studies suggest several 
elements that should be included in a legal framework to promote 
community and to enhance peaceful negotiations in urban redevelopment.  
The first two cases studied show the profit motive challenging, or 
overcoming, motivation for building community.  This indicates that the 
legal framework should design a win-win situation where the benefits of 
local community can be enhanced in the project at the same time that 
participants are protected against loss, and the chance for outside investors to 
reap large gains is minimized.  
The Incheon case shows that the low income families could not hold out 
for long without enhancing their incomes, and therefore they abandoned 
local community by selling out to outside investors.  Promoting local 
community requires that the project not be dragged out too long.  Small-
scale projects would seem preferable to large-scale projects.  
The cases show that people are powerfully motivated to protest when they 
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perceive they are being excluded or treated unfairly or threatened.  For an 
arbiter to be able to play a good role in arbitrating conflicts there must be not 
only an ideal of the common good (in this case housing rights) that is 
defined by law, but also a procedure for carrying out the project that allows 
all affected persons to sense that they are included in the negotiation 
process.  There is a consistent finding in the case studies that the local 
administration or the police do not take on the role of arbiter in 
redevelopment conflicts.  The research here would indicate that since the 
law does not provide for the common good in terms of housing rights, nor 
include a procedure that enhances fairness, the administrators and police lack 
meaningful ways to arbitrate conflicts.  
Since local community and housing rights have value for the common 
good but their benefits are not as apparent to individual residents as 
expectations of profit, when local community and housing rights will be 
included in the legal framework of redevelopment projects it will be 
necessary to have specially trained persons available, such as community 
organizers or community welfare workers, to aid in communications, 
information dispersal, education programs, consensus formation strategies 
and the like.  
 
● Private Sector Housing Renewal in England and Wales: the impact of  
changing legislation 
 
This paper provides a summary of the ‘new’ system for the renovation of 
houses in the ‘private sector’ in England and Wales as introduced by 
government legislation in 2002.  The new system is a radical departure 
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from the old.  It introduces a new national standard for houses in the private 
sector, the ‘Decent Homes’ standard, which is accompanied by a new 
method of assessing the condition of a property, the Housing, Health and 
Safety Rating System (HHSRS). Under the Regulatory Reform Order (RRO, 
2002), local authorities are provided with wide, discretionary powers to 
provide ‘housing assistance’ to home-owners and private landlords in order 
to maintain standards within the sector.  A major change from the ‘old’ 
system is the adoption of financial assistance in the form of loans rather than 
grants and this is proving a major challenge to local authorities. 
 
Whilst it is still ‘early days’ for the new system, there are signs that the 
simultaneity of the change in legislation across such a broad area of policy is 
proving to be difficult for local authorities to implement.  The task to 
increase the use of private finance is proving particularly problematic as 
major private sector lenders (the banks and building societies) are reluctant 
to engage with local authorities.   
 
The policy changes do not imply that the new policy is more or less 
relevant to similar policies in Korea.  What they tend to underscore, 
however, is that 
 
y Local policies are appropriate for local circumstances 
y Sustainable home-ownership for low-income home-owners 
continues to require government support in order to sustain 
standards 
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• Legislative changes anticipate a greater ‘enabling’ role for 
local housing authorities in the private sector than hitherto 
• Clearance versus retention and improvement remains a 
critical issue 
• Community involvement and capacity building remain at 
the heart of area-based renewal programmes 
• The concept of ‘leverage’ is seen as increasingly important 
to the effectiveness of private sector housing renewal 
programmes than hitherto. 
 
● Housing Market Renewal Fund - A new approach to housing renewal 
 in the UK 
 
This paper examines the development of a new, large scale, strategic 
approach to restructuring housing markets in the North and Midlands regions 
of England. Drawing heavily from the direct experience of the author, the 
progress and evolution of this programmes is outlined from it’s inception to 
current delivery. 
 
In the mid – 1990’s, housing markets in many inner urban areas of 
Englands northern cities began to fail. This was characterised by widespread 
abandonment, falling prices and a switch away from ownership to short term 
and unstable renting. Running alongside this were often deteriorating 
environments, social infra structures, rising levels of crime and worklessness. 
 
Neither traditional methods of housing renewal focussed on the physical 
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improvement of the housing stock nor more recent regeneration programmes 
aimed at increasing skills and capacity of residents could deliver the 
solutions to a problem of this scale.   
 
Housing market renewal (HMR) funding began in 2003 to provide 
resources to the areas experiencing both the most intensive problems of 
market failure and at risk of this continuing unabated without rapid 
intervention – these areas are the HMR Pathfinders. The programme 
attracted initial 2/3 year funding of £500m – a figure now to be matched 
over the coming 3 years. 
 
Specifically established multi-agency Boards overseen by central 
government manage the programme. Regional government works with the 
Pathfinders to ensure that their work fits in with broader local economic, 
planning, neighbourhood renewal and housing strategies.  
 
The paper looks at some of the practical and philosophical points that this 
programme has raised. 
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CHAPTER 1 
 
ESTATE REGENERATION IN LEE BANK, 
BIRMINGHAM 
 
 
 
Christopher Watson 
Centre for Urban and Regional Studies 
The University of Birmingham UK 
 
 
 
1. Introduction 
 
Regeneration in England is basically of two types.  The first is associated 
with the older housing areas of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries.  
It followed from the period of slum clearance that characterised policy towards 
older housing from the 1950s to the early 1970s. It was believed in the 1970s 
and much of the 1980s that judicious improvement of the remaining older 
housing could extend its useful life and maintain the important place of such 
housing in the functioning of local housing markets.  More recently, some 
areas have become the focus of housing market renewal policies, especially in 
the Midlands and the North of England. 
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The second type of regeneration has focussed on mainly public sector 
housing estates built from the 1950s to the 1970s, often as a consequence of 
the slum clearance programmes directed at the older nineteenth century 
housing in inner city areas, and at the derelict sites in these areas caused by 
bomb damage during World War II.  Some of the new post-war estates 
were built in inner city areas, often to high densities with multi-storey flats; 
others were on the periphery of the cities on green field sites, sometimes 
with poor and costly public transport links, inadequate social and community 
facilities and poor job opportunities. 
 
Both types of regeneration essentially are a response to the same issue:  
that is, the legacy of poor sub-standard housing inherited from the period of 
industrialisation and urbanisation that characterised the United Kingdom in 
the nineteenth century.  In the case of the older housing areas that still 
remain, an important aim is to improve the housing to modern standards and 
to retain or improve the position of the areas within local housing markets.  
In the post-war redevelopment estates, the regeneration now taking place can 
be seen as a second attempt, within a period of less than forty or fifty years, 
to bring about lasting improvements to the character of inner city or 
peripheral neighbourhoods and the opportunities of the people who live there.  
Many of these areas are associated with problems of deprivation and social 
exclusion. 
 
The term ‘regeneration’ implies a much broader concept that the 
essentially property-led approaches of the past, embracing as it does not only 
the physical regeneration of an area but its ownership and management and 
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the social and economic well-being of the people who live there.  The 
involvement of local communities and others with a legitimate interest in the 
area is an essential part of the process. 
 
2. Birmingham 
 
With a population in 2001 of just under one million people and as the 
main city in a conurbation of 2.5 million people, Birmingham is the second 
most populous city and the largest local authority with the most unified 
system of governance in the UK.   
 
Birmingham provides many examples of successive regeneration policies 
and programmes both in the older and the more recent parts of the city and 
these are well documented elsewhere. (references to follow)  As a city of 
the industrial revolution, Birmingham grew rapidly in the nineteenth century. 
Suburbanisation was a major feature of the twentieth century:  it included 
the development of some very large council housing estates in the 1920s and 
1930s and from the 1950s to the 1970s.  By the end of the 1970s, more than 
100,000 dwellings, over 30 per cent of Birmingham’s housing, was provided 
by the local authority which was recognised as one of the largest public 
housing authorities in Western Europe.   
 
3. Changing Policies for Council Housing 
 
In the 1980s, policies were introduced which led to the decline of council 
housing in Britain and further reinforced the growth of owner-occupation. . 
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Council housing in Birmingham, as in other British cities, was considerably 
changed by the ‘right to buy’, the decline in new building and by 
under-investment in the management and maintenance of the public housing 
stock.  The long-term residualisation of the sector was also significant and 
by the mid-1980s it was apparent that special programmes were needed to 
deal with problems of deprivation and the lack of public spending on repair 
and maintenance that were both consequences and causes of the process of 
‘residualisation’ – the concentration of the socially and economically 
deprived and of others with little or no choice, into the declining public 
rented sector.  
 
From the mid-1980s, the earlier policy of council house sales to sitting 
tenants was complemented by further government policies to encourage the 
transfer of public sector housing estates into different forms of tenure.  This 
was done by offering grants, where necessary, to help bring properties to a 
reasonable standard and thus to attract private finance for refurbishment, 
restructuring and improved future housing management.. The major ‘stock 
transfer’ initiatives that developed, to varying degrees of success, were 
known as Tenants Choice; Large Scale Voluntary Transfers1, and Local 
Housing Companies.  None was designed specifically to achieve 
regeneration but rather to reduce still further the size of the housing stock in 
public ownership and the state’s long-term financial responsibility for it.  
Not surprisingly, the earliest stock transfers were not in the major urban 
areas and did not include the worst estates.  By contrast, the introduction in 
1995 of the Estates Renewal Challenge Fund was an attempt to attract 
                                            
1 In this case, the whole of a local authority’s housing stock was transferred to a new landlord, 
typically a housing association established for the purpose. 
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private finance into tackling some of the most deprived local authority 
estates.  
 
1) Lee Bank and the Central Estates 
 
Lee Bank and the surrounding estates of Five Ways 2 , Woodview, 
Benmore and The Sentinels, referred to collectively as ‘The Central Estates’ 
are within one mile of the city centre of Birmingham.  They were built 
between 1950 and the mid-1970s to replace dense areas of nineteenth 
century slums and to clear bomb sites.  Located at the southern entrance to 
the city, the estates were seen, when they were built, as a symbol of the 
modern Birmingham  - a city of the future.   The estates had 27 tower 
blocks (of 5 or more stories), mostly on Lee Bank but including The 
Sentinels (Cleveland and Clydesdale Towers), both of 32 stories, alongside 
the inner ring road of the city centre. 
 
Table 1. Housing types in Birmingham and the Central Estates 1991 (percentages) 
Housing type Birmingham Central Estates 
House 76.7 8.3 
Flat (purpose built) 19.3 90.1 
Flat (conversion) 2.9 1.5 
Not self contained 1.0 0 
Not permanent 0  0 
Total (base) 374,079 2,729 
Source: Census of Population, 1991 
 
                                            
2 Originally built as a private estate and purchased by the city in the late 1970s 
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Figure 1. General view of the area, looking towards the city centre 
Source:  Optima Community Association 
 
By the 1990s, the Central Estates faced many difficulties.  Some were 
physical, resulting from problems with the design and construction of the 
original buildings; some were due to inadequate maintenance and repair; 
some reflected the fragmentation of the housing stock through council house 
sales (including the sale of flats in multi-storey blocks); and some the social 
and economic problems of the area.  People living on the estates were 
predominantly local authority tenants (Table 2). 
 
Table 2. Housing tenure in Birmingham and the Central Estates 1991 (percentages) 
 Birmingham Central Estates 
Owner occupied 60.0 5.8 
Private rented 6.6 2.6 
Housing association 5.6 7.5 
Local authority 26.4 82.8 
Other 1.3 1.2 
Total (base) 374079 2729 
Source: Census of Population, 1991 
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Under the Estate Action programme that began in 1985, part of the Central 
Estates had received funding for refurbishment.  Some properties were 
demolished; in some others, heating systems were improved and windows 
replaced.  Some land was made available for small-scale new developments, 
for example by two Birmingham-based housing associations3 under the 
auspices of the Central Housing Partnership, a group of housing associations 
working with the local authority and other agencies committed to the future 
of the area.  The Estate Action programme came to an end in 1995 and with 
apparently no more funding ‘in the pipeline’ for the Central Estates, 
residents took matters into their own hands when, in 1996, they protested 
that their concerns about the deteriorating housing stock were not being 
acted upon.  ‘Staging sit-ins and roof top protests they ensured that their 
stories were brought to a national audience’ (Optima, 2004).  Their banners 
proclaimed “Welcome to Lee Bank – Birmingham’s slum quarter”4, even 
though there were many other areas of poorer quality housing in 
Birmingham that might have been more deserving of the title.  As a result 
discussions took place between the city and the residents ‘to work out a plan 
for the future of the area, examining how to bring in real economic and 
social investment’ (ibid). 
 
It was against this background that the City of Birmingham, which in the 
past had sought to acquire any funds that were available for the council 
housing stock, began to consider the possibility of using the Estates Renewal 
Challenge Fund, even though this would mean a transfer of housing to a new 
                                            
3 Mercian Housing Association and Waterloo Housing Association 
4 The use of the term ‘slum quarter’ was a deliberately ironic reference to the city’s redevelopment 
plans which focused on promoting areas such as ‘The Convention Quarter’, ‘The Jewellery 
Quarter’, ‘The Chinese Quarter’ and ‘The Irish Quarter’.  
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organisation.  In doing so, the city was strongly influenced by the demands 
from local residents.  
 
The Estates Renewal Challenge Fund (ERCF) had been launched in 
November 1995 with the aim of regenerating some of the remaining big, 
run-down local authority estates by facilitating their transfer to registered 
social landlords5 (RSLs), thus enabling private finance to be raised to help 
meet some of the costs.  By contrast with previous transfer mechanisms it 
was recognised in the design of ERCF that certain types of housing area had 
a low or negative value and thus could never be seen as a realistic 
investment by any RSL or private sector organisation.  The amount of 
money that needed to be spent to bring such areas up to an acceptable 
standard was in excess of the tenanted market value: that is, the value of the 
income stream associated with the rents on the properties. (Hall et al, 2003 
100).  ERCF provided the possibility of a ‘dowry’ from government to be 
paid as part of a business plan involving the transfer of ownership of the 
stock and a programme of repair and modernisation.  The dowry would be 
set at the level that would make the business plan work, assuming certain 
rent levels (ibid). So the government would pay a dowry, the local authority 
would transfer the stock and private financial institutions would add their 
lending in order to fund the refurbishment of the housing and to develop a 
viable, sustainable, independent landlord  (Hall et al op cit: 22). 
 
The city council and the residents worked together on a bid for ECRF 
                                            
5 A Registered Social Landlord is a housing organisation registered with the Housing Corporation 
under the terms of the Housing Act 1996.  Most RSLs are non-profit Housing Associations.  
Housing Associations are now the main providers of new social rented housing in England and 
some have been created as vehicles for the transfer of local authority housing into RSL ownership.    
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grant support.  The application was submitted and was successful: an eight 
year programme and a grant of GBP 56 million were agreed, on condition 
that the residents voted in favour of transferring the housing stock from the 
city council to a new registered social landlord.  The ballot took place in 
December 1998 and 62 percent of residents voted in favour of the transfer. 
 
The next stage was for the new landlord, Optima Community Association, 
to be registered with the Housing Corporation and in June 1999, the housing 
stock transfer took place, taking nearly 2,800 homes out of the ownership of 
Birmingham City Council and into the ownership of Optima.     
 
2) Optima Community Association 
 
The preparation of the ECRF bid, the establishment of Optima 
Community Association and the transfer of stock took more than one year.  
The arguments for transfer were compelling.  There were no other options 
for funding the kind of regeneration envisaged.  The government wished 
ECRF to be used in the way proposed by Birmingham; and was keen also to 
involve Birmingham in the programme, seeing it as a possible precursor to 
more substantial housing stock transfers in the city.  Many residents were 
enthusiastic and the private sector was interested, particularly in view of the 
proximity of the area to the convention quarter and the city centre which 
were enjoying significant growth in private sector ‘city living’. 
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Figure 2.  Location of the Central Estates (Hall et al 2003: 116) 
 
For the city council and the residents, the alternatives to transfer were to 
do nothing; to continue with a programme of partial works, for example to 
heating systems and windows; or to consider the partial or complete 
demolition of the area, the rehousing of residents elsewhere and the sale of 
the land to private developers.   At the time, given the scale of its housing 
problems, the city estimated that up to GBP 2 billion was needed for 
investment in its housing stock across the city6.  This compared with a 
housing investment programme for the whole city in 1998/99 of GBP 35 
million.  
 
Optima was established as a community-led organisation.  The Board of 
Management has 15 members:  seven are tenants, five are independent, and 
                                            
6 The investment plan was based on a housing stock of 95,000 council dwellings, including 353 
tower blocks, 20,000 pre-war council houses, 20,000 post-war flats and maisonettes, over 50 
non-traditional property types, and 50 per cent of properties without central heating . 
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three are City Council nominees.  The Board, advised by its paid officers, is 
responsible for the implementation of the comprehensive regeneration 
framework, the key aims of which are to: 
 
h Achieve community stability 
h Widen housing choice 
h Reduce crime and fear of crime 
h Promote training and employment 
h Provide investment to complement the city centre 
h Enhance the quality of life for residents, especially through health, 
education, the economy and the environment 
 
The main elements in the programme are to: 
 
h Refurbish 1,500 properties 
h Demolish 1,300 properties 
h Build 550 homes for rent 
h Lead a major regeneration programme, including over 1,000 homes for 
sale. Offices, shops, parks, hotels and leisure facilities are planned. 
h A social and economic programme 
h Radical housing management improvements 
h A complete overhaul of the housing repairs service 
 
The total investment in the programme is estimated at GBP 350 million 
over an 8 to 10 year period.   
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3) Refurbishment, Clearance and New Building 
 
A major programme is underway to refurbish existing dwellings.  The 
aim is to meet the aspirations of residents by improving external features 
such as the appearance of the buildings, gardens and the environment.  
Internally, improvements are being made to common areas, particularly 
entrances and lifts, to make them secure and welcoming.  Within dwellings, 
the main works are to modernise kitchens, replace outdated electrical wiring, 
and redecorate. 
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Figure 3. Deterioration of the fabric of a tower block 
Source:  Optima Community Association 
 
More than half the original dwellings in the Central Estates have been or 
are scheduled for clearance. Most of the clearance is of tower blocks and 
involves rehousing either within the area or elsewhere with the local 
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authority or housing associations. Both the exterior refurbishment and the 
demolitions have resulted in a significant change in the appearance of the 
estates, which is continuing to evolve as the new building work develops on 
site. 
 
After the transfer to Optima, a development framework for the Central 
Estates was agreed with the city council, which retains planning 
responsibilities for the area.  Commercial agents, planning consultants and 
marketing consultants were appointed.  A joint venture was agreed between 
Optima and the city council under which both would help to market the area 
under a new ‘brand name’.  In this way, the Central Estates were re-named 
‘Attwood Green’7 and part of Lee Bank was re-named ‘Park Central’, the 
names under which all marketing of new housing is taking place.  The 
‘rebranding’ was intended clearly to connect with the housing and other 
property developments in the city centre, and especially in the neighbouring 
‘Convention Quarter’.  These plans were launched in July 2000 and the 
process began of selecting a ‘lead developer’ for Phase 1 (Lee Bank/Park 
Central) who would be responsible for the development of housing for sale.  
Of those that tendered, three companies were short-listed and Crest 
Nicholson were appointed in November 2000.  They are in the process of 
implementing the approved plan, which is due for completion in the autumn 
of 2008.  The plan envisaged the building in Park Central of 637 
apartments and 119 houses for sale by Crest; and 60 apartments and 165 
                                            
7 Named after Thomas Attwood, a political campaigner of the early nineteenth century, who argued 
for parliamentary reform and became one of Birmingham’s first two Members of Parliament, 
following the Reform Act of 1832.  The name ‘Park Central’ refers to the park  which will be a 
main feature of the redeveloped ‘Lee Bank’. 
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houses for rent by Optima.  
 
 
Figure 4 Refurbished tower blocks 
Source: Optima Community Association 
 
Proceeds from the sale of land to the developer were to be re-invested in 
Attwood Green to help fund other developments for which Optima would be 
responsible.  Private sector finance for Optima was to be provided by the 
building society Nationwide, a major financial institution.  
 
4) Social and Economic Programme 
 
The social and economic programme is an important element in the 
regeneration of Attwood Green and the project includes funds specifically 
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for this purpose The programme has eight key themes: 
 
h Employment 
h Community Enterprise 
h Crime and Community Safety 
h Education 
h Health and Family Support 
h Young People 
h Empowering Communities 
h Arts 
 
Among the support currently provided is an Employment Resource Centre 
that provides a wide range of services aimed at helping local people access 
employment and training opportunities.  It is estimated that 17 per cent of 
Optima residents are unemployed, compared with a city-wide average of 8 
per cent in 2002 (Table 3). 
 
Table 3. Unemployment 2002 (percentages) 
 Unemployment rate 
Optima Tenants 17.0 
Edgbaston8 8.6 
Ladywood 15.9 
Birmingham Average 7.9 
Source: Birmingham City Council; Optima Community Association 
(from Hall et al, 2003:124) 
 
Services at the Employment Resource Centre include careers guidance, 
job search, designing CVs, help with job applications, job preparation, 
                                            
8 Edgbaston is the area within which Attwood Green is situated.  Ladywood is an ‘inner city’ area 
that adjoins the north-west boundary of Attwood Green . 
 16 
personal development courses, short training courses and individual 
guidance sessions.  Optima funds two employment outreach; workers who 
are based at the Employment Resource Centre.   
 
There is also a local Business Forum for businesses based near the city 
centre that provide support and help to schools, voluntary and community 
groups in the area.  The businesses offer different levels of support, for 
example providing staff time for reading volunteers, IT Support and 
financial help. 
 
Support specifically for young people is given by a local Youth and 
Community Centre at which Optima funds a youth outreach worker who is 
employed to provide a service for young people living in the Attwood Green 
area.  ‘His role is to make contact with socially excluded youngsters and 
help them access advice and services to address their specific needs’ 
(Optima, 2004). 
 
Community safety is being enhanced as a result of a grant received from 
the Home Office which was used to employ a local person who fitted 
security equipment and gave advice to over 200 households.  The success 
of the project has resulted in further funding being obtained.   Another 
initiative was the establishment in 2001 of a Community Wardens scheme, 
with funding from government departments.  Four wardens are employed.  
‘The aim is to help reduce crime and the fear of crime  by providing a 
physical presence on the estates at critical times of day’ (ibid).  The 
wardens also deal with such issues as abandoned vehicles, graffiti, rubbish 
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and vandalism.  They work closely with vulnerable residents such as the 
elderly and provide a link with the statutory services including the Police 
and Fire Service. 
 
Optima is helping to fund a childcare initiative at a Church centre on the 
estate, which provides after-school facilities for children whose parents are 
at work and good quality, affordable childcare during the school holidays.  
Optima also supports the work of the Birmingham Money Advice Group and 
a Credit Union based on the estates.   BMAG is a city-wide service for low 
income people with personal debt and/or welfare benefits problems.  The 
credit union receives people’s savings, grants affordable loans and arranges 
cheap household contents insurance for people living on the estates. 
 
As part of a Public Art Strategy, Optima residents are creating designs for 
artworks on Attwood Green in partnership with three artists.  Proposals and 
potential sites have been developed as sketches and visuals and are the 
subject of public viewing and comment in late 2004/early 2005 (Optima, 
2004)   
 
special funds by applying for or being a partner in an application to a 
government de These are examples of the type of support available to the 
local community which Optima is helping to encourage, perhaps by 
providing funds or by helping to publicise the availability elsewhere of 
support for disadvantaged and vulnerable people.  Normally, Optima itself 
would not expect to provide such services directly and most are available 
from the existing networks of community support provided by the local 
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authority or often by voluntary organisations.  Optima, however, can 
enhance what is available by its financial support, for example, for 
community workers; and by encouraging the take-up of services among the 
people who live in Attwood Green.  It can also help to access partment such 
as the Home Office. 
 
4. Evaluation 
 
Much progress has been made since 1999 when the Central Estates that 
now form Attwood Green were transferred to Optima Community Housing 
and the present process of regeneration was begun.  Resources that were 
not available under previous policy regimes have been provided and these 
have attracted other monies, mainly from the private sector but also from the 
city council, other government departments, other government programmes, 
and other housing associations.  The original ERCF grant of GBP 56 
million is expected to lead to a total investment in the area of at least GBP 
350 million over a ten year period.   Much of the worst housing has been 
or is being demolished; other housing has been, or will be, substantially 
improved internally and externally; and a major programme of new private 
building is  underway.  New offices, a hotel and new shopping facilities 
are planned and the appearance and image of a rather neglected, run-down 
housing area close to the city centre is being gradually transformed. 
 
In all these terms, especially financially and physically, the prospect is that 
the regeneration of Lee Bank and its neighbouring estates will be judged a 
success. Some might wish to attribute this success to the policy of having 
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transferred the estates from the ownership of the local authority to a new 
housing association, Optima Community Association.  Others might argue 
that the project would never have started but for the determination of local 
residents to insist that ‘something should be done’ to improve their estates; 
and for the continued involvement and commitment of residents, even to the 
extent of their representation on the Optima Board of Management.   
Another factor could be the proximity of the area to the revitalised city 
centre, ensuring financial viability for the project because of its commercial 
prospects and the scope for promoting home ownership and city living.  It 
could also be said that ERCF was well designed to deal with exactly the 
problem of low or negative value that characterised inner urban estates such 
as Lee Bank and made the attraction of private finance for regeneration 
impossible without a dowry.  In reality, all these factors have played a part 
but it does not mean that the ‘Optima solution’ is the only way the project 
could have been undertaken, nor that the approach adopted is necessarily 
replicable in other large run-down council estates in need of regeneration. 
 
As far the central policy, that of housing stock transfer, is concerned it 
should not be concluded that only non-public organisations are capable of 
achieving the kind of regeneration being seen in Attwood Green.  Transfer 
was made necessary because of prevailing public funding policies, 
developed over nearly twenty years, that fitted into a political philosophy of 
privatisation, and which had sought to underplay the long-term role of local 
authorities in direct housing provision.  The fact that a newly elected 
Labour government9 also seemed committed to housing stock transfer made 
                                            
9 elected in June 1997 after 18 years of Conservative government 
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the transfer of the Central Estates inevitable.  In different circumstances 
and with different policies on the role of local authorities in housing and 
regeneration, a different approach might have achieved similar outcomes on 
the Estates. 
 
Resident involvement is an accepted feature of present-day regeneration 
programmes and the contribution of the residents and community groups on 
Attwood Green is acknowledged.  Residents were active in community 
affairs long before the stock transfer took place.  Discussions about the 
future of Lee Bank and its neighbouring estates had been in progress for 
many years and for example, residents were involved in the planning of the 
earlier housing association developments on Lee Bank under the auspices of 
the Central Housing Partnership (Horita, 1996).  It is not surprising 
therefore, that residents were sufficiently well-organised to take matters into 
their own hands when they launched the campaign in 1996 drawing attention 
to “Birmingham’s slum quarter”.   
 
As Hall et al (2004: 76) show, ‘resident participation’ does not mean that 
the whole community is involved or even that it wholeheartedly supports the 
activities taking place.  For example, the schools do not yet participate to 
any considerable extent.  But the longstanding nature of resident 
involvement on the Estates, and their integration into the policy and 
management of the project has given a stability to the process that is 
valuable and respected.  But the number of people directly involved is 
small and there can be conflicts, as in any project of this kind. 
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Attwood Green has three major roads running through it:  two 
north-south main roads leading to the city centre and the east-west middle 
ring road, a principal route for traffic wishing to by-pass the city centre.  
The estates were brought together for the purposes of the ERCF grant 
application yet because of the roads, the physical links between them are 
difficult, and it might be assumed that this would tend to fragment the 
communities living in each.  In fact, it is argued that this is not the case 
(Hall et al 2003: 133) but that the collective sense of being cut-off and 
isolated from the city centre has engendered a spirit among the residents, 
who have become united by their ‘symbolic isolation’ within the city.  It is 
a matter for speculation as to how these feelings will run in future when the 
estates develop a more mixed character and different sets of interests 
amongst those who live there.   
 
A question so far unasked is this paper is about the people who used to 
live in what is now called Attwood Green but who have moved on, either in 
search of better opportunities elsewhere or because of displacement through 
clearance or the refurbishment of existing dwellings.    Many have used 
the Central Estates as a stepping stone to housing elsewhere in the city, 
though the rate of turnover appears now to be lower than in the past, due to 
the recent decline in the number of properties available for letting.  
Whether any displaced residents can or will wish to return to Attwood Green 
remains to be seen but it is likely that for many, it will become a more 
attractive area in the future and a key objective of the project is to bring new 
confidence to the estates.   
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One of the issues of piecemeal regeneration is that, by targeting resources 
on one defined area, its character, popularity and standing will rise and the 
problems, or some of the problems it had in the past, will move on to other 
areas. This may be particularly difficult to manage when different 
organisations have lead responsibility for different projects.  Such 
co-ordination as there is may rest with the local authority. It is not in charge 
of the process but may have to bear some of the consequences as ‘landlord 
of last resort’.  For those who remain there is the issue of having to ‘live on 
a building site’ for many years, while some properties are demolished, others 
are refurbished  and new ones are built. 
 
Finally, although many of the outcomes of a project such as the Lee Bank 
regeneration will often be seen and assessed in physical terms, success 
cannot be measured by this alone.  The holistic nature of the regeneration 
process requires that the effectiveness of the social and economic 
programme, and the continuing role of resident involvement needs to be 
considered as part of the evaluation of the long-term benefits which are 
hoped for from a major project such as this. 
 
Acknowledgements   
 
This paper was written while the author was a Visiting Researcher in the 
Department of Geography, Population and Environmental Management, 
Flinders University, Adelaide, Australia. 
 
The paper draws extensively on unpublished material by Alan Murie of 
 23 
the Centre for Urban and Regional Studies, The University of Birmingham; 
and by Simon Kimberley, Chief Executive and Lesley Whitling, Director of 
Housing, Optima Community Association.   Other sources are referenced 
below. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 24 
 
References  
 
 
 
 
 
 
[to regeneration in Birmingham – to follow] 
 
Hall, S,  Lee, P, Murie, A, Rowlands, and Sankey, S (2003), Restate – London and 
Birmingham, Centre for Urban and Regional Studies, The University of 
Birmingham (unpublished draft) 
 
Hall, S, Murie, A, Rowlands, R, Sankey, S (2004), Large Housing Estates in the UK: 
Policies and Practices, RESTATE report 3j, Urban and Regional Research Centre,  
Utrecht University [http://www.restate.geog.uu.nl] 
 
Horita, Y, (1996?), ………………Centre for Urban and Regional Studies. The 
University of Birmingham (unpublished MSocSc thesis)  
 
Optima Community Association (2004), website http://www.optima.org.uk 
(November 2004) 
 
 
 
 
 
 25 
 
 
CHAPTER 2 
 
Emergence of Planned Development in Urban Renewal 
From Piecemeal to Comprehensive Planning 
 
 
 
Chul Koh and Hwan-Yong Park 
 
 
 
1. Introduction 
 
It has been a long time to recognize that urban residential renewal is one 
of important aspects in providing splendid landscape and systematic urban 
planning.  Until the new millennium, the urban and residential renewal is 
just another sector that the private party should be concerned.  Hence, it is 
not excessive to state that the renewal was out of public control and its 
attention.  Current changes in urban and residential renewal prove that we 
are in the transition period that the renewal trend moves from piecemeal 
development to comprehensive planning to balance the renewal site with the 
surroundings and to lessen social costs attributed from unplanned 
redevelopment. 
 
Current urban residential renewal is operated under three kinds of 
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programs for the improvement of residential environment: Housing 
Redevelopment (HR), Residential Environment Improvement Program (REI), 
Multi-family Housing Reconstruction Program (MHR).  The REI has three 
sub-programs, which are multi-family housing construction, site 
improvement, mixed types.  The three kinds of urban residential renewal 
have been their unique characteristics in project site, residents before and 
after the project, and housing type of their outcomes. 
 
HR and REI have been used for deteriorated single-family detached 
houses that are usually scattered around hillsides whereas MHR for 
multi-family housing sites.  Sites of the former are places of low-income 
households and saving housing costs by sharing houses with other 
households.  Hence, the programs are carried out in a form of city planning 
project with governmental assistances and controls, such as sale of 
government owned land and small housing provision schemes.  On the 
other hand, the latter is for middle-income households in multi-family 
housing sites and no government assistance is provided. 
 
As a matter of fact, slum clearance was the only method utilized in the 
deteriorated residential areas until 1973 because of unmatured 
socio-economic circumstances for urban renewal.  At that time, urban 
residential renewal was not a main concern for central and local 
governments because of limited monetary availability for housing 
investment.  All of resources were invested in economic development and 
housing was little concerned from the perspectives of city planning.  
Self-Help Rehabilitation (SHR) was the first program that residents in 
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dilapidated and substandard houses could choose for physical improvement 
of housing and residential environment.  Other forms of urban residential 
redevelopment were introduced and guided by the local government of Seoul.  
They were AID Loan Program (ALR) in 1973, Trust Redevelopment (TR) in 
1978, and the Cooperative Housing Redevelopment Program (CHR) in 1982.  
Until now, CHR has been understood as the most efficient way to improve 
deteriorated houses in terms of financial burden, resident agreement, and 
role allocation of urban redevelopment.  The feasibility of CHR will be 
influenced by recent introduction of new policies such as segmentation of 
land use and decrease in the floor area ratio in residential land, especially for 
the general residential area. 
 
In this paper, we will investigate what circumstances contributed to the 
failure and success of four forms of urban residential redevelopment as well 
as REI and MHR.  We will pay more attention to the historical 
development, financial strategy, payment body, protection of low-income 
households.  In the final chapter, emergence of new renewal policies 
targeting planned development in urban residential renewal is discussed. 
 
2. Historical Development of Urban Residential Redevelopment 
 
1) Conceptual Change in Urban Residential Redevelopment 
 
(1) Self-Help Redevelopment Program (SHR) 
This was the first form of urban residential redevelopment introduced in 
1973-1975.  The title was named after the literal meaning of it, in that 
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residents did physical improvement of housing by themselves.  The 
practical procedure was to install public facilities by the local government of 
Seoul and to carry out housing renovation by residents.  It was a joint 
project between Seoul government and native residents. 
 
Financing scheme of SHR was the same as that used in the 
land-readjustment project, which was to sell public residential land in the 
sites of SHR and the money was allocated to a special account of 
redevelopment housing costs for public facility installation and residential 
land preparation. 
 
To stimulate urban residential redevelopment, partial permission of 
developing illegal houses and provision of development incentives were 
granted, but financial costs and financing problems for that were still existed 
and unsolved.  Therefore, the first intention to apply the land readjustment 
technique to SHR was not successful and changed to a new form of urban 
redevelopment. 
 
(2) AID Loan Redevelopment Program (ALR) 
Since 1976, Seoul government attempted to use foreign funds for housing 
redevelopment projects to solve financial problems.  It was a development 
loan from AID, which was borrowed from Federal Housing Bank in New 
York of America under the guarantee of Korean government and AID.   
 
The main purpose of AR was to expand financial ability of Seoul 
government and to change the development method to rehabilitation from 
 29 
redevelopment through active participation of residents.  Introduction of 
ALR to urban redevelopment was not bad because it supplied financial 
assistance to land purchase and house rehabilitation for residents.  It was 
also used for the investment costs of public facilities. 
 
Thorough Review of ALR was requested in the end of 1978 for several 
reasons.  First of all, housing improvement in small sized parcels was so 
minimal that the effect of ALR was under expectation.  The slow speed of 
accomplishment for housing redevelopment was another factor to review the 
program.  Fundamental reasons for reviewing it came from the unrealistic 
conditions for the loan.  The requirements were that at least 70 percent for 
the project area land must be owned by the public and no more than 10 
percent of squatter housing should be allowed for demolition.  As a result, a 
few sites were improved by the method and application of the method was 
stopped. 
 
(3) Trust Redevelopment Program (TR) 
In 1978, Seoul government planned to implement a new redevelopment 
method, which was construction of public housing in large partitioned 
parcels and three dimensional housing construction.  It was an old 
fashioned method in a way that the private sector was involved in housing 
construction and it was accomplished by resident's self-help.  The 
difference from the past was to constitute the promotion committee for 
multi-family housing construction and to let a third party be involved in the 
project operation. 
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As a matter of fact, it was a return from the progressive improvement in 
land rehabilitation to clearance redevelopment and emphasized the speedy 
redevelopment.  Active clearance of residential redevelopment was faced 
with strong opposition from residents, that was never seen before.  
Residents wanted to postpone the project time schedule or to rehabilitate 
houses in current their parcels like ALR program.  The complaints came 
from the lack of financial burden by residents, little financial assistances, and 
development gains to be expected from their performance. 
 
This was a turning point for housing redevelopment.  Squatter 
settlements and substandard houses with no legal permits were considered 
not as an object for demolition, but as a housing stock for low-income 
households.  It was understood that minimizing excessive redevelopment 
could contribute to the residential security for low-income households and 
alleviation of financial burdens by citizens.  Hence, preliminary guidelines 
were introduced.  They included agreement of more than two thirds of 
residents, just compensation and relocation measures for project operation, 
preference of rehabilitation, and functional regeneration of current houses 
rather than clearance. 
 
(4) Cooperative Housing Redevelopment Program (CHR) 
The concept of CHR was a joint operation of housing redevelopment 
bodies between residents and a construction company to lessen financial 
problems associated with development, which had been one of strong 
obstacles for redevelopment.  The mechanism of the method was that 
residents provided residential land whereas the costs were born by the 
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company in advance and reimbursed after completion of the project.  This 
was little different from the TR method in the involvement of construction 
companies.  However, the essence was to accomplish self-reliant finance by 
the joint operation. 
 
It was an introduction of market mechanism to the housing redevelopment.  
There should be additional housing construction in addition to those 
consumed by the current residents and the surplus was supplied to the 
households outside the project area.  The income from housing sale was the 
main factor for sound project feasibility to be sustained.  What was 
necessary for the operation was the existence of ample density gap for high 
density development to produce additional housing construction. 
 
CHR has been the most useful method for residential redevelopment.  
CHR was used in 115 sites out of 228 sites in 1973-1996 and almost all of 
sites were carried out by CHR since 1984. 
 
2) Historical Changes of Similar Housing Redevelopment Programs 
 
(1) Residential Environment Improvement Program (REI) 
REI was introduced in 1989 when the law of 'Temporary measure for 
residential environment improvement of urban low-income residents' was 
legislated.  The background of this program was come from the fact that 
improvement of the urban residential standard by new housing provision had 
minimal effects on the urban renewal in areas of low-income households.  
Hence, central and local governments attempted to figure out a method that 
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applied variance or special exception of the Building Code to the 
improvement of individual parcels. 
 
A similar type of residential redevelopment was existed under the 
legislation of urban planning law in 1962.  The amendment of the law in 
1965 allowed to designate substandard sites for stimulating redevelopment 
projects and to change architectural regulations in redevelopment sites.  In 
1973, the legislation of 'Temporary measure for housing improvement 
stimulation' law made it possible to enforce that housing improvement 
projects were considered to be legal projects of urban planning.  It was also 
possible to abolish or to change previous land use and was specified to 
transfer the ownership of publicly owned land to local governments for free. 
 
Urban Redevelopment law was enacted in 1976 to establish the 
redevelopment standard for substandard housing in terms of minimum lot 
size, building dilapidation level, et al.  But, the free transfer of publicly 
owned land ownership was deleted in the law of 'Temporary measure for 
housing improvement stimulation.'  In 1983, it was a turning point since 
housing redevelopment introduced CHR method.  CHR was a three 
dimensional development project in consideration of subdivision ownership, 
which was quite different from current site improvement or two dimensional 
land substitution.  As mentioned earlier, it was possible for CHR to produce 
surplus of new constructed housing for outside housing market, which in 
turn created capital gains from the project.  The introduction of CHR 
showed two sides of housing redevelopment.  The increased feasibility was 
one thing, which was always a bottle neck of housing redevelopment.  The 
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other was that housing redevelopment sites densely aggregated by 
low-income households were replaced by residential areas for 
middle-income households.  Another point to be mentioned was that 
constructed housing had been so large-scaled and luxurious that it exceeded 
housing burden of native residents and decreased the resettlement ratio 
dramatically.  Consequently, it questioned for whom the housing 
redevelopment was operated.  The solution was to introduce the REI 
program through enactment of the legislation in 1989.  It was a temporary 
law effective until 1999 and was extended its force to 2004.  As of 2003, it 
has been a part of Urban and Residential Environment Renewal law. 
 
REI is applied to sites of single-family detached houses and the outcomes 
are somewhat different from the previous site characteristics.  The final 
output of REI has three forms: site improvement for individual buildings, 
land substitution for multi-dwelling construction of lower than four stories, 
and multi-family housing construction.  It looks like combined outcomes of 
HR and MHR programs.  The similarity and complexity of these three 
types provides background for policy makers to propose a new law 
enactment, which is the law of 'Urban and Residential Environment 
Renewal' in 2003. 
 
REI program is for the low-income households, and it is closely related 
with the minimum housing standard established in 1998.  The standard 
requires satisfaction of residential facilities, bedroom usage, and floor area 
size standards.  If one of the three standards is not satisfied, the households 
are classified as substandard.  Estimating how many households are 
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qualified for the minimum housing standard is good information for policy 
makers to implement low-income housing policies.  Using the population 
and housing census of 2000, the statistics of the qualified households for the 
whole nation is as follows: 
 
h Households under minimum housing standard : 23.4% 
h Households under residential facility standard : 74.3% 
h Households under bedroom usage standard : 39.1% 
h Households under floor area size standard : 14.8% 
h Households under three types of standard : 5.3% 
 
There must be some considerations for implementing assistance policies 
for substandard households.  It would be possible to commit mistakes when 
they are based on the superficial aspects of substandard factors.  Lack of 
residential facilities could be improved by repairs and rehabilitation whereas 
other substandard housing aspects by residential relocation and urban 
redevelopment projects.  However, it may not be a realistic strategy since it 
is impossible to install kitchens, toilets, bathrooms in a very limited space of 
housing.  One of best alternatives for substandard households is to carry out 
community renewal projects in order to install these facilities for public use.  
Otherwise, clearance redevelopment would be the second alternative.  For 
site choice and implementation of improvement plans, it is also important to 
know spatial distribution of substandard households by jurisdiction and 
redevelopment site.  
 
(2) Multi-family Housing Reconstruction Program (MHR) 
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The CHR program has had positive effects on housing reconstruction for 
deteriorated apartments and stimulated strong demand for apartment 
reconstruction.  Especially it was concentrated on low-rise apartment in low 
density that was high in the project feasibility.  The legal basis was on 
'Housing Construction Stimulation' and 'Possession and Management of 
Multi-family Building' laws.  The amendment of 'Housing Construction 
Stimulation' law in 1987 provided the legal basis for MHR and amendment 
of the enforcement ordinance for the law supplemented relevant charters for 
the evaluation standard of reconstruction and establishment of housing 
cooperatives. 
 
The main target of MHR is multi-family housing that should be older than 
20 years and special allowance is given to single-family detached houses and 
multi-family housing in the ‘Apartment Site.’  The basic principle of MHR 
disallows reconstruction of only single-family detached houses.  
Exceptional MHR could be allowed if a mayor concedes reconstruction is 
necessary for the disaster prevention.  The MHR operation of single-family 
detached houses requires resident agreement of 100%. 
 
MHR sites should be satisfied by the conditions of possibilities for safety 
accidents, excessive repair costs, remarkably low land use level.  Normal 
resident agreement is 80% of subdivision owners and rights to vote, 
respectively.  The ratio goes up to 90% when to approve the project plan 
and to 100% when to start the project construction. 
 
Building safety evaluation for MHR is one of most important stages.  
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However, there have been some questions for the selection of safety 
evaluation organizations and evaluation results.  Hence, the application 
procedure for safety evaluation is changed in a way that coopertives for 
MHR request a mayor for the evaluation and the mayor can designate an 
organization to carry out.  The designation procedure may be omitted when 
it is considered unnecessary to execute. 
 
MHR program is often compared with CHR since their differences 
provide merits and drawbacks in terms of public consideration, operation 
easiness, tenant treatment.  First, MHR is not necessary to designate the site 
since its legal base is on the 'Housing construction Stimulation' law that 
considers it as a citizen-based building construction project.  Second, MHR 
is not necessary to establish a development plan or even the general plan 
from the public side and to review the plan in the city planning level.  Third, 
legal obligations for tenants are not existed for MHR and the project 
operation goes easy and fast.  However, it is criticized that large-scaled 
MHR programs may induce rental housing problems because of tenants' 
housing preservation. 
 
On the other hand, MHR and CHR have strong similarities in stimulating 
housing markets.  New housing provision from their programs satisfies the 
housing demand of current residents when the legal development density is 
allowed to produce housing surplus to be sold in the outside market and to 
provide development gains for the residents.  The programs provide 
different opportunities for three parties: housing enlargement and new 
housing construction for current residents; housing construction projects in 
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inner city areas for housing builders; new housing possession in already 
established urban areas for potential housing buyers.  Because of these, the 
mechanism of the program is apt to depend upon the housing economy and 
macro economy fluctuations since new demand of outside the market as well 
as current residents and housing builders are involved. 
 
3. Historical Development of Problem Solving for Redevelopment 
 
1) Development Views and Redevelopment Bodies 
 
There are several factors involved in the views and bodies of housing 
redevelopment operation.  It is mentioned that main concerns of housing 
redevelopment include size of the floor area ratio, bodies to bear costs of 
public facility installation, housing height controls, and rental housing 
construction to be provided for renters living in the redevelopment sites.  
The bodies involved in the redevelopment have their own views and 
different willingness to pay for the program.  Site residents want high 
feasibility in residential improvement, and residents living in the outskirt of 
the site want clean residential environment.  For local government officials, 
efficient urban redevelopment is essential, and for citizens it is important to 
enjoy prominent urban scenery at an inexpensive cost.  
 
The fundamental differences in ways of thinking ask for legal and 
institutional assistances in these private redevelopment.  The characteristics 
of development should be changed to the public rather than the private 
operation, and redevelopment site size should be large enough to improve 
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socio-economic circumstances and conditions of the infrastructure in the 
area. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5.  Factors of Consideration and Development Bodies for Redevelopment 
 
2) Institutional Changes in Treatment of Tenants 
 
There is no disagreement that residents are entitled to make decisions for 
housing redevelopment in their deteriorated areas.  Literal definition of 
residents includes owners and tenants, regardless of who owns the buildings 
and land.  But, many people have doubts about the fact that tenants have a 
right to choose the change of the current residence.  It produces various 
forms of disputes about how to get the best result for tenants.  Treatment of 
tenants has been varied by the social perception on the welfare aspect of 
low-income households.  In the early stage, it was a form of charity from 
individuals and later it was understood as a protection scheme. 
 
The first measure for tenant treatment was announced in 1986.  It was so 
 
 
Feasible Improvement 
Local Government
Efficient Renewal
Citizens
Low-cost Planning
Site Residents Surrounding Residents
Clean landscape
Floor area ratio 
Public facility installation body
Height Contrals 
Tenant rental housing 
Consideration Factor 
 39 
late in consideration of the redevelopment history.  The form was the 
payment of housing costs for two months to tenants living in the sites longer 
than one month after the project development decision had been announced 
officially from the local government.  The legal base was not on 'Urban 
Redevelopment' law, but on the enforced regulation of 'Special Law of 
Public Land Possession and Loss Compensation.'  The housing costs were 
based on the average household expenditure of urban workers. 
 
In 1987, the right to purchase one room of small-sized apartment was 
allowed in addition to payment of housing costs.  The right of one room 
was not enough to be an owner since possession of three of them was 
necessary for housing purchase.  Hence, the option of room provision was 
not fully effective to the resettlement of tenants since they had poor financial 
abilities and sold their right to housing investors for capital gains.   
 
In 1988, another option for tenants was prepared to minimize social 
problems associated with sale of the right to one room.  The option was a 
right to purchase a small apartment of 7 pyong (23m2) for exclusive use.  
In 1989, the measure was amended to enforce strong payment standards for 
payment of realistic housing costs and exclusion of intentional illegal 
attempts to obtain the housing costs.  The legal duration for the housing 
costs was changed from one to three months and the payment period for 
housing costs was extended from two to three months    
 
In 1989, the governmental policy for tenants was totally changed to 
Permanent Rental Housing provision of 7-12 pyong for exclusive use.  The 
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measure made the Seoul government purchase the Permanent Rental 
Housing units constructed by cooperatives of housing redevelopment.  The 
housing price of sale was under the market value since it was based on the 
standard construction costs for small houses, which was established by the 
government. 
 
The scheme of providing Permanent Rental Housing to tenants had merits 
in that it provides comparatively ample residential space and stable living 
occupancy for low-income households.  On the other hand, it produced 
project financial problems since housing units were purchased at a 
under-market price and there was little assistance for the local governments 
to purchase the units.  Hence, the housing redevelopment fund of Seoul city 
was exhausted.  It was a turning point for the Seoul city to raise necessity 
of rental housing management and to establish the Comprehensive Plan of 
Housing Redevelopment on the citywide scale. 
 
3) Compulsory Ratio of Small-sized Housing Construction 
 
HR and REI for multi-family housing construction are required to 
construct small-sized housing for the residential improvement of deteriorated 
areas and low-income residents.  This requirement has merits of reflecting 
housing demand of the areas whereas the place would be collectively formed 
of small-sized housing units and could be stigmatized as low-income 
residences. 
 
Historical development of the compulsory ratio of small-sized housing 
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construction was started in 1984.  It was set by the Seoul city regulation 
that more than 50% of newly constructed houses should be less than 85m2 
for exclusive use.  In 1986, the ratio was continued and another factor was 
added that more than the number of cooperative members should be housed.  
In 1988, the compulsory ratio of 50% for the housing size less than 85m2 
was increased to 60%.  In 1989, the term of 'more than the number of 
cooperative members for housing sale as well as more than the number of 
tenant households' was included.  In 1991, the compulsory ratio for the size 
less than 85m2 was changed to 80% and another obligation for the ratio was 
added, which was to construct more than 50% for houses less than 60m2.  
Although housing controls has been relaxed after IMF, the ratio is constantly 
applied.  For the reference, the ratio for the size of less than 85m2 in REI 
program is 90%. 
 
4) Task to be solved: Community-Based Housing Renewal 
 
Current housing redevelopment has mainly produced multi-family housing 
for the efficient land use and the problem solving of quantitative housing 
shortage.  Many research analyses on housing redevelopment indicate that 
site-oriented multi-family housing provision has neglected community 
development.  The concept is hardly applied to the development of 
single-family detached houses and the houses are substituted for 
multi-family housing through MHR program.  The planning aspect of urban 
residential redevelopment has concentrated on the physical improvement and 
has ignored creation of comfortable and livable environment.  Because of 
main interests in the housing provision, community facility installation and 
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public facility construction are left to the satisfaction of the minimum level 
and it is not paid attention to socio-economic considerations.  Hence, it is 
very hard to find regional plans in consideration of community.  As a result, 
previously existing unique characteristics are disappeared after urban 
residential redevelopment and construction of newly developed buildings 
has a tendency to show unbalanced with the surroundings. 
 
Table 4. Main Interests and Neglect in Housing Redevelopment 
 Main Interests Neglect Aspect 
Housing Type Multi-family Housing Single-Family Houses 
Planning Aspect Physical Environment Building Construction 
Comfortable Environment 
Qualitative Standards 
Construction Object Housing Provision Site Improvement 
Community Improvement 
Public Facility Installation 
Facility Level Minimum Facilities (Parking, Green space) 
Acceptance of Various 
Tenants’ Demand 
Planning Area Current Site Community Area 
 
4. Emergence of Planned Development in Urban Residential Renewal 
 
1) The Comprehensive Plan of Housing Redevelopment 
 
(1) Site Selection Criteria for the Comprehensive Plan 
The comprehensive plan of housing redevelopment was established in 
1998 to minimize urban residential sprawl in redevelopment sites.  The 
housing redevelopment has been criticized by destructing urban landscape 
and residential structure, reckless public rental housing construction, and 
high density building in mountainous areas.  The Plan uses selective criteria 
for site designation of housing redevelopment.  The sites to be redeveloped 
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should be satisfied with combination of four aspects:  over-crowded 
residences of more than 70 houses per ha in aggregated substandard housing 
areas; sites in which the number of below-minimum parcels are more than 
50%; illegal houses in which government land is more than 50%; sites in 
which the ratio of roads adjoined with more than 4m is less than 50%. 
 
(2) Land Use and Density Plans of the Comprehensive Plan 
The Comprehensive Plan is mainly consisted of three plans in terms of 
land use, density, and public facility installation.  The land use plan 
categorizes housing redevelopment areas into four types.  They are areas 
requiring special management; areas for residential environment 
improvement; areas maintaining the residential function; and areas for 
housing provision stimulation.  The first one is to preserve urban landscape 
and natural environment protection and the second one is to redevelop 
houses collectively in the general residential area.  The third one is for 
keeping current residing population whereas the fourth one is for areas with 
satisfactory traffic flows in subway station territories. 
 
Table 5. Allowable FAR by Land Size of Public Facility 
Planned FAR Size of Public Facility 
 10% 15% 20% 25% 
180% 200% 212% 225% 240% 
200% 222% 235% 250% 267% 
220% 244% 259% 275% 293% 
 
The density plan suggested in the Comprehensive Plan is in accordance 
with the land use plan and has three types.  The first one is the planned 
FAR of 180% for areas to be protected for natural environment and urban 
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landscape.  The second one is the planned FAR of 200% for areas to be 
preserved for residential environment improvement and the third one is the 
planned FAR of 220% for areas where residential functions ought to be 
maintained.  The FAR of three types can be varied by how much land in the 
project site is dedicated for public facility installation.  This induces active 
contribution to the creation of public space and facilities such as small sized 
parks, playgrounds, community facilities. 
 
(3) Public Facility Plan of Comprehensive Plan 
In general, housing redevelopment projects have devoted part of their land 
for the public use and surrounding road expansion.  The dedication is not 
enough for the increased population by the project.  Hence, the most 
important aspect is how to preserve school sites and demanded construction 
of roads in the public facility plan of the Comprehensive Plan.  The site 
criteria to be selected for preservation of elementary school sites are as 
follows: areas out of commuting influence (500m radius), areas with many 
students per school where the ratio is 10% higher than the average; and areas 
to be expected with lack of school facility.  The facility plan asks for 
positioning school sites as well as ensuring financial resources.  In reality, 
it is almost impossible to position schools in proper places. 
 
2) Urban and Residential Environment Renewal Law 
 
The newly suggested law was enacted in December of 2002 and is 
effective as of 2003.  This law unifies renewal programs of commercial, 
business, and residential uses.  It also puts three different redevelopment 
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programs operated under individual laws into one legislation.  This could 
be one of structural problems of the law since three different housing 
programs have been operated by their unique legal base, operation body, and 
operation manners.   
 
The consolidated law is composed of urban and residential environment 
renewal programs.  The former includes central redevelopment, industry 
redevelopment, and market redevelopment, especially for conventional 
markets.  The latter is for REI, HR(including CHR), and MHR.  The law 
has three important changes and provides paradigm shift in the residential 
redevelopment history. 
 
The first change is to devise the Comprehensive Plan of Urban and 
Residential Environment Renewal every 10 years, which is similar to the 
Comprehensive Plan of Housing Redevelopment.  The comprehensive plan 
includes various renewal aspects.  They are urban conditions of sites and 
surrounding areas in terms of population, buildings, and land use; coverage 
of designated areas for residential improvement; land use related plans; 
density plans for FAR and household number in each site; installation plans 
of social welfare and cultural facilities for tenant use; and residential 
stabilization plans for tenants.  The Plan will stimulate the movement of 
urban renewal emphasis from physical oriented planning to more attention to 
the socio-economic aspects of the community. 
 
The second one is to designate renewal sites in accordance with the 
Comprehensive Plan and to prepare the Renewal Plan for those sites.  
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When the Renewal Plan is drawn up, it is taken for granted that the District 
Unit Plan is prepared.  The Renewal Plan contains size and boundary of 
sites, urban planning facility related plans, FAR and housing size ratio, 
expected time schedules.  The Renewal Plan is a subordinate of the 
Comprehensive Plan in the aspect of scale. 
 
The third one is that architectural variations for REI are excluded because 
it has been criticized as a main factor for the decline in residential 
environment.  In addition, free transfer of government owned land and 
financial assistances from government for infrastructure installation are 
strengthened.  One more important thing to be mentioned worthy is that 
MHR projects of more than 300 households should be included in the 
Comprehensive Plan.  It means that larger MHR is treated as an urban 
planning project rather than citizen-suggested projects that used to be in the 
past. 
 
3) New Town-in-Town Project 
 
The concept of new town-in-town is quite an extraordinary approach 
under the current urban renewal system (especially CHR, REI, MHR) since 
it accepts detached single family housing which is deteriorated, but 
over-standard.  If current standards of residential renewal programs are 
applied, the housing could be impossible to be an object for renewal in two 
reasons: one is above the legal standard for the residential renewal and the 
other is strictly forbidden for conversion of single family residence to 
multi-family housing site. 
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As a matter of fact, the growing deteriorated housing is a urgent task for 
housing policy makers since there should be something to be done, but there 
is no active program for that.  The only current program is to assist 
homeowners financially to repair their houses for their own good.  It takes 
much time and requires collective action for the whole site.  In reality, it 
happens individually and spontaneously. Hence, it is always impossible to 
accomplish the fixed goal within a certain time. 
 
To avoid the current institutional constraint, Seoul metro-government 
suggests to use the Urban Development Law with special exception, which 
used to be the Land Readjustment Law.  In addition, Master Architect 
program is introduced in order to increase effectiveness of urban renewal 
and systematic urban design.  With this program, the new town-in-town 
project is able to be a mixture of demolition and rehabilitation.  But it is 
still a task to be solved. 
 
However, the New town-in-town scheme has generic problems.  The 
Urban Development Law was established to increase developable land 
provision instead of housing construction.  In order to carry out its main 
legal purpose, the proportion of land without any building structure is set to 
be more than 50% and its application is usually beyond the built-up area.  
Hence, it was impossible to find any urban and residential renewal sites that 
satisfy the condition of vacant land.  In order to apply this law to renewal 
sites, the government devised an exceptional article.  The vacant land 
restriction is not applied if consultation has been made with the Minister of 
Construction and Transportation.  Another problem is how and where to 
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build houses with the law for land provision.  This made it possible by 
introducing three-dimensional land substitution in an area of land secured by 
the authorities in recompense of development outlay.  The government 
allows the proportion of the deducted land for the development cost 
compensation to be less than 70%.  With these modified legal articles, 
multi-family housing units can be provided by the Urban Development Law 
in residential renewal sites. 
 
Modification of the legal system in residential renewal does not solve 
procedural hindrances.  The problems faced with current new town-in-town 
projects are who to be in charge of the project and how and what to do with 
different land uses and various steps of project progress.  Typical renewal 
sites have all kinds of land uses: commercial shops, business buildings, 
single-family and multi-family houses, even conventional markets.  Some 
sites are in progress of CHR, REI, or MHR. 
 
Hence, the Seoul government introduces and attempts to find a vicarious 
execution body that perform the rest of the New Town project when the 
master architect appointed by the borough of the Seoul government devises 
the land use plan.  In the land use plan, three different districts are proposed 
for the renewal method: self-control improvement district, improvement 
project district, and urban development project district.  The first one is to 
target the area which needs maintenance and gradual improvement.  The 
District Unit Plan and urban planning facility projects can be applied to the 
district.  The second is to target conventional residential renewal sites 
which include CHR, REI, MHR.  The third one is for the rest of the area.  
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The area is usually single-family houses with high density and serious 
physical deterioration.  For this district, there are only applications of land 
and three dimensional substitutions.  Unfortunately, rehabilitation methods 
have not been developed yet for the adaptive use of their houses instead of 
demolition. 
 
5. Conclusion and Policy Implications 
 
Until now, various urban and residential renewal methods have been 
introduced to improve residential living conditions.  Some are successful 
and others have failed to meet the expectation of residents and policy makers.  
CHR is an example that shows residential improvement can be accomplished 
by the mixture of planning and market mechanism in the provision of 
housing and residential environment at an inexpensive cost.  On the other 
hand, the mechanism of CHR is highly criticized that it takes too much 
advantages of the real estate speculation.  It is also blamed that low-income 
households are forced out from their living places by this program. 
Current new legislations attempt to accommodate these past trial errors 
and to suggest new ways such as provision of balanced landscapes with 
surrounding areas, preservation of sound living environments, and 
systematic blending of housing provision and urban planning.  These 
changes come from the retrospect that the urban residential renewal was not 
performed by the thorough preparation of housing provision in the urban 
planning.  Urban renewal was not the only sector that fails to consider 
whole planning system in a simultaneous way.  Because of that, we created 
urban sprawl and urban sprawl gave us unbearable increase of housing prices.  
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It should be understood in the planning stage that the urban renewal moves 
and responses spontaneously to our system by the market mechanism. 
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CHAPTER 3 
 
The Roles of NGOs in Squatter Redevelopment 
: Korean cases10 
 
 
 
By Seo-hwan Lim 
 
 
 
1. Introduction 
 
NGOs have grown both in terms of their numbers and influence on the 
government policies along with the changing power relation in Korea which 
had long been characterized by strong state and weak civil society. The 
relation has changed in favor of the latter since the late 1980s when the 
authoritarian government yielded to the increasing pressure from the people 
for constitutional reform towards more democratic system.  
 
Squatter redevelopment is one of the fields in which NGOs actively 
involve often escalating troubles associated with redevelopment beyond 
                                            
10 Most data in this paper are based on documents obtained from KNHC, the Daejeon City 
government and the Joint Campaign of Displaced People against Squatter Redevelopment In 
Daejeon, and a research report of Lim and Jin (2003) 
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what can be managed at a project level. This paper examines an instance of 
how NGOs act in squatter redevelopment projects in Korea.  
 
2. NGOs 
 
There are a variety of types of NGOs: Community-based NGOs(CBOs), 
City-wide NGOs, National NGOs, and International NGOs11. Some of these 
have state and city branches and assist local NGOs. 
 
In Korea, many national NGOs are involved in urban squatter 
redevelopment. They range from politically neutral traditional charitable or 
religious bodies including churches and human right organizations to 
politically or ideologically motivated militant organizations. The latter group 
includes Korea Displaced People’s Union, Korea Displaced People’s 
Conference (National Council for Crumbly Man), and Korea Federation of 
Student Association. Korean Federation of Trade Unions and radical 
environment organizations often join them. It is this second group that often 
stirs up public sentiment and makes it very difficult for public agencies to 
carry out redevelopment works. 
 
Friedman12 noted that Latin American NGOs tended to be more political 
than their Asian counterparts. But in my view, Korean NGOs in these groups 
are no less political than Latin American NGOs; they often become even 
militant. The militancy is originated from student activists’ involvement in 
squatter redevelopment in the late 1980s. Although the students were split 
                                            
11 Cousins William (1991) 
12 Friedman (1992) 
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into several factions according to their interpretation of the nature of Korean 
social formation, they broadly shared a common premise: that Minjung 
(connoting oppressed people) must be the central force for social change. A 
major objective of the student movement was to help Minjung to organize 
and be conscious of what to struggle for became. Many students, either 
leaving school by their own will or expelled from universities, went to work 
in factories to help organize labor movement. They were also increasingly 
involved in the struggle of urban squatters. It was the time when the struggle 
of the urban poor for shelter in squatter redevelopment intensified and, as it 
became a political issue, political parties, government agencies and human 
right groups competed to hold public meetings and conferences to discuss 
housing problems of low-income households. 
 
The student movement aimed not just at realizing a `liberal democracy', a 
traditional objective of opposition movements, but to change the whole 
social system into a socialist one. So their objective in squatter 
redevelopment was not simply solving housing problems of individual 
residents but reform of the entire social system, which, they believe, 
produces squatters in the first place. Many NGOs involved in squatter 
redevelopment were influenced by student activists in terms of the 
perception of problems and the patterns of actions.  
 
The NGOs have their own political or ideological motivations and tend to 
exaggerate local conflict that occurs in a redevelopment project. They focus 
on the social hardships of the poorest or the most marginalized section of 
residents in a redevelopment project, which are otherwise likely to be 
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disrespected. They often go to excess by generalizing the particular 
circumstances of the poorest section and accordingly by demanding far more 
than what the local communities and public developers or the government 
can afford. They may motivate or press the government to reform the whole 
redevelopment system in favor of the most vulnerable people. From the 
viewpoint of public development agencies, this makes squatter 
redevelopment a very difficult job. In addition, they have some limitation in 
responding to the particular needs of individual resident. They are unable to 
give attentive consideration to the individual needs as their main concern is 
not to help individuals but to improve general social conditions of the lives 
of those in poverty and tend to be ideological. 
 
Community-based Organizations (CBOs) are NGOs that arise out of 
people's own initiatives at community level. They are mostly small self-help 
organizations often supported by charity organizations, churches, volunteer 
workers or student voluntary services. Examples in Korea are Study Room 
for Children, Night Class, Self-help Medical Cooperatives, etc. Many of 
them are dependent on outside help. Some outside NGOs are devoted to 
rising the consciousness of the urban poor or helping them to understand 
their rights in gaining access to needed services. Nowadays, local 
governments run programmes to assist them.  
 
The CBOs tend to be politically neutral and practical as they focus on the 
interests of local residents rather than those of wider society. But they often 
act for the interests of main-stream faction. In squatter redevelopment, for 
example, CBOs acting for the majority in a community tend to regard the 
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most vulnerable minority group as a group to be persuaded to cooperate with 
the majority and to be appeased with some cash. 
 
We will see how national NGOs act in squatter redevelopment through the 
case of Yongdu redevelopment project compared with the case of CBOs in 
Nagok squatter redevelopment in the following. I would like to begin by 
briefing on squatter redevelopment programmes in Korea.  
 
3. Programmes for in squatter redevelopment in Korea 
 
Squatter redevelopment in Korea is carried out in accordance with the 
Urban and Housing Environment Improvement Law, which prescribes on 
two types of programmes: Cooperative Housing Redevelopment Programme 
and Residential Environment Improvement Programme.13  
 
In the Cooperative Housing Redevelopment Programme, the residents first 
organize a cooperative, which becomes the project proprietor. A private 
construction firm is then invited to join the cooperative as both an investor 
and contractor. The firm finances all the expenses for redevelopment 
including loans for temporary housing for the residents who have to vacate 
their houses for one to two years, construction costs and compensation for 
demolished properties. The city government sells state land to the residents 
at subsidized prices, often half of market prices.  
 
                                            
13 Three papers discussed Korean squatter redevelopment programmes in previous workshops. See 
Bae (2001), Lim(2001) and Park(2002). In the papers, each author used different English names for 
the pogrammes. Here I adopt Dr. Park’s naming. 
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After the residents vacate houses, the construction firm demolishes them 
and rebuilds new houses, mostly high-rise apartments. The new housing 
units are usually 1.5 to 2 times as many as that of demolished units. Each 
household is allocated a new unit. Extra units are sold in the market. The 
revenue from the sale is applied to the payment of development expenses 
that the Construction Company paid in advance. Surplus revenue is to be 
distributed among cooperative members. Cooperative members get new 
houses often at no additional expenses as their shares of the revenue are 
normally more than the redevelopment costs. In this process, many 
low-income households sell their houses at market prices and move to other 
areas. Many cooperative members sell off their right to new housing before 
the completion of redevelopment mainly because of their inability to pay for 
new apartments. 
 
This has been the most dynamic programme for squatter redevelopment in 
Korea. Tenant households are hit hardest in this type of housing 
redevelopment. Squatter homeowners and tenants are basically in the same 
category of social classes. They share same social networks within which 
they were interdependent for jobs and daily lives. A sense of community or a 
spirit of mutual help seems well developed among the residents.  
 
However, as an author observed, ‘community is not a monolithic, single 
entity, with completely shared visions and goals’.14 Residents in squatter 
settlements in Korea are divided into various interest groups according to 
property ownership, types of property (commercial/residential), residency, 
                                            
14 Bratt, Rachel G.(1996): pp 179 
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jobs (commuters or workers in the place) or compensation amount. The 
heterogeneity is disclosed in form of open conflict among them when their 
area is redeveloped. Since the late 1980s, when squatter redevelopment 
under the Cooperative Housing Redevelopment Programme became 
profitable business and profit-making and distribution became the main 
concern of the residents, squatter redevelopment has stirred up troubles. 
Major conflict often arises between tenant households and squatter 
homeowners. Squatter homeowners make capital gains by reselling their 
properties once they bought land at subsidized prices while tenants, with no 
legal property rights and thus insufficient compensation for their removal, 
often refuse to vacate their shelters. What normally happens in urban 
squatter redevelopment in Korea is physical collision between tenants and 
demolition squads resulting in casualties.  
 
As the bloody eviction of tenants in the private-initiated scrape and 
rebuilding programme, i.e., Cooperative Housing Redevelopment 
Programme brought on public criticism, the government formulated a 
public-initiated programme, that is, Residential Environment Improvement 
Programme (REIP), and enacted the Provisional Law for Residential 
Environment Improvement in 1989. This law prescribing on the REIP was 
incorporated into the new Urban and Residential Environment Improvement 
Law in 2003. 
 
Korea National Housing Corporation (KNHC) and local governments 
carry out REIP. There are two types of implementation: scrape and 
rebuilding and upgrading. KNHC undertakes scrape and rebuilding projects: 
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it buys off all the properties (normally low-rise but densely built substandard 
housing), makes development plan and redevelops the area on the approval 
of development plan from local government and rebuilds them into high-rise 
apartments. Local governments do the latter improving infrastructures while 
residents are responsible for the improvement of their own houses 
 
Both CHRP and REIP are primarily targeted at improving the physical 
environment of squatter settlement rather than the living conditions of 
people living there. It regulates the redevelopment works with uniformly 
standardized legal procedures and criteria and planning and development 
guidelines. Problems associated with this are not only architectural, i.e., 
producing unimaginative and monotonous landscapes. A more serious one is 
that the programme is not flexible enough to attentively consider the needs 
of people that are very much particularistic and local. 
 
The troubles with REIP arise mostly between KNHC and the residents, 
particularly those with insufficient compensation amount. This brings NGOs 
as external agents into redevelopment projects. Yongdu Residential 
Environment Improvement Project provides a good case in which we can see 
how hard line NGOs act in squatter redevelopment. In the project, troubles 
between KNHC and NGOs speaking for some residents aroused public 
criticism on squatter redevelopment. We will see first Yongdu case and then 
Nangok Squatter redevelopment. The latter shows the role of CBOs in 
squatter redevelopment and contrast to that of national NGOs. 
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1) Yongdu Residential Environment Improvement Project, Daejeon City15. 
 
Yongdu squatter area was created by Korean War refugees in the early 
1950s and since then remained a substandard housing area lacking proper 
city waters, sewerage and other urban utilities. Redevelopment of the area 
was long-cherished desire of the city government. 
 
Between January and March 1994, Joong-gu District Office (the Borough 
Office concerned) conducted a survey on the willingness of the residents to 
agree upon the redevelopment of their area in accordance with Residential 
Environment Improvement Programme. According to the Urban and 
Residential Environment Improvement Law, the city government needs to 
obtain the approval of two thirds or more of property owners and one half or 
more tenant households in order to designate the area for Residential 
Environment Improvement Project. 
 
Daejeon city government officially obtained approval of 69.2% of 
landowners, 75.1% of homeowners, and 73.6% of tenant households by 
March 1994, and it made a draft plan for the redevelopment and exhibited it 
before the public for a month. It then designated the area as Residential 
Environment Improvement Area in 1995. The total project area was 59,986
㎡ with 511 buildings including 290 illegal ones. All 744 households 
including 411 homeowners and 363 tenant households with a total 
population of 2,355 were living in the area. Those who had rights to 
properties in the area were 587. This meant that there were many absentee 
                                            
15 Daejeon is the fifth largest and a fast growing city in Korea with a population of 1.4 million. It is 
located 200km south of Seoul.  
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landlords. 
 
In November 1996, the City government announced Residential 
Environment Improvement Plan for the area and Joong-gu District Office 
concluded an agreement with KNHC on the redevelopment of the area; the 
District Office was to build infrastructures while KNHC was to undertake 
scrape and rebuilding of houses. The Daejeon city government then 
designated KNHC the formal developer in November 1998. 
 
KNHC prepared a redevelopment plan and briefed it to the residents in 
October 1999. The development plan was approved by the Daejeon City 
government in October 2000. It planned to build 1,135 units of apartments; 
761 for-sale and 374 rental. Demolition and reconstruction works were to 
begin at the end of 2001 and to be completed by the end of 2004.  
 
Up to this point of time, all the works seemed to be progressing easy. 
However, when KNHC published its compensation plan and started to 
negotiate with residents and owners in February 2001, the project came to 
trouble. KNHC decided to buy land at appraised values ranging between 
890,000~2,990,000 won/pyong (in average 1,123,000). The prices were the 
arithmetical means of values appraised by a KNHC-appointed appraiser and 
that by residents-appointed one. These were above the 
government-published prices16 by 30%.  
 
Land prices for compensation were to be appraised by adjusting the 
                                            
16 MOCT periodically conducts surveys on land prices and announces them publicly. Then the 
prices, the government-published prices, become references for any appraisal when public bodies 
buy the land. 
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government-published prices by appropriate price indexes for the period 
between the time of notification and the time of land purchase. The purpose 
was to exclude any future development gains from the compensation prices 
of properties that are to be expropriated. For landowners, `reasonable prices' 
meant prices of land actually traded in the market as affected by new devel-
opment plans. It thus meant prices including a part of future development 
gains. 
 
It seemed that until the publication of the compensation plan, most 
residents did not give any serious thought to the redevelopment plan; they 
just expected a good development gains.17 Until the mid-1990s when the 
area was designated for redevelopment, property markets in Korea were 
rather prosperous and one could normally expect a good development gains 
in urban development and redevelopment. However following the economic 
crisis of the end of 1997 all the property markets were nearly collapsed and 
the economy and housing markets were not recovered from the crisis by the 
time when KNHC began to redevelop the area. And land and houses could 
not be appraised at high prices as the residents expected before. 
 
Among the 744, 445 were given 20 million or less for each for 
compensation. Out of 587 property owners, 385 were given 20 million or 
less for each for compensation. At that time, Chonsei18 prices of apartments 
in the vicinity were around 2.3 million for 15 pyong, 2.7 for 17 and 4.5 for 
                                            
17 When KNHC and the Joong-gu district Office argues that they got approval of more than 2/3 
residents for redevelopment, the Joint Campaign against the redevelopment refuted that the 
approval was obtained by cheating the residents and thus was ineffective. 
18 The most popular private rental system in Korea, in which tenant pays a lump sum of deposit 
money at the time of occupancy instead of paying monthly rent. Interest of the deposit becomes 
monthly rent. 
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22. In other words, compensation it was virtually impossible for some of the 
residents to find alternative housing other than the present shacks. KNHC 
thus amended the eligibility criteria for the Permanent Rental Apartments19 
to accommodate those who could not afford alternative housing with their 
compensation money.   
 
Frustrated at the compensation plan, more than 200 property owners and 
residents refused to accept KNHC’s compensation plan. Even the poorest 
groups refused Permanent Rental Apartments; they argued that they lived in 
their own houses though they are mostly squatter shacks and did not want 
rental houses. In March 2001, they formed an urgent conference of residents 
for environmental improvement project, and began a campaign for what they 
called ‘fair compensation’. They demanded land prices at 4 to 6 million 
won/pyong plus free apartments for home-owning residents and preferential 
rights to shop keepers to buy new shops and new apartments for landowners 
at same unit prices as unit compensation prices for land.  
 
As KNHC did not (and legally could not) accept this request, 198 
landowners (out of 467) and 218 building owners (out of 516) raised formal 
objection to the plan and asked for the judgment of the Land Expropriation 
Arbitration Board. By May, 2001, 318 out of 587 who were eligible for 
compensation accepted KNHC’s offer but the remaining 269 were 
demanding raises in compensation prices. In the meantime, they staged street 
                                            
19 Permanent Rental Housing was designed for people in the lowest income bracket, namely 
Residential Protection Target Groups and Self-support Protection Target Groups as defined in 
accordance with the Livelihood Assistance Law. They are households who are unable to make a 
living, due either to wage earners too young or too old. Rental prices were usually 25 percent of 
market prices. 
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demonstrations at Chungchung Branch Office of KNHC and the head office 
of KNHC in Seoul and the District Office protesting the ‘unfair 
compensation plan’. These rallies and demonstrations continued until 
September 2001. 
 
In November 2001, the Central Land Expropriation Arbitration Committee 
rejected all the objections. However, until December 2001, out of 587 who 
had rights to properties in the area, some 200 were still refusing to accept 
KNHC’s compensation prices. There were 482 houses to be cleared and 
among them 349 were already demolished and 93 homeowners and 40 
tenants were still living in 133 houses. 
 
Among those who were offered only small amount of compensation 
money, 47 households lived in shacks built on land owned by a private Girls 
High-school. They lived on the land for more than 20 years and thus 
obtained the right of residence but could not claim compensation for land but 
only their shacks which were appraised at very low prices. These people 
were those who offered the most stubborn resistance to the redevelopment 
plan to the last. 
 
KNHC deposited their compensation amount with the Land Expropriation 
Arbitration Board and gave them warnings for demolition several times as 
they refused to receive their compensation money. Then KNHC started to 
clear existing shacks and buildings to break ground for reconstruction in 
January 2002, a few months behind schedule. On March 21 2002, all 50 
houses were demolished including 19 houses whose residents were still 
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refusing to leave. KNHC had a demolition firm to clear the houses evicting 
the residents by force. 
Enraged with the eviction by force, they presented petitions to the city 
government and the Ministry of Construction and Transportation (MOCT). 
At the same time, they organized a campaign against the redevelopment plan 
itself and turned the campaign into a public commotion. Daejeon branch of 
National Council of Churches came in and investigated the details of the 
eviction. And the incident was reported in local new papers in somewhat 
sensational manner and broadcast on local television in a series of special 
edition. This brought about public criticism on inhumane eviction of 
squatters and attracted attention of NGOs.  
 
Korea Displaced Peoples Union, the most militant organization of 
displaced people, immediately came in to support those under the threat of 
forced eviction and this escalated the campaign beyond what could be 
managed at the project level. Korea Federation of Student Association, the 
largest activist student organization also joined the campaign. These two 
groups were the extremist actors in urban squatter redevelopment helping 
and sometimes instigating the residents to carry out their struggle for shelter 
in a well organized and often violent ways. Bloody fighting between the 
coalition of residents and students on the one side and the demolition squad 
on the other reappeared in Yongdu redevelopment projects. 
 
In May 2002, KNHC proposed to redesign some of the 411 apartments 
with floor areas between 21 to 24 pyongs into smaller and thus cheaper units 
and provide them to those residents who had difficulties in finding 
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alternative houses after leaving the area. But this could not appeal to the 
residents.  
In June 2002, civil organizations, political parties, activist student 
organizations came in to form a joint campaign against forced eviction with 
the residents. They included Daejeon branch of the National Council of 
Churches in Korea, Socialist Party, and Democratic Labour Party. They then 
declared following resolution: to organize Daejeon Joint Campaign for 
Displaced People taking notice of all the squatter redevelopment projects in 
Daejeon; to hold public forum for the reform of the whole institutional 
framework for squatter redevelopment itself; to initiate the amendment of 
the law concerning REIP and promulgation of City Ordinances for fair 
redevelopment, i.e., ordinances that are more responsive to the needs of the 
poorest; and to raise funds to assist displaced people and so on.  
 
They argued that they were not fighting simply for the individual interests 
of the residents; what matters to them, they claimed, is menacing by what 
they called ‘the anachronistic’ programme of squatter redevelopment of the 
urban poor’s right to live and the right to property. They also claimed that 
the same problem could be repeated in coming redevelopment projects and 
decided to develop the Joint Campaign into a permanent organization to 
fight for the complete reform of the squatter redevelopment system. 
 
In the meantime, KNHC continued demolition works. On 18 July, the 
second forced eviction was carried out. There were 28 households who did 
not leave and 9 tents where some people evicted in March retuned and lived. 
All 19 houses and all the tents were cleared including 17 houses where 
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people were still living refusing to leave. The people joined by activist 
students resisted against demolition of their houses. There was thus a serious 
physical collision between the demolition squads on the one side and 
students and residents on the other resulting in several casualties.  
 
A few demolition workers were seriously wounded and several residents 
were arrested for the use of violence. Both sides brought suits of violence 
against each other. Some residents set up tents and went on all-night sitting 
demonstrations in front of KNHC branch office, District Office and staged 
rallies denouncing the forced eviction.  
 
Some 30 residents, students and people from Korea Confederation of 
Trade Unions staged violent demonstrations against the redevelopment 
project. Tens of residents and some hundred students gathered at Daejeon 
Railway Station Square, government offices in Gwacheon20 and so on 
demanding the punishment of those responsible for the forced eviction, the 
right of residence in the place, the release of residents in custody in charge of 
violence. They since then sit at the negotiation table with KNHC on behalf 
of the residents.  
 
As of August 2002, some 20 organizations constituted the Joint Campaign, 
which began to speak for the residents. They included Daejeon Construction 
Workers Union, Daejeon-chungnam Green Korea, National Movement for 
Unemployment Policies in Daejeon, MINKAHYUP Human Rights Group, 
Street Vendors Association, Socialist Party, Democratic Labor Party, NCC, 
                                            
20 A New Town built in an outskirt of Seoul in the early 1980s to accommodate government office 
buildings relocated from the downtown Seoul 
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Korean Confederation of Trade Unions, a local Church, Regional Joint 
Conference of Students in Daejeon, etc. 
After the Joint Campaign began to support them, the residents added to 
their demand. They requested KNHC to sell them 20 to 25 pyong apartments 
at the same unit price as unit compensation prices for their land. In other 
words, KNHC was asked to sell new apartments at a unit price of 1.23 
million won per pyong in average (between 890,000-2,990,000) while 
KNHC needed 3.4 million per pyong in order to cover development 
expenses. They went further by claiming that, when residents wanted to buy 
larger apartments than they could buy with their compensation money, they 
would pay for extra floor area at cost prices, which was in their estimation 
2.7 million won/pyong while KNHC’s estimation was 3.6. In addition, the 
residents wanted the prices for new apartments to be paid in ten years with a 
grace period of 20 to 30 years free of interest. They also requested temporary 
housing within the area during the redevelopment works refusing to move to 
public rental apartments KNHC provided in the vicinity of the project area 
for temporary relocation.  
 
Not only that. The Joint Campaign demanded extra compensation money 
of 20 to 30 million won for each household to make up for the losses of their 
working days during the time of their fighting against demolition works, 
compensation for the damages inflicted on their furniture during the 
demolition works, punishment of those responsible for the forced eviction 
and police officers, immediate suspension of forced eviction and adoption of 
measures to prevent forced eviction from happening again, release of 
representatives of the residents and NGOs who were placed under arrest in 
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the charge of assaulting KNHC staffs, establishment of fact-finding mission 
comprising both parties to reveal the truth of the whole redevelopment 
process.  
 
By this time, 693 households out of the 774 accepted the compensation 
prices. The others persisted in their demand. KNHC made some concession 
to the demand. It reduced sales prices of new apartments from the original 
3.6 million won to 3.4 million won per pyong and provided public rental 
apartments including National Rental Housing 21  for relocation and 
temporary housing in the vicinity of the redevelopment area. The corporation 
decided to build 75 units of apartments in smaller sizes (15 pyong) than 
originally planned (20 to 24 pyong) to make easier for poor residents to 
resettle in the area though smaller units are more expensive in terms of unit 
cost of construction but cheaper in selling prices. 
 
It relaxed one of the eligibility criteria for compensation. Only those 
tenants who moved into the area before the date of the designation of the 
area, April 1995, for REIP were entitled to any compensation. KNHC 
changed the date to that of the public notice of REIP, November 1995. The 
corporation also planned to provide those who lacked money and thus unable 
to move out with loans up to 280 million won at annual interests of 3 to 4%. 
 
However, in September 2002, a talk between KNHC and the residents and 
                                            
21 A new type of public rental housing designed by the present government for low-income 
households. Those who do not own houses and whose monthly income is no higher than 50 or 70 
percent of the average urban wage earners’ income are eligible for National Rental Housing. 
Priority is given to those who subscribe with Housing Subscription Saving System. The 
government is planning to build one million units between 2003 and 2012. 
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Joint Campaign was broken. KNHC could not such demands as that to sell 
new apartments at the same unit prices as unit compensation money for land 
and that to compensate lost working days. What made the negotiation even 
more difficult was that the Joint Campaign insisted upon a package 
settlement while KNHC proposed to solve problems one by one.  
 
By December 2002, there were still 43 households who did not leave the 
area refusing to accept KNHC’s plan. 40 homeowners and 3 tenants. They 
with the support of the Joint Campaign continued street demonstrations. 
Petitions and appeals to authorities as well as negotiations continued for 
almost one year. This was dragging on the whole development work. 
 
As the whole redevelopment work dragged on, it cost both KNHC and the 
city government as well as residents who were involved in demonstrations. 
The delay would frustrate also those who accepted compensation plan and 
left the area earlier and were waiting to move into the redeveloped new 
apartments. Another problem was that the site area covered with broken 
pieces of building materials and wastes was inflicting inconveniences on 
people in neighboring areas. Demonstrators were making tremendous noise 
using speech amplifiers. Between May 2001 and November 2001 (186 days), 
they staged such noisy demonstrations and continued during the whole year 
of 2002 at the City Hall plaza, West Daejeon plaza, MOCT office and 
KNHC offices, and even in front of the Presidential Office, Blue House. 
Noises of high pitched tone through the speakers of demonstrators caused 
public enmity among office workers and residents in buildings around those 
offices. 
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Daejeon city government, so far watching the development of the situation 
rather calmly, intervened to mediate between KNHC and the residents. In 
March 2003, officials from city government and KNHC, representatives of 
residents, some people from the Joint Campaign met three times for working 
level negotiation, but without success. The Joint Campaign demanded 
KNHC to state in detail what constitutes the sale price of new apartments. 
This was not accepted by KNHC. The city government persuaded KNHC to 
lower the prices and KNHC reduced the price from the planned 3.65 million 
to 3.4 million won per pyong. Representatives of residents and the Joint 
Campaign demanded special favor for those participated in demonstrations 
sacrificing their work for living. This was also not accepted.  
 
The Joint Campaign, in a meeting with City government and KNHC, still 
claimed for the reform of REIP itself, opening up of the details of 
construction costs, KNHC’s apology for all the irrationalities its squatter 
redevelopment and troubles it made to the residents, observance of the 
principle of compensation in kind. 
 
Not only that, the residents entrusted the negotiation to the Joint Campaign. 
This made the negotiation virtually impossible as the Campaign declared 
that the residents gave up all their previous demand and wanted a 
comprehensive reformulation of REIP itself. The chairman of Joint 
Campaign at a press interview on July 9, 2003 told that the residents gave up 
all the individual material gains but decided to fight for a complete reform of 
squatter redevelopment system and thereby to win their self-respect and to 
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let the public know the true meaning of their struggle. In other words, he, a 
church minister, meant that the residents were sacrificing their individual 
gains to achieve a complete reform of the squatter redevelopment system.  
 
The Campaign argued that it was not a matter of the amount of 
compensation but a matter of the right of surviving and squatter 
redevelopment system must secure the right to live at the place. KNHC and 
the District officials suspected that the NGOs involved attempted to increase 
their power at the cost of residents. For them, the residents’ demand for 
compensation was excessive and the Joint Campaigns’ demand for complete 
reform of redevelopment system was unrealistic as the reform of 
redevelopment system needed an in-depth study and could not be done 
instantly and thus. 
 
July 18 2003, Daejeon city government organized a special team to solve 
Yongdu Problem and also formed a working level conference of concerned 
parties, namely the city government, District Office, the Joint Campaign, the 
representative of residents and KNHC. They had meetings several times but 
without any productive agreement. 
 
Residents were almost exhausted due to long outdoor- sleeping 
demonstrations. The residents had difficulties in going for everyday work. 
As a result, residents one by one left the campaign accepting KNHC’s 
proposal for compensation. By July 2003, 727 households out of the total 
774 (94%) accepted the compensation plan. 29 still refused any proposals for 
compensation and 19 instituted law suits which was pending in court. As the 
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residents who were still participating in the campaign decreased in numbers, 
their action became more violent and relied more on the Joint Campaign. 
President candidates of Democratic Labour Party and Socialist Party paid 
visits to the place to encourage people to take hard-line attitude against the 
KNHC plan. 
 
As the protest against the redevelopment dragged on though the number of 
residents participating in demonstration was decreasing, the city government 
raised a lump sum of 160 million won. Among the amount, 100 million was 
a donation from a construction company. With the money, the Jung-gu 
District Office arranged 10 public rental apartments with deposit money 
exempted for those who refused the compensation to the last. By October 
2003, as the residents one by one left the fighting squad, the campaign 
virtually came to an end.  
 
What NGOs as external agents did in Yongdu project was more than half 
year’s delay of the redevelopment work and a little more cash and public 
rental apartments at free deposit money for those who were involved in the 
campaign against the redevelopment to the last. 
 
An official from the city government who were in charge of the project 
and interviewed for a research represented a critical view (of the local 
authorities and the development agency) on the role NGOs in squatter 
redevelopment.  
 
‘The reason that the protest of residents (although as small as 29 at the 
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final stage) against the redevelopment is that there were too many 
households who were given very small amount of money. They were paid 
only a petty sum for their properties. Their protest is thus understandable. It 
was a mistake that KNHC carried out eviction without temporary housing. 
But the problem could be solved through dialogue and negotiation. A 
problem was NGOs. Their intervention made the problem unmanageable’. 
And he regretted that Daejeon city government brought up Korea Displaced 
Peoples Union. In his view, Korea Displaced Peoples Union could promote 
their influence through the campaign in Yongdu project.  
 
2) CBOs in Nankok Cooperative Housing Redevelopment Project 
 
This contrasts to the case of Nangok redevelopment project 22  that 
underwent rather quietly despite the fact that Nangok had a much larger area 
and population. 
 
Nangok was a relocation settlement created for displaced people from the 
inner-city squatter redevelopment projects in Seoul in 1967. Its total area 
was 171,770 ㎡, almost three times that of Yongdu. 159,061㎡ was 
state-owned land and 12,709㎡ was owned by the Seoul city government. 
There were 2,502 houses, of which legally built houses were only 20. The 
remaining 2,482 were illegal ones.  
 
There were all 2,175 tenant households. Among them, 1,351 were entitled 
to compensation for removal while the remaining 824 households were not 
                                            
22 As I wrote about Nangok squatter redevelopment in some detail in previous workshop, here I am 
describing only briefly. See Lim(2001)  
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as they were not able to prove that he or she has been resided in the area 
since at least three months before the designation of the area for 
redevelopment. It was some of these 824 who refused to leave to the last 
demanding for ‘fair’ compensation.  
 
The area was first designated for housing redevelopment in May 1995 but 
remained untouched as private developers hesitated to come in as the whole 
property market collapsed after the economic crisis in 1997. On the request 
of Seoul city government, Gwanack Distirict Office and property owners 
Korea National Housing Corporation (KNHC) entered into an agreement 
with the residents to redevelop the area. KNHC was formally designated as 
the development agency for the area by the Gwanack Distirict Office in June 
2000. 
 
KNHC prepared a plan to clear the area and to build 3,322 apartment units. 
The plan was on exhibition to the public from 20 July to 24 August 2001 and 
Gwanack District Office, the competent authority for the area, approved 
Nangok housing redevelopment plan in September 2001. Demolition works 
began in July 2002. 
 
Those who have property rights in the area were 2,519. 400 were living in 
the area and 2,119 were absentee landlords. KNHC lent up to 20 million won 
at no interest to resident property-owners for removal expenses and up to 10 
million won to absentee owners who had to refund Chonsei deposits to turn 
their tenants out of their houses. Those who want to move in public rental 
apartments are not given loans for removal expenses. Qualified tenants were 
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given an option: they can choose moving into new public rental apartments 
provided by KNHC in another redevelopment project nearby or 
compensation payment in cash.  
 
As always, compensation for removal became a problem in Nangok too. 
Moreover, Nangok was the largest squatter settlement remained to be 
redeveloped and many people expected KNHC would face a very tough 
resistance from the residents. However, Nangok redevelopment work 
underwent rather quietly. This is contrasted to the case of Yongdu .  
 
As is the case in Yongdu, what normally happens in squatter 
redevelopment is that NGOs, particularly organizations of the urban poor 
such as Korea Tenant Association, Korea Displaced People’s Union come in 
and encourage the residents to organize systematic resistance to the 
redevelopment plan demanding full compensation or alternative housing. In 
that case, the redevelopment work most likely drags on. Both the 
development agency and residents suffer a loss. In Nangok too, Korea 
Displaced People’s Union sounded out the residents on their help to organize 
a systematic fighting against the redevelopment. 
 
In Nangok, there were indigenous organizations, Dream-tree Childerens 
Study Group, Nakgol Study Group, Nangok Residents Liberary, Nangok 
Residents Association, Nambu Night School. These organizations formed 
Nangok Community Association with Nakgol Church, in May 1988 and was 
renamed Nankok Regional Societies Conference. This Conference worked to 
help residents in many ways: to assist households with unemployed heads by 
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running free schools for the children and younger generation, helping people 
find employment, providing meals for children without lunch, arranging jobs 
for housewives with unemployed household heads (e.g. in preparing lunches 
for children), organizing study tour for children, supply of manpower for 
relief works for unemployed The conference played a major role in the 
redevelopment of Nankok. It invited KNHC to redevelop the area, organized 
meetings to discuss the redevelopment of the area, held public hearings on 
redevelopment plan and meetings with KNHC staffs.  
 
KNHC convinced the conference and also Kwanack Branch of the 
Association of the Handicapped that the involvement of outside NGOs 
would make the matter more complicated and thus make the work drag on 
imposing more cost on both KNHC and the residents. And Kwanack Branch 
of Association of the Handicapped persuaded Korea Displaced People Union 
and other outside NGOs not to intervene in Nangok redevelopment. It also 
guarded the area from people moving into the area for compensation money.  
 
Another problem that public bodies face in squatter redevelopment is that 
there is a tendency for residents not to trust public agencies. As they are 
ignorant of the technical procedures, financial process, calculation of cost 
and profit of the project, technical matters such as making site plans, 
architectural plans and development plans, they are worried that they may 
not be compensated rightly. KNHC could overcome this problem by hiring a 
private consulting firm recommended by the residents. With the support of 
the community organizations and the role of the third party consulting firm, 
KNHC could avoid any serious violence in Nangok. 
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However, in Nangok too, there were some 60 households who refused to 
leave the area because they were mostly moved into the area after its 
designation for redevelopment and thus were not qualified for any 
compensation. And again, Korea Displaced Peoples Union attempted to join 
them at the final stage of the negotiation. It was worried that eviction of the 
remaining residents by force became unavoidable as KNHC could not wait 
indefinitely.  
 
Nangok Regional Societies Conference, in cooperation with the District 
Office, arranged them to receive benefits from welfare programmes of the 
District Office, helped elderly people living alone to find relatives who 
would take care of them. Demolition contractors also paid some money. By 
Decemmber 2002, there were only several households who refused to leave 
their place but were evicted rather quietly. These people were not supported 
by any external agents. This contrast to the Yongdu case in which the most 
marginalized groups could exert certain power because of the support of 
external agents, NGOs. In Nangok, they were regarded by the Community 
Conference as annoying people who should be appeased with some cash to 
leave the area without making any trouble. 
 
4. Concluding remarks 
 
The present programs for squatter redevelopment primarily concern the 
improvement of physical environment and very little the social and 
economic conditions of the lives of residents. As a result, clearance and 
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rebuilding approach has become dominant. And as far as the clearance and 
rebuilding approach is maintained, compensation for the existing shacks and 
land becomes most critical. Residents are here regarded as objects of 
material compensation. It inevitably produces those who become worse off 
by being unable to get alternative shelters better than their present shacks. 
They thus have no choice but to resist against the redevelopment. But they 
are in a very weak position and without help from outside their resistance 
cannot be effective. 
 
National NGOs armed with morality and credibility help this most 
vulnerable section of residents in squatter redevelopment. They sided with 
those with the smallest compensation in Yongdu project. National NGOs 
thus protect the interests of the poorest or the most marginalized section of 
residents that are otherwise likely to be disrespected in squatter 
redevelopment. In this respect, their activities have moral justification.  
 
Another contribution of NGOs to squatter redevelopment is that they 
continually point out problems of the redevelopment system, arouse public 
opinion on that and put pressure on the government to rethink and reform the 
entire squatter redevelopment system. 
 
On the other hand, as their ultimate objective is to reform the whole 
system and is not a particular redevelopment project, they tend to be ideal 
and political and have limitations in responding to the specific needs of local 
people. They demand the government or public bodies to realize such 
hoped-for value as equity and equality or human dignity often disregarding 
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the ability of our society to afford them. It seems in this sense that they are 
criticized (mostly by government officials and KNHC people) for trying to 
increase their ideological and political influence over the society by 
sacrificing squatter residents who are in difficulties.  
 
And their support of people in squatter redevelopment is temporary. As 
they are not community specific or community based organizations, they 
join the residents only during the period of development, particularly the 
period of struggle. After all the disputes over compensation end and 
construction works for redevelopment began, they leave the area. It also 
should be noted that as the external agents took initiative in negotiation with 
the authorities, residents acted as dependents in Yongdu project. 
 
In this respect, CBOs, as seen in Nangok case, are more helpful for the 
residents to cope more practically with and have initiative in squatter 
redevelopment. They act for the interests of their community rather than for 
the whole society. They are thus more realistic and can be immediate help to 
the residents. 
 
In order to minimize or avoid conflicts, redevelopment programs need to 
be redesigned to address the problem of social and economic conditions of 
the residents’ lives as well as that of physical environment. The major 
objectives of squatter area redevelopment should include the improvement of 
employment opportunities by providing job training, assisting them to run 
common workshops and so on. Residents including tenants themselves then 
should be main actors in improving their living conditions in their places 
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rather than merely targets of compensation for removal or dependents on 
external agents such as national NGOs. In this regard too, CBOs seem more 
efficient in dealing with the particular and diverse needs of people. They 
know well about the housing needs of its community members.  
 
CBOs however tend to focus on the interests of residents but those of the 
main-stream faction. In other words, the minority, usually the most 
vulnerable section of residents, is likely to be disrespected; they are treated 
as a minor group to be persuaded to cooperate with the majority and to be 
appeased with some cash as seen in Nangok case. 
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ESTATE REGENERATION IN TOWER HAMLETS, 
EAST LONDON 
 
 
 
Stephen Hall,  
Centre for Urban and Regional Studies 
The University of Birmingham UK 
 
 
 
1. Introduction 
 
This paper presents and contextualises empirical case studies of two 
differing approaches to estate regeneration in the London Borough of Tower 
Hamlets; the Tower Hamlets Housing Action Trust (HAT), one of six HATs 
in England, and Poplar HARCA, a Local Housing Company established with 
Estate Renewal Challenge Fund (ERCF) resources. The paper comprises six 
further sections: a brief history of estate regeneration in England; a 
description of the HAT and ERCF programmes; an introduction to Tower 
Hamlets; the Tower Hamlets HAT case study; the Poplar HARCA case 
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study; and, conclusions linking the case studies to on-going debates on estate 
regeneration in England.  
 
2. Estate regeneration policy in England 
 
The aims and activities of the regeneration of social housing estates in 
England have undergone numerous changes in the past two decades.  
 
Initially, the problems of estates were not interpreted in a structural social 
and economic context. Improved local housing management was the key 
priority, as in the Priority Estates Project. 
 
In the 1980s, regeneration was dominated by a physically deterministic 
approach. Programmes such as Estate Action (Pinto, 1991, 1993) and Design 
Improved Control Experiment (Coleman, 1985) prioritised physical ‘bricks 
and mortar’ style housing regeneration. 
 
In the 1990s, a more ‘holistic’ approach, that sought to reconcile social 
and economic questions, was advocated by government (Oatley, 1998; Hall 
and Mawson, 1999). Estate regeneration became incorporated into generic, 
area-based policies such as City Challenge (Atkinson and Moon, 1994; 
Oatley, 1995) and the Single Regeneration Budget or SRB (Hall, 2000; 
Rhodes et al, 2003), which addressed economic development, employment, 
ethnic minority needs, crime, environmental improvements, and community 
infrastructure as well as housing problems. Large-scale estate-based physical 
regeneration was the exception rather than the norm during this period. One 
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such exception was the Housing Action Trust programme (see below).  
 
From the mid 1990s, a parallel estate-based regeneration focus was 
introduced, oriented around the transfer of local authority housing stock to 
housing associations, through programmes such as Large Scale Voluntary 
Transfer and the Estate Renewal Challenge Fund or ERCF (see below). This 
permitted significant levels of private finance to be secured for estate 
regeneration, in addition to measures to tackle broader economic and social 
issues such as unemployment and crime (HACAS Chapman Hendy, 2002).  
 
In the mid 1990s, much media and government debate focused on the 
problems of the ‘worst estates’ (e.g. joy-riding, concentration of single 
parents). The Labour government’s National Strategy for Neighbourhood 
Renewal was launched in response to these pressures and seeks to address 
problems related to employment, housing, education, health and crime, 
through improved planning and provision of public services (Tiesdell and 
Allmendinger, 2001; Hall, 2003). 
 
The organisation of policy and range of participants has also changed over 
time.  
 
Estate regeneration policies in Britain are, typically, formulated and 
funded by central government, but implemented locally. A defining 
characteristic of regeneration during the past two decades has been the 
increasing array of participants in the partnership-based process. 
The participant of local residents in estate management has been a priority 
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of regeneration programmes since the 1980s. More recently, local residents 
have become involved to a greater degree in the formal decision making 
process of regeneration programmes through participation in representative 
forums and other activities such as ‘Planning for Real’. Attempts to involve 
local people in estate regeneration have met with uneven success (Hastings 
et al, 1996; Taylor, 2003). 
 
During the past decade, the private sector has become an important player 
in estate regeneration, with the banking sector providing significant levels of 
finance for housing renewal programmes, following the transfer of local 
authority housing stock. 
 
3. The Housing Action Trusts and Estate Renewal Challenge Fund 
 
The Housing Action Trust (HAT) model was introduced in the Housing 
Act 1988 – which also included measures such as Tenant Choice and the 
extension of Compulsory Competitive Tendering to housing management – 
and, thus, form part of the Thatcher government’s project to 
‘de-municipalise’ social rented housing (Evans and Long, 2000; Tiesdell, 
2001). However, the HATs became operational in the early years of the 
Major administration and evolved into a more inclusive, holistic 
regeneration scheme (Evans and Long, 2000; Tiesdell, 2001).  
 
HATs are ‘Non Departmental Public Bodies’ (NDPBs) designed to 
regenerate disadvantaged housing estates deemed beyond the modest 
resources and competencies of local authorities. The housing stock on these 
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estates is transferred to the HAT, which assumes responsibility for its 
regeneration and management.   
 
HATs were, initially, to be imposed on estates selected by central 
government. However, the legislation was amended to enable tenant ballots 
to sanction the initial transfer and determine the choice of post-HAT 
landlord (Tiesdell, 2001). Early (1988) proposals to establish HATs in 
London, Sandwell, Sunderland and Leeds were defeated in tenants’ ballots, 
because of suspicion that HATs represented a vehicle for the ‘privatisation’ 
of council stock (ibid.). 
 
HATs were, duly, designated in 1992/2 in Birmingham, Hull, Liverpool, 
and London (Stonebridge, Tower Hamlets, Waltham Forest).  They are all 
located in inner city areas except Hull, which has a peripheral location. Hull 
is unique in terms of the nature of its stock (inter-war ‘cottage’ style 
housing). The other HATs had a far more diverse housing stock (Evans and 
Long, 2000), the size of which varied from 1,600 dwellings in Stonebridge 
and Tower Hamlets to 5,500 in Liverpool. The HATs received government 
grants of between £115 million in Hull and £260 million in Liverpool 
(Tiesdell, 2001), far larger than is typical for regeneration schemes in 
England.  
 
HATs are, ostensibly, agencies designed to develop estates in a ‘holistic’ 
fashion. However, the bulk of their efforts have been channelled into 
physical housing regeneration, involving very substantial demolition and 
rebuilding programmes, except Hull where the emphasis was on housing 
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refurbishment (Evans and Long, 2000; Tiesdell, 2001). All HATs were 
characterised by the above average standards of new-build housing and 
intensive consultation of existing tenants (Evans and Long, 2000; Tiesdell, 
2001).  
 
HATs were also given powers to facilitate the provision of local amenities 
and provide support to local business (Evans and Long, 2000). They have 
also sought to boost local employment through support for arm’s length 
regeneration projects and introduced initiatives to reduce crime (ibid.). 
 
HATs have proved a very expensive regeneration vehicle (Evans and 
Long, 2000) with an investment per dwelling of £65,000 compared to 
£11,000 for the ERCF – see below – (Tiesdell, 2001).  
 
The Conservative government was an active supporter of the transfer of 
local authority housing stock to housing associations as a vehicle for the 
de-municipalisation of social housing and for raising private investment 
finance. Housing associations are not constrained by the same restrictive 
public sector borrowing regulations as local authorities. The 1985 and 1988 
Housing Acts permitted local authorities to dispose of their stock and to use 
the capital receipt to invest in housing improvement (NAO, 2003). Stock 
transfers were encouraged through HATs, Large Scale Voluntary Transfer 
(LSVT) since 1988, and the ERCF since 1995. 
 
Transfer is an important element of the Labour government’s objective of 
ensuring that all social housing is of a suitable standard by 2010 (NAO, 
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2003). The government have disbanded ERCF and transferred finance to the 
Housing Investment Programme (HIP), which will support the transfer of up 
to 200,000 dwellings annually (Murie and Nevin, 2001). 
 
By 2003, local authorities had entered into transfer agreements resulting in 
the transfer of over 740,000 dwellings, or 18% of the total local authority 
stock (NAO, 2003). However, prior to 1998, only two transfers, accounting 
for a mere 2,900 units out of the 260,000 thus transferred were located in 
disadvantaged urban areas (Nevin, 1999). The degraded stock in these 
neighbourhoods would not generate a sufficiently large capital receipt to 
clear the outstanding debt and fund future investment. The majority (i.e. 
90%) of early transfers have been self-financing, located in southern 
England, and pursued through LSVT (NAO, 2003). The ERCF provides a 
government dowry to cover the negative value of the housing stock in 
disadvantaged areas.  
 
The National Audit Office estimates that stock transfers have raised £11.6 
billion of private finance (NAO, 2003). These figures must be interpreted in 
the context of an estimated repair backlog of £19 billion nationally (ibid.). 
 
Tenants are most empowered through the ballot process. After transfer, 
their influence is much reduced (Tiesdell, 2001). However, the majority of 
agreements have involved the transfer of the entire stock of a local authority 
to a new housing association designed explicitly for this purpose. Tenants 
have not, therefore, been presented with greater choice as the rhetoric 
implies (NAO, 2003).  
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1) The London Borough of Tower Hamlets 
 
The Borough of Tower Hamlets is located immediately to the east of 
central London. Tower Hamlets represents clearly the paradoxes of 
London’s ‘world city’ status with its concentrations of socio-economic 
problems adjacent to the world-class real estate of The City and Docklands 
(Fainstein et al, 1994; Buck et al, 2002). Tower Hamlets is recognised in the 
government’s Index of Multiple Deprivation (2000) as the most 
disadvantaged local authority area in England (average of ward level 
averages). All Tower Hamlets 19 wards are in the most deprived 10% of 
wards nationally and 17 are in the most deprived 5%. However, the Borough 
is also characterised by extreme levels of housing demand.  The average 
ratio of house prices to household income, at 5.27, is the 15th highest of any 
local authority area in England (Wilcox, 2003). This compares to an average 
ratio in London of 4.8 and a national average of 3.4 (ibid.). Local residents 
are effectively disenfranchised from the Borough’s private housing market.  
 
The two case study neighbourhoods, Bow and Poplar in the east of Tower 
Hamlets, are traditional working class areas and form part of the declining 
industrial sub-region known as the Lea Valley. However, the adjacent 
sub-region is employment rich. Immediately to the south is the Canary 
Wharf development in Docklands. To the east, in the neighbouring Borough 
of in Newham, is the development area associated with the Channel Tunnel 
rail interchange. The commercial and financial centre of London is located 
only two kilometres to the west.  
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A basic statistical profile of Tower Hamlets, Bow and Poplar is provided 
in Appendix A. The Borough has a younger age profile; more significant 
black and minority ethnic population, lower employment and higher 
unemployment rates and a far higher proportion of social housing and flatted 
accommodation than is the norm for London (itself atypical in these 
respects) or England and Wales. 
 
2) Tower Hamlets Housing Action Trust   
 
Introduction 
 
Bow is located in the north east of Tower Hamlets. Much of the housing 
stock was built during the Victorian period and the west of Bow is heavily 
gentrified. However, Bow also has several post-war social housing estates. 
The area is bounded by numerous physical barriers in the form of canals and 
trunk roads. 
 
The Bow estates are inhabited predominantly by white working class 
residents. This is a product of past housing allocation policies. Prior to the 
introduction of equitable allocation policies, white families tended to be 
allocated to the most modern housing, in the east of the Borough, especially 
Bow. Black and minority ethnic households found themselves concentrated 
in older stock in the west.  
 
Three Bow estates (Lefevre, Monteith, Tredegar), formerly belonging to 
the London Borough of Tower Hamlets (LBTH), were transferred to Tower 
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Hamlets HAT (‘THHAT’) in 1993 (following a ballot of tenants). A 
government proposal to designate a HAT elsewhere in Tower Hamlets (the 
Ocean Estate in Stepney, now the site of a New Deal for Communities 
programme) was rejected by tenants. THHAT’s original stock numbered 
1,575 units, comprising mainly high-rise units constructed in the 1960s and 
1970s.  
 
The objectives of THHAT are to bring about lasting regeneration of the 
area, empower residents to make informed decisions about their housing 
choices and give them a stake in the community, by: 
 
h Building new homes or improving existing homes for all residents, to 
the highest standards of quality, amenity, internal and external space 
standards that available resources will allow. 
h Ensuring the effective, sensitive and responsive management and 
maintenance of its homes. 
h Providing a wider choice of tenure and forms of homes ownership to 
its residents. 
h Improving the social, living and environmental conditions in its area, 
in part through improved job opportunities and youth and 
community facilities. 
h Providing the best possible value for money and most effective use 
of resources in all its work. 
 
The majority of the HAT’s efforts, in practice, have been devoted to 
housing renewal. This is reflected in the proportion (80%) of its budget 
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(£142 million between 1993 and 2003) devoted to housing development and 
management. By the end of the programme (2004/5), almost all the 
pre-existing stock will have been demolished, approximately 1,000 new 
homes will have been built, in a low rise traditional ‘neighbourhood’ format, 
and a further 150 improved. 
 
In 1995, the HAT estimated the lifetime cost of its development 
programme to be £175 million. However, in 1996, the government fixed the 
HAT’s lifetime grant at £123 million. As an NDPB, the HAT could not 
borrow additional resources to make good the shortfall. It, therefore, entered 
into partnership with Circle 33 Housing Association and jointly established 
Old Ford Housing to complete the remainder of the physical regeneration 
programme and manage the new stock. 
 
In 1998, the HAT established a Community Development Trust, Bow 
People’s Trust (BPT), to undertake community and economic regeneration. 
The HAT committed to provide £4.4 million in grant in aid to BPT, over a 
seven-year period, to be supplemented by other sources  (e.g. National 
Lottery, European Social Fund).  
 
As a result of the establishment of Old Ford and BPT, the HAT has 
become a smaller organisation than originally envisaged. Indeed, its role 
changed from one of landlord to service purchaser and contract monitor.  
 
The HAT has, more recently become engaged in a wider spectrum of 
activity in partnership with the local authority and other bodies, in the 
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context of the National Strategy for Neighbourhood Renewal. 
 
A basic statistical profile of Tower Hamlets, Bow and Poplar is provided 
in Appendix A. Bow has an older age profile; less significant black and 
minority ethnic population, and an even higher proportion of social housing 
and flatted accommodation than is the norm for Tower Hamlets. 
Employment and unemployment rates are comparable to those for the 
Borough. 
 
Housing and physical regeneration 
 
The basic physical characteristics of the estates at the time of HAT 
designation may be described as follows:  
 
h Monteith, built from 1968 to 1970 and comprising three 22 storey 
tower blocks, four smaller blocks, plus sheltered accommodation and 
an old people’s home, housed mainly an elderly population. At 
designation, it was described as having ‘no redeeming characteristics, 
indeed no character of note at all’. However, the estate is 
conveniently located for Victoria Park, immediately to the north. 
h Lefevre, built between 1969 and 1971 and comprising four 10 storey 
blocks forming a physical ‘wall’ between the adjacent urban 
motorway and the rest of Bow plus five smaller blocks and a 
community centre, had a mix of ages among its tenants and was in a 
reasonable state of repair at HAT designation. 
h Tredegar, the newest of the three estates completed in 1977 and 
comprising 16 medium and four low rise blocks plus a shopping and 
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community centre block, had a younger population with a reputation 
for anti-social behaviour. The smaller units were of a traditional, 
rather than systems built, construction and have remained in good 
condition. 
 
The designation of the HAT was essentially driven by the condition of the 
housing stock in the early 1990s, which was, the worst in Bow, although, not 
necessarily, in Tower Hamlets. The estates had not been significantly 
improved since construction and had been the subject of failed Estate Action 
bids. Many blocks suffered from classic symptoms of obsolescence and 
decline: inadequate insulation, poor windows and fittings, leaks, inadequate 
lifts, poor bathroom facilities, inadequate drainage, poor rubbish disposal 
facilities, condensation, and, cockroach infestation. In design terms, the long 
corridors inherent to the deck access design of some blocks made convenient 
escape routes for muggers, burglars, etc.  
 
The HAT Masterplan described the housing component of the programme 
as a ‘new start’, the objectives of which were: 
 
h The demolition of all the existing housing with the exception of a 
tower block containing 130 flats, a sheltered housing scheme of 30 
flats and nine existing homes.  
h The development of 1,097 new homes, of which 49% are to be 
houses with gardens. 
h Improvement of the remaining housing.  
h The development of a further 60 homes as a mixed tenure scheme in 
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partnership with the private sector.  
 
The HAT’s housing renewal programme started in spring / summer 1995 
with the demolition of a tower block on the Lefevre Estate and multi-storey 
car parks on Monteith and Lefevre. The initial renewal programme 
envisaged discussions with tenants on Tredegar about their re-housing 
options in January 1995 with a move to their new homes in October 1996 
and demolition of their old accommodation by February 1997. The 
development programme was due to be completed with the demolition of 
Block H, Lefevre Estate in October 2003. However, a significant amount of 
work remained, to be completed by Old Ford, at the time of the HAT’s exit 
in summer 2004.  The HAT’s first new homes were completed in 
September 1996. A proportion of the housing stock was kept empty prior to 
HAT destination to provide land for demolition and new build so that tenants 
would only need to be moved once (i.e. directly into their new homes). 
There has been no ‘decanting’ typical of large-scale clearance schemes in 
England. 
 
The HAT is able to provide new housing built to a higher standard than 
can be achieved through Housing Corporation grants elsewhere. The largest 
proportion of new build properties and three bedroom dwellings (the largest 
has nine bedrooms). The HAT’s allocation policy is also more generous than 
elsewhere locally. All adults of 16 years and above are entitled to a double 
bedroom. HAT tenants are, therefore, privileged in a Borough, which suffers 
from the highest levels of over-crowding within the UK.  
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Not surprisingly, the HAT’s most recent quality of life survey (THHAT, 
2002) indicates a high degree of satisfaction with the newly built housing 
stock, especially size and number of rooms, the residents’ choice process, 
and, the quality of the workmanship. However, the replacement of tower 
blocks by traditional housing has entailed a far greater degree of social 
interaction between tenants. Many miss the privacy afforded to them by their 
former housing circumstances.  
 
The HAT has operated a generous allocation policy towards ‘hidden 
households’, especially tenants’ children, within its existing resident 
population. The HAT has sought to keep families and communities together, 
and has seen re-housing hidden households was one way of achieving this. 
This is a contentious issue in the context of the acute levels of housing need 
that exist in Tower Hamlets. However, these new tenancies are a very small 
proportion of overall lettings. The majority of new lettings in the past decade 
have been the result of direct applications to Old Ford for Assured Short 
Hold Tenancies (ASHTs), often to key workers, in stock earmarked for 
demolition. 
 
A number of tenants had exercised their ‘right to buy’ their home, 
introduced in the 1980s Housing Act prior to designation. As the local 
housing stock comprised mostly flatted accommodation, earmarked for 
demolition, the HAT was obliged to operate a leaseholder buyback scheme 
to ensure the smooth running of the development programme. In addition, it 
operated a Cash Incentive Scheme, with grants of up to £22,000, for those 
tenants that wish to forfeit their tenancy to buy a home on the open market.  
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The designation of the HAT essentially ‘ring-fenced’ the estates. There 
were no new allocations to the area following designation. This means that 
the demography of the estate has been ‘frozen’ during the past decade, which 
has, thus, seen considerable physical renewal but very little social renewal. 
This is in contrast to events in Tower Hamle5ts, generally, which has 
witnessed rapid social change with gentrification in the private sector and 
increased proportions of minority groups, especially Bengali community, 
within the social housing sector. 
 
Economic and social regeneration 
 
The HAT estates experience a variety of economic and social problems.  
 
There are no significant employers within the Bow area. The local 
manufacturing employment base has declined dramatically and many of 
smaller workshops have been converted into flats.  
 
Educational attainment levels locally are low. There is a lack of choice of 
good schools locally and many parents place their children on waiting lists 
for schools in nearby Bethnal Green. The local boys’ school is particularly 
problematic. In the recent past, there has been racial tension and high levels 
of truancy. In terms of further or higher educational aspirations, there are 
very few university applications from Tower Hamlets or the estates. There is 
a lack of aspiration to want to go to school let alone college or university. 
For many local people, therefore, work is low skilled occupations: 
childminders, cleaners, school assistants, and dinner ladies. 
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In addition, physical and social mobility is low. This is particularly the 
case for older residents and minority communities. The problem is not 
necessarily one of physical access to external job opportunities, as public 
transport connections are good, but that local people are very parochial and 
do not to want to travel to work outside the area. It is, generally speaking, 
younger residents that travel out of the neighbourhood to work. Most of 
these are employed in low pay, low status occupations in Docklands, the 
City and West End.  
 
There is a high level of entrepreneurial expertise within the East End. 
However, the process of social betterment invariably means successful 
residents leave the neighbourhood, often moving further out of London to 
Essex and the North Eastern suburbs. It is difficult to retain aspirational 
households within East London.  
 
The centre of Bow is dominated by the historic Roman Road Market. 
However, this area has been characterised by physical decline in recent years 
and does not, generally, meet local shopping needs adequately. For most 
consumer durables, residents are required to travel outside the 
neighbourhood, for example to the Isle of Dogs, the West End or even as far 
as Lakeside Shopping Centre in Thurrock, Essex.  
 
Tower Hamlets has high concentrations of chronic long-term illness, 
single parents, mental and physical health problems among its residents. The 
most important local health issues are high levels of under-age pregnancy – 
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the conception rates for females aged between 15 and 17 in Bow’s Park 
Ward are the highest in Tower Hamlets and twice the national average 
(EDAW, 2003) – drug addiction, and asthma. There are many local people 
permanently on sickness disability benefits.  
 
In terms of crime, ward level data indicates that robbery (mugging) is a 
significant problem in the Bow area. The robbery rate in Park Ward is nine 
times the national average (EDAW, 2003). There exists, within the East End, 
a very materialist culture of ‘public show’. Local people spend a high 
proportion of their disposal income on their appearance and this culture 
contributes to the vicious circle of crime (e.g. teenagers are mugged for their 
expensive footwear). 
 
The East End of London has a long-standing association with gangs and 
organised crime within the white working class community. More recently, 
local black youths and younger elements of the Bangladeshi community 
have organised into gangs and have a keenly developed territorial rivalry 
with gangs from neighbouring Hackney.  
 
The HAT’s four strategic objectives in economic development are: 
 
h To increase job choice and provide training for residents. 
h To enable residents to have more money in their pockets in the short 
term.  
h To enable residents to access money that can be of collective benefit. 
h To meet needs and maximise economic opportunities for those not 
 103 
seeking or able to gain full time work.  
 
The HAT has been able to use its own activities as a vehicle for providing 
jobs and training. For example, it has sought to exploit construction work 
through a Local Labour in Construction project and to ensure that local 
residents benefit from sessional employment, e.g. leafleting.   
 
Bow People’s Trust (BPT) has been the de facto delivery agent for 
economic and social regeneration projects. BPT’s Employment and Training 
provides assistance with preparation of CVs and application forms, interview 
technique, plus specific vocational needs including: computing; basic skills 
(literacy and numeracy); and, English for Speakers of Other Languages 
(ESOL). BPT also runs a free job brokerage services for local companies 
that seeks to match job seekers with employment opportunities and provides 
support for community businesses.  
 
The local authority has appointed a Town Centre Manager for the Roman 
Road Market area, using £90,000 of Neighbourhood Renewal Fund 
resources.  
 
Bow Boys School is also the target of a number of Neighbourhood 
Renewal Funded projects with an aggregate budget of £730,000. These 
include: Accelerating Achievement at Key Stage 3, which aims to address 
the causes of under-achievement and barriers to progress in targeted schools 
through the provision of full time home – school liaison workers, evening 
ICT classes for families and parenting classes, plus literacy support projects; 
 104
Tower Hamlets Boys Schools, an action research project targeting schools in 
danger of failing government targets and includes an ICT strategy to support 
raising standards at Bow Boys School; and, Supporting GCSE Achievement 
at Bow Boys School, the objective of which is to improve educational 
attainment of Year 11 pupils at the school through investment in academic 
mentoring, additional staff, ICT equipment and books, plus revision classes.  
 
A Neighbourhood Renewal Fund supported project, St Paul’s A New 
Heart for Bow aims to create a ‘Healthy Living Centre’ for Bow. This will 
include an exercise centre, community hall, healthy eating café, and 
community art space. The project has a budget of £250,000 and targets 
disabled people and the elderly. It is led by the Church of St Paul with St 
Mark. 
 
The Police are involved in community issues and hold a forum for 
residents as well as attending the Neighbourhood Renewal Local Area 
Partnership meetings. In addition, knife workshops are offered to local 
children about the dangers and implications of people carrying knives and 
guns. 
 
Partnership and community involvement 
 
For the past decade, Bow HAT has had formal responsibility for the 
regeneration of the three estates. It has sought to achieve some of its 
objectives in partnership with its successor organisations: Old Ford and Bow 
People’s Trust. The HAT will bequeath a trust fund endowment, on exit, the 
resources of which will be generated through the sale of surplus land. BPT, 
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Old Ford and other local groups will be eligible to apply to the trust for 
funding. 
 
Local residents have been involved in the regeneration programme in a 
variety of ways.  
 
The designation of the HAT was subject to ratification through a ballot of 
tenants. In spring 1993, tenants were balloted on the HAT proposals. The 
turnout was 76%, with 65% of tenants voting for HAT designation. 
Residents also have the right to choose their landlord after the HAT has 
ceased to exist. Overwhelmingly, they have chosen Old Ford Housing.  
 
The key strategic decision-making body is the HAT board. This comprises 
12 appointed members, of whom three are residents. There are four 
sub-committees that cover the work of the HAT’s directorates: housing 
management; development; community and economic development; finance 
and administration.  
 
The HAT Masterplan was formulated by consultants, under HAT 
supervision, with close involvement of residents. Tenants were involved 
particularly in the deign stage of the programme. Consultation methods 
included: open meetings, resident design group meetings, surgeries for 
consultations with architects, open days, ‘Planning for Real’ sessions, coach 
trips to existing housing schemes, newsletters, comment books in estate 
offices, preference indicators ‘stick a dot’ against options, ‘awaday’, 
questionnaire on the Masterplan. Residents were involved in choosing the 
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internal layout of their homes (including fixtures and fittings and colour 
schemes in kitchens and bathrooms) and the external appearance of the home, 
including street layout.  
 
The HAT programme has, thus, prioritised the needs and aspirations of 
existing tenants. Many of these were resident in the Bow area at the time of 
the construction of the estates in the 1960s. This was a period when public 
consultation and engagement were uncommon. 
 
The East End of London has a well-developed community and voluntary 
sector infrastructure, particularly that related to the relief of poverty. Much 
of this is partly a product of the philanthropy of the Victorian age and is 
concentrated, in particular, in the west of Tower Hamlets. There is a general 
paucity of faith, community and voluntary sector organisations in Bow. 
Much of the community activity within the HAT estates has been 
housing-oriented. This is, perhaps, not surprising as poor housing has been 
the driver for the regeneration of the estates and local organisations, e.g. 
tenants’ associations have prioritised this single issue. In April 2000, a new 
forum, TML, which represents Old Ford tenants on the three estates, was 
established. However, it has reduced its general level of activity, perhaps 
because its immediate housing needs are in the process of being satisfied.  
There is a problem with integration on the estates. It is difficult to secure the 
participation of some minority ethnic groups (e.g. within TML). This is 
especially true of the small Asian communities on the estates. 
 
3) Poplar Housing and Regeneration Community Association (‘Poplar HARCA’) 
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Introduction 
 
Poplar is located in the east of Tower Hamlets, immediately south of Bow 
and north of the London Docklands development area.  
 
Poplar’s diverse land use consists of light industrial premises interspersed 
by numerous small social housing estates. The area  is bounded and 
intersected by major physical barriers including trunk roads, canals and 
railways. The main shopping centre is Chrisp Street Market, on the southern 
boundary. However, this is largely inaccessible from some of the more 
peripheral estates.  
 
Poplar, due to its proximity to the Port of London, has historically been 
associated with immigrant communities. Tower Hamlets, previously a 
traditional white working class Borough, has been populated by a large 
Bangladeshi community since the 1970s. This change happened most 
quickly in the west of the Borough but has recently extended to Poplar 
 
The area has been unique in east London for its ‘monolithic’ social  
housing stock. There has been very little private housing in the Poplar 
neighbourhood during the post war period. This position has been changing 
since the opening of the Docklands Light Railway (DLR). There is now 
considerable pressure for new private housing developments at DLR stations 
in Poplar. The area has experienced significant levels of ‘right to by’ activity 
in the past and, approximately, 20% of residents are leaseholders.  
Poplar Housing and Regeneration Community Association (HARCA) was 
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the first urban housing company to be established through the ERCF. Seven 
diverse and widely dispersed estates, comprising 6,360 units formerly the 
property of the London Borough of Tower Hamlets, were transferred to 
Poplar HARCA (PH) following three ballots: between 1997 and 2001.  
 
PH has seven key objectives: 
 
h Encourage and development investment in Poplar.  
h Develop genuine partnerships. 
h Develop successful and effective neighbourhood and housing 
services. 
h Make Poplar safe.  
h Encourage a culture that promotes ideas from local people.  
h Fulfil people’s potential through education and training. 
h Resource maximization. 
 
The physical regeneration programme (now complete) involved the 
demolition of some 10% of the stock and the refurbishment of the remainder 
using a £53 million dowry from the ERCF plus £91 million of private 
finance. PH’s economic and social regeneration budget is £1 million per 
annum, raised from rent income and other sources. Each estate has a 
HARCA centre which is a multi-purpose building used for youth activities, 
training, health education, childcare, care of the elderly, English language 
tuition, literacy and numeracy training, sports and leisure activities, etc.  
 
A key partner of PH is Leaside Regeneration, an urban regeneration 
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company, set up in 1999 to promote the physical and economic regeneration 
of the north east of Tower Hamlets and west of the adjacent Borough, 
Newham. It was funded via SRB round four resources and has, since 
designation, successfully bid for SRB round six monies to support a 
‘Communities in Business programme.  
 
Another key partner, the Bromley by Bow Centre (BBBC) is a community 
organisation which runs a variety of health, education and training, 
enterprise and family support projects, including a community care facility, 
arts projects, community café, employment and training courses, nursery, 
health centre, newly restored park area, and sports provision for local 
children.   
 
PH is an active networker and has sought to develop a role in managing 
neighbourhoods in the Poplar area outside the estates for which it is the 
principal landlord. Accordingly, PH, in partnership with Leaside 
Regeneration and BBBC, has established the Poplar Area Network (PAN), 
which sub-divides the Poplar area into five discrete neighbourhoods. 
Partners include the Metropolitan Police, SPLASH, Sure Start, Poplar 
Partnership Excellence in Cities, Poplar Education Action Zone, and Tower 
Hamlets College. 
 
A basic statistical profile of Tower Hamlets, Bow and Poplar is provided 
in Appendix A. Poplar has a younger age profile; more significant black and 
minority ethnic population, lower employment and higher unemployment 
rates and a far higher proportion of social housing and flatted 
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accommodation than is the norm  even for Tower Hamlets. 
 
Housing and physical regeneration 
 
The Poplar estates were built over a long period of time; during the 1930s 
(London County Council), 1950s (Poplar Metropolitan Council), and 1960s 
(Greater London Council). The estates are very diverse in terms of their age 
of construction, predominant dwelling type, design and location. Therefore, 
residents experienced a diversity of housing related problems.  
 
The basic physical characteristics of the estates may be described as 
follows:  
h Aberfeldy comprises mainly three storey flats plus some new houses. 
The estate suffers from extreme physical isolation and is tightly 
bounded by major trunk roads plus the River Lea. 
h Bow Bridge and Coventry Cross comprise four and five story flats 
built during the inter-war period. The estates have a large minority 
ethnic population. 
h Burdett comprises mostly flats with some maisonettes and houses. It 
has a large Bangladeshi population.  
h Lansbury comprises four and eight storey flats and maisonettes. A 
significant minority of the residents are pensioners. Part of the estate 
was built for the 1951 Festival of Britain. It has been described as 
one of the most popular and successful post-war housing schemes in 
London. 
h Lincoln comprises flats, and cottages. The resident population is the 
most diverse of the HARCA estates. 
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h Teviot comprises three storey flats and maisonettes. It has a 
multi-ethnic population. The estate is extremely isolated and is cut 
off from the rest of Poplar by major railway lines. 
 
The London Borough of Tower Hamlets (LBTH) had previously 
succeeded in securing Estate Action, Design Improvement Controlled 
Experiment (DICE) and SRB funds to improve the estates but need 
outstripped local resources. The original housing stock had a negative value 
of £53 million. This was underwritten by a £54 million ERCF dowry, in 
addition to which, PH secured loans from Abbey National (£69 million) and 
BNP Paribas (£22 million). Private finance was easy to secure given high 
level of demand for housing in East London.  
 
The housing development programme was implemented in partnership 
with East Thames Housing Group, which did most of the physical work so 
PH could build up its competence in economic and social regeneration. The 
physical regeneration programme was completed in 2002 and all housing is 
categorised as ‘decent’. Some 10% of the original stock has been demolished, 
to be replaced with 500 new homes. The balance has been refurbished to 
give it an extended life of 30 to 50 years. The physical improvements 
included: new kitchens and bathrooms; central heating up-grades; door entry 
systems; new front doors; pitched replacement roofs; double-glazed 
windows; replacement or refurbishment of lifts; improved entrance areas; 
repainting and brick cleaning. New build housing (237 units) has replaced 
large blocks on the Aberfeldy estate.  
The key issue at the time of HARCA designation was the ‘manageability’ 
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of the housing stock. That is, problems such as benefit dependency and 
anti-social behaviour rather issues related to the housing stock itself. Indeed, 
the decision to designate the HARCA in those estates where it operates was 
related to maximising the number of housing units that could be improved 
using the ERCF grant. Some estates in the area with more profound 
structural problems (e.g. Leopold) were specifically excluded from the 
HARCA’s stock.  
 
The key problem is some estates is accessibility. This is a particular 
problem in Aberfeldy and Teviot, both of which are isolated from the rest of 
the area by major arterial road routes, railways and the River Lea.  
 
PH has remained part of the LBTH Common Housing Register. As such, it 
accepts nominations from the local authority. Nevertheless, turnover has 
remained low; less than 5% in 2001 and 2002. This is a function of the 
extreme levels of demand for housing in the area. Housing is in such short 
supply that once allocated to a dwelling, tenants are reluctant to leave. 
Nonetheless, Poplar is considered to be one of the less popular 
neighbourhoods within the Borough’s Choice Based Letting system. The 
majority of potential tenants (and especially key workers) prefer a location in 
the west of the Borough, with good arterial routes into central London, to 
Poplar.  
 
Apart from the housing renewal programme, the major physical 
regeneration programme locally is the Limehouse Cut Regeneration 
Programme. This is a £1.4 million project, funded through Leaside 
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Regeneration's SRB6 programme, to regenerate and improve the 1.5-mile 
Limehouse Cut Canal. The scheme is led by British Waterways London and 
supported by Leaside Regeneration and Lea Rivers Trust. It aims to make 
the Cut a safer, more accessible and exiting place for all members of the 
local community. The UK’s first floating towpath was opened in July 2003, 
on the Limehouse Cut Canal. The innovative floating towpath has been 
installed under the busy A12 Blackwall Tunnel Northern Approach so that 
visitors to the canal will no longer have to enter an intimidating subway or 
cross a busy road to get from one side of the bridge to the other. The scheme 
will be of particular benefit to local residents who currently have to cross the 
trunk road to access local shopping facilities on the other side. The towpath 
is 242 metres long and two metres wide and is made up of 60 floating units. 
Colourful lighting has been installed in the pontoons and under the bridge to 
provide an attractive, safe and welcoming environment. 
 
Economic and social regeneration 
 
Poplar experiences a variety of economic and social problems.  
 
The local industrial estates provide employment opportunities for many 
local white working class and black households plus commuters from 
neighbouring Newham and Essex. However, the local Bengali community 
have very limited access to these employment opportunities.  
 
The local skills base is very limited. A PH commissioned survey (mbA, 
1998) reported that two-thirds of respondents had no UK sourced academic 
qualifications and four-fifths had no vocational qualifications. Moreover, the 
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job search horizons of local residents are very parochial. Three-quarters of 
respondents reported that they would look for work within Tower Hamlets, 
but fewer than one-fifth in the City and West End. This parochialism is 
reinforced by the fragmented built environment of Poplar with its numerous 
physical boundaries, roads, canals, and railways.   
 
The Poplar estates are characterised by high levels of poverty and benefit 
dependency. In the survey, two-thirds of respondents reported that someone 
within their household was in receipt of at least one form of benefit whereas 
one-tenth did not have use of any of the following: phone, washing machine, 
drying facilities, study space, cable or satellite TV, a lift, a private garden or 
a balcony.  
 
Unsurprisingly, Poplar is characterised by significant health problems. The 
area has the highest number of amputees in London (due to diabetes and 
circulatory problems), Heart disease, stokes, cancer and diabetes also rank 
highly locally. There are many teenage pregnancies among young married 
Bengali girls, sometimes only 16-17 years of age and high incidence of 
mental health problems. Health provision locally is very poor. The majority 
of the small number of general practitioners are male doctors with no 
nursing support.  
 
The survey (mbA, 1998) indicated considerable anxiety among local 
residents over crime related issues, some 42.7% of respondents reported that 
females within their household never went out alone after dark. A further 
21.5% said that there were parts of the neighbourhood that they specifically 
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avoided. Burglary is a significant problem in the Poplar area. The burglary 
rate in Poplar’s East India Ward is nearly twice the national average (EDAW, 
2003). 
 
The main shopping centre in Poplar is Chrisp Street Market on the 
southern boundary of the HARCA area. This is a thriving but low grade 
shopping area. However, it is inaccessible for many residents living in the 
northern half of the area. None of the HARCA estate possesses adequate 
local shopping facilities. For consumer durables, the more mobile residents 
are obliged to travel further afield, such as Lakeside in Essex. 
 
PH has a dedicated community and economic regeneration department. Its 
mission statement is ‘To work with local people to define and achieve their 
own financial and social aims and to create an environment where they want 
to live’. Each estate has a Neighbourhood Centre, in which a Community 
Area Director (CAD), responsible for regeneration, is based. In partnership 
with Bromley by Bow centre, the CADs have formulated ‘Community 
Plans’ for each estate.  
 
The local authority has appointed a Town Centre Manager for the Chrisp 
Street Market area, using £90,000 of Neighbourhood Renewal Fund 
resources. 
There is a small Excellence in Cities (EiC) Action Zone in Poplar. 
Education Action Zones were established in the Schools and Framework Act 
1998 with the objective of raising standards in schools. EiC Action Zones 
(small zones) are designed to address the educational problems of the major 
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cities where standards have been consistently low. They typically focus on a 
single secondary school and its associated primary schools.  There are 
currently 109 EiC Action Zones in England. Each receives a grant of 
£250,000 a year for a period of three to five years. They are encouraged to 
seek business sponsorship, which is matched by government, to a maximum 
of £50,000 per annum.  
 
Tower Hamlets-Poplar EiC Action Zone, began in January 2001, and 
target sLansbury Lawrence School and seven associated primary schools. 
These eight schools aim to develop and strengthen partnerships with parents, 
provide support to pupils (creating continuity between primary and 
secondary schools), and enrich the curriculum and people’s lives. 
Specifically, the zone’s objectives are: to secure a steady increase in parental 
attendance at school events, to enable teachers to identify pupils progress 
and areas of development; and, to ensure vulnerable pupils show no signs of 
deterioration on transfer, with 50% continuing any previous improvement. 
The key external partners involved are: Tower Hamlets College, PH, Sure 
Start, LBTH Local Education Authority, and Citigroup.  
 
In 1998 the BBBC building was named one of the first leading examples 
of a Healthy Living Centre.  The approach to health and regeneration 
involves promoting health in its most holistic sense, resulting in close 
working relationship with general practitioner partners and primary care 
teams.  The Bromley by Bow Health Team now includes: complementary 
therapists, artists, community nurses, general practitioners, gardeners, 
multi-cultural youth, family and community care teams.  
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PH works closely on crime prevention with LBTH Youth Service, Police 
(including PH subsidies for Police overtime), Victim Support, Community 
Safety Unit, Social Landlords Crime and Nuisance Group, Crime Concern. 
A private contractor provides an estate ranger service designed to counter act 
crime and anti-social behaviour. Crime Concern has been commissioned to 
undertake research into a community safety strategy for Poplar. Informed by 
this work, the Poplar Area Network (PAN) Partnership community strategy 
has defined five major aims to: reduce crime and anti-social behaviour by 
and against young people; decrease fear of crime and reprisal; tackle and 
restrict the substance misuse; reduce domestic burglary; and, build the 
capacity of PAN partnership to rescue crime and fear of crime.  
 
A variety of Neighbourhood Renewal Fund supported projects, with an 
aggregate budget of £560,000, are deployed to achieve these aims. These 
include: Creating Safer Communities (extending PH’s neighbourhood 
‘ranger’ programme to crime ‘hot spots’ elsewhere); Poplar High Street and 
Tower Hamlets College Safety in the Community, (installing Closed Circuit 
Television systems in Poplar High Street and in the local college); Poplar 
Youth Inclusion Programme (identifying and engaging 50 young people at 
risk of committing crime and providing them with alternative leisure pursuits 
such as football and cricket workshops); Drugs and Young People in Poplar 
(providing outreach work to support prevention and greater up-take of 
rehabilitation programmes; North Poplar Youth Engagement Project 
(engaging young people in positive community activities, e.g., local football 
teams, weekend activities, art, video and film workshops, weight training, 
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summer youth groups and outreach work); and, various small projects (e.g. 
removing abandoned cars promptly from estates, engaging ‘vulnerable’ 
young people in community filmmaking, local history courses, the arts, local 
football leagues). 
 
Partnership and community involvement 
 
The housing development programme was implemented in partnership 
with East Thames Housing Group. Other key partners include, as noted, 
Leaside Regeneration (an Urban Regeneration Company) and Bromley by 
Bow Centre.  
 
Tenants are involved in the regeneration programme and neighbourhood 
management in a number of ways. 
 
All ERCF programmes are subject to ratification by a ballot of tenants. 
Three tenant ballots were held prior to transfer. The first, (Lansbury North, 
Lincoln North, Burdett) had a 66% turn out and 72% yes vote. The second 
took place the following year. The third ballot failed. A small group of 
tenants joined PH independently in 2001. 
 
The main PH board has 18 members, comprising five LBTH nominees, 
seven residents (6 tenants and one leaseholder) and six independents 
(including one from ETHG). 
 
PH developed a comprehensive framework for community involvement in 
November 1998. A Community Involvement Support Team has been 
 119 
established and is funded, partly, by the Housing Corporation’s Community 
Training and Enabling grants programme.  
 
Each estate has an Estate or Area Board, each of which nominates 
representatives to the Joint Estates Panel, which nominates seven 
representatives to the PH board. Estate Boards are responsible for dealing 
with immediate local issues, e.g., housing management and community 
regeneration, and have sub-committees and working groups for this purpose. 
Each Estate Board has 20 full members, including a proportionate number of 
tenants and leaseholders and these have a two year term of office. All 
residents are eligible for election. The Chair and Vice Chair of the boards 
also reflect the tenure split locally. Some 27% of the membership of estate 
management boards is from BME groups, who comprise more than half the 
overall population. The Joint Estates Panel is the main strategic body for 
local residents. Its purpose is to consider issues relating to the services 
provided by PH. The Panel comprises 12 tenants and six leaseholders 
 
Tenants satisfaction surveys indicate increasing participation rates in 
estate management: from 7% in 1999 to 50% in 2001. Tenants were less 
satisfied with opportunities to get involved in 2001 (52%) than in 1999 
(72%) but more satisfied with the extent to which their views were taken into 
account by PH: 52% in 1999 compared to 60% in 2001. PH performs better 
on this indicator than LBTH but less well than HC comparator group, 
although most members of this are not located in disadvantaged areas 
(Housing Corporation, 2001). 
In general, East London has a well-developed community and voluntary 
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sector infrastructure. However, this has been under-developed in the eastern 
neighbourhoods of Tower Hamlets. Poplar is no exception. At the time of 
HARCA designation, there were no pre-existing tenants’ associations. The 
only community and voluntary sector organisations were philanthropic 
(Bromley by Bow Centre, Salvation Army, Churches). There was no 
indigenous ‘grass roots’ activity. 
 
4. Conclusions 
 
The case studies of Tower Hamlets HAT and Poplar HARCA illustrate 
well a number of important and unresolved questions concerning estate 
regeneration policy in England.  
 
First, the two case studies illustrate the continuing importance afforded to 
physical housing regeneration. It is now widely acknowledged that ‘bricks 
and mortar’ type investment alone (e.g. Estate Action) has not led to 
sustainable regeneration. There has, thus, been a shift in investment from 
physical to human resources during the past decade (Forrest and Kearns, 
1999). City Challenge and the Single Regeneration Budget witnessed a 
diminution of estate-based physical housing renewal (Hall and Nevin, 1999).  
In this respect, the two case studies are both atypical, as they are 
fundamentally housing-led, and typical, as they have pursued parallel 
economic and social regeneration efforts. It has been argued the importance 
of housing has been neglected in recent government thinking and, 
particularly, in the National Strategy for Neighbourhood Renewal (Forrest 
and Kearns, 1999; Maclennan, 2000), which considers employment to be the 
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primary success factor (Hall, 2003). Nevertheless, the strategy acknowledges 
explicitly physical improvement as government priority and introduces a 
Decent Homes standard; a ‘commitment’ to bring all ‘social housing up to a 
decent standard by 2010, with a third of this improvement taking place by 
2004, over which half of which will be in the most deprived areas.’ (SEU 
2001, p40). More recently, the government’s Sustainable Communities Plan 
(ODPM, 2003), which seeks to address the dual problems of the lack of 
affordable housing in London and the South, on the one hand, and low 
demand in parts of the North and Midlands, on the other, provides for 
substantial new build in the former and demolition and re-building in the 
latter.  
 
Second, the two case studies illustrate the continuing importance afforded 
to stock transfer. This has been justified by governments on a number of 
grounds. For the Conservative government, the de-municipalisation of social 
housing was a self-justifying ideological objective. In addition, it has been 
argued that transfer brings added value to the regeneration process in that it: 
levers in private resources (and, thus, limits public borrowing); it offers 
improved organisational competence (as politicised, bureaucratic, 
multi-purpose local authorities are replaced by single-purpose bodies, e.g. 
HATS, or entrepreneurial housing associations); and, it provides choice for 
tenants. However, each of these arguments can be countered. Local 
authorities could be empowered by change in public borrowing regulations. 
The a priori argument that they are organisationally inferior is prejudicial 
rather than empirical. Tenant choice is limited if transfer is conducted en 
masse. Nevertheless, the process has continued under Labour government. 
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Local authorities can seek additional investment in their housing stock 
through three options but these all require a separation of housing strategy 
and management responsibilities: Stock transfer; Arms Length Management 
Organisations or ALMOs (the transfer of management responsibilities to 
independent ALMOs – although local authorities remain the legal landlords. 
High performing ALMOs are eligible for additional government housing 
investment funds); and, the Private Finance Initiative or PFI (the signing of 
contractual arrangements between local authorities and private consortia 
which refurbish and manage the stock for a specified period in return for a 
fee). 
 
Third the case studies illustrate a crucial and unresolved question, that is, 
who are the intended beneficiaries of investment: existing residents, future 
residents, statutory agencies with fixed investments (e.g. housing, schools) 
and inflated managements costs (e.g. policing) in declining neighbourhoods, 
or, a combination of these?  In the case of THHAT, the answer is atypical 
and unambiguous. It can be argued that the existing residents of the estates 
have led a privileged existence during the past decade. They have benefited 
from a uniquely well-resourced regeneration programme, resulting in the 
construction of new homes built (within limits) to their own (high) 
specification. In addition, HAT designation effectively excluded the 
possibility of more difficult tenants being housed locally and permitted a 
generous policy of housing the children of existing tenants. However, there 
are important questions arising about the sustainability of such an approach, 
not simply because of cost. The re-absorption of the estates into the broader 
housing market of Tower Hamlets in 2004, following HAT exit, will create 
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significant challenges in terms of an influx of new residents who may differ 
from the existing population in respect of age, race, socio-economic 
circumstances and lifestyle. The case of Poplar is more typical. The 
regeneration programme in Poplar has been less well funded, although the 
estates have still been fortunate to be in receipt of a significant renewal 
programme, and the estates have remained within the broader Tower 
Hamlets housing market. The entire housing stock has been refurbished 
during the past five years or so and is now classified as being of a statutorily 
‘decent’ standard. However, it can be argued that physical housing 
conditions have not been fundamental problems in the Poplar estates. The 
key challenge has been ‘manageability’ (e.g. anti-social behaviour).  The 
area is characterised by profound social and economic problems 
characteristic of many inner-urban neighbourhoods. These affect existing 
residents, deter future residents and impose disproportionate costs on the 
public services. Moreover, as in Bow, these problems have proved far more 
intangible and illusive than physical regeneration.  
 
Fourth, the case studies demonstrate that urban communities may be 
peripheral in an economic and social sense, even when they benefit from a 
highly central geographical location. The government’s approach to 
economic and social regeneration, embodied in the National Strategy for 
Neighbourhood Renewal, advocates improving the employability of 
residents of disadvantaged neighbourhoods through supply-side measures 
(Hall, 2003) such as those deployed by the HAT and Poplar HARCA (e.g. 
training, counselling, work incentives, childcare). This thesis has been 
criticised for neglecting demand-side considerations, especially the 
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long-term decline of the employment base of Britain’s cities (Turok and 
Edge, 1999). However whilst, the level of employment opportunities and 
amenities accessible in the immediate vicinity is poor, both Bow and Poplar 
are located in a jobs rich sub-region due to their proximity to Docklands and 
Canary Wharf to the south, the City and West End to the west, plus the 
Newham development area to the east. Despite the strong aggregate level of 
employment demand in East London, almost insurmountable supply-side 
barriers exist in neighbourhoods like Bow and Poplar. A number have been 
cited in this paper: the low levels of educational attainment locally, adequate 
transport links that are not exploited because of concerns about security and 
access; and, a built environment that functions as a psychological barrier, 
reinforcing parochial attitudes and limiting social mobility, as well as a 
physical one.  
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Appendix 1  
 
 
 
 
Table 6. Demographic profile 
 Bow Estates Poplar Estates Tower Hamlets London England and Wales 
Under 16 19.2 30.4 22.9 20.2 20.2 
16 to 19 4.9 6.6 5.5 4.7 4.9 
20 to 29 20.6 17.9 24.1 17.0 12.6 
30 to 59 38.8 32.7 34.9 41.7 41.5 
60 to 74 10.2 8.5 8.6 10.5 13.3 
75 and over 6.4 3.9 4.0 5.9 7.6 
SOURCE: Census 200123 
 
 
Table 7. Ethnic profile 
 Bow Estates Poplar Estates Tower Hamlets London England and Wales 
White 68.4 41.5 51.4 71.2 90.9 
Asian / Asian 
British 15.5 41.5 36.6 12.1 4.6 
Black / Black 
British 10.4 10.3 6.5 10.9 2.1 
Chinese / Other 2.3 3.7 3.0 2.7 0.9 
Mixed 3.4 2.8 2.5 3.2 1.3 
SOURCE: Census 2001 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                            
23 Census output is Crown copyright and is reproduced with the permission of the Controller of 
HMSO and the Queen's Printer for Scotland 
 130
 
 
 
Table 8. Economic activity profile 
 Bow Estates Poplar Estates Tower Hamlets London England and Wales 
Employed 50.3 39.0 49.1 60.2 60.6 
Unemployed 7.3 8.1 6.6 4.4 3.4 
Econ. active 
student 3.0 3.4 3.4 2.9 2.6 
Retired 9.7 8.4 7.7 9.8 13.6 
Econ. inactive 
student 6.2 8.8 8.9 6.6 4.7 
Looking after 
family 9.6 13.7 10.3 7.2 6.5 
Permanent sick / 
disabled 7.9 8.2 6.4 4.6 5.5 
Econ. Inactive 
other 6.0 10.4 7.6 4.3 3.1 
SOURCE: Census 2001 
 
 
Table 9. Housing profile (tenure) 
 Bow Estates Poplar Estates Tower Hamlets London England and Wales 
Owner 
occupied 22.9 16.8 29.0 56.5 68.9 
Local authority 
rent 38.6 45.2 37.4 17.1 13.2 
Housing 
association rent 26.0 28.9 15.1 9.1 6.0 
Private rent 12.6 9.1 18.5 17.3 11.9 
SOURCE: Census 2001 
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Table 10. Housing profile (dwelling type) 
 Bow Estates Poplar Estates Tower Hamlets London England and Wales 
House 14.4 10.5 16.3 51.1 80.4 
Flat (purpose 
built) 77.5 85.1 76.1 33.0 13.6 
Flat (converted) 7.2 3.4 6.0 13.9 4.4 
Other 0.9 1.0 1.6 2.0 1.6 
SOURCE: Census 2001 
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CHAPTER 5 
 
Governance as a new model for Maintenance of 
Residential Improvement  
–With a focus on the changes in the roles of the public and 
private sectors – 
 
 
 
Chun, Hyeon-Sook 
 
 
 
1. Introduction 
 
With the launch of the local autonomy system in 1995, local authorities 
started to have reinforced its functions. This development resulted in 
increasing the need to introduce local governance as the main system to 
manage local issues. Governance is defined as a ruling approach or network 
system in which the public sector, private and various civil organizations 
voluntarily rely on one another or cooperate. The role of a local Government 
has switched from one that creates institutions and approves businesses to 
the one that promotes local development by encouraging cooperation and 
participation of different bodies such as residents and civil organizations. It 
is required for a local Government to support these organizations when it 
 134
comes to the issue of upgrading housing environments. 
The main concept of the Maintenance of Residential Improvement 
program (hereinafter MRI) is based on sustainable development, growth 
management and participation of the residents (Hong, 1996). MRI is an 
inclusive term, including diverse programs that intend to improve residential 
environments. MRI should aim at improvements of the physical environment, 
the preservation and boosting of community and the creation of an 
environmentally healthy society. Cooperation between Government, civil 
organizations and residents is important for this to happen. 
In the past, the Government, residents and private sector remained 
separate entities with little or no interaction. Today, organic interaction with 
the Government and private sectors are of great importance, and mutual 
supplementation is pursued through close cooperation with each other. The 
recent MRI is headed in a new direction moving away from the demolition 
and redevelopment approach of the past. Housing redevelopment 
(hereinafter CHR) and Reconstruction of apartment (hereinafter RA) is 
integrated now under the management of a single act, and the public nature 
of the project is getting stronger; as we have seen in urban planning 
management and the lowering of floor area ratios. 
Participation of residents has been reinforced by stepping up the 
conditions for consensus and the formation of the resident-focused 
community. Civil organizations play more important roles and have more 
influence over the enactment of laws and policy decisions. 
Community-focused MRI, which has recently been emphasized, can be 
achieved through the participation of diverse subjects and governance. Lots 
of NPOs (Nonprofit organization) were organized in the late 1990s, and 
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some NPOs focused on housing problems. These NPOs have played an 
important role in advocating new policy. The Government strengthens the 
public nature of MRI, and the participation of residents is considered 
important and the role of NPOs has increased. These aspects show the new 
paradigm of MRI. In this paper, I will examine the change and new direction 
of MRI. 
 
2. History of MRI and Changes in the Roles of the Main Player 
 
The ideal concept of MRI has changed. In the past, MRI was implemented 
in squatter areas by demolition and rebuilding. The role of Government was 
very restricted. Now MRI has shifted from squatter settlements to old and 
sub standard housing. In addition it has changed from clearance and 
demolition to the improvement of residential areas. The public role of 
Government can be strengthened through the expansion of public 
intervention. 
 
1) Government-led Demolition and Redevelopment Policy (from 1950 to early 1970)  
 
In those days All-out demolition and Migration (1950-1965) and People’s 
Apartment Projects were major policies. Because of rapid urbanization, 
people moved into the cities from rural areas. They illegally occupied the 
public land and formed urban squatter areas. All-out Demolition and 
Migration (1950-1965) led by the Government happened on a wide scale 
during this period. People’s Apartments were constructed (1965-1972) for 
those people who lived in slums, but it stopped after the collapse of the 
WOW apartment. Large-scale settlement projects were built side by side. 
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Those who had jobs downtown moved into Seoul after selling off their 
tickets of new settlement. Also, residential revolts broke out as the 
infrastructure was not built and social services for the residents were not 
supplied. Residents fought to maintain their livelihood. Therefore these 
projects turned out to be a failure. Urban squatters who had a job downtown 
moved to other areas in the city, so the squatter areas didn’t decrease in spite 
of continuous demolition by the Government. 
The leader of the MRI projects was the Government and the public was 
forced to follow Government policy. The Government’s response to the 
demolition activities was temporary and didn’t have contingency plans to 
assure proper housing for the people. The movement of residents’ was 
spontaneous and temporary. Religious organizations and communities of the 
time were ill-equipped to deal with the looming social welfare crisis . 
 
2) Activation, local Improvement and self-redevelopment (From 1967 to mid 1970’s)  
 
The Activation and Local Improvement Program (1967-1974) was a 
program that acknowledged the legality of poorly constructed illegal houses 
once residents upgraded them at their own expense. The Local Improvement 
Project started in 1970 and sought to improve the illegal houses. These 
policies were implemented in order to upgrade the illegally constructed 
development by recruiting the active participation of the residents. This 
program had advantages in which people could upgrade their housing 
without fear of losing their homes. It failed to achieve the intended purposes 
as the proper public facilities were not secured and the public land was not 
disposed of as planned. 
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With the Transitional Provision Act on the Promotion of Housing 
Renovation enacted in 1973, redevelopment and upgrade techniques were 
introduced that tried to improve the residential environment by long term 
planning. Self-Redevelopment led by the residents and HR based on loan 
was promoted (1973-1982). The Urban Redevelopment Act was enacted in 
1976 and this policy aimed at pursuing a systematic urban environment 
upgrade by designating areas for redevelopment and carrying out projects 
based on the Urban Planning Act. Control of the urban redevelopment 
projects was transferred to the Urban Redevelopment Act from the Urban 
Planning Act. Redevelopment on Loans and Entrust Redevelopment 
(1976-1978) were introduced in order to solve the problem of insufficient 
funds, but they were put to a stop in a short period. 
There were no changes in the basic Government policy on illegal 
settlement areas and the main request from the residents were for reductions 
in the price of public land and activation of illegal buildings. Other requests 
were made to delay the demolition to avoid wintertime and to raise the 
compensation levels for move-out to a realistic, fair market value level. 
Christian communities and some the educated people started to show interest 
in the slum areas (Kim, .1999; 224). 
While continuous efforts were made to demolish illegal residential areas, 
other illegal housing developments kept showing up. It was a vicious cycle. 
This era featured the implementation of purely Government-led projects. 
There was no system in place to settle conflicts among residents and the 
Government, and only temporary demands of residents were met in the 
community. As civil society was still immature, the Government came up 
with policies on its own with no input from civil organizations. Because of 
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the temporary situation of residents, small-scale residents’ movement could 
not be easily organized; it was impossible for them to exercise political 
power even when they were organized. 
 
3) Promotion of the Market-led Redevelopment and the Formation of Residential  
Movements (1983-1987) 
 
The introduction of the CHR scheme in 1983 provided momentum to the 
general housing redevelopment program. The scheme was utilized to 
upgrade residential areas and secure lands for house building. As the 
potential value of the outlying areas grew, there came more pressure to 
promote redevelopment activities. However, the resettlement rate of those 
people who originally lived in the place before redevelopment was very low 
as most of them moved out after selling off their tickets, which would have 
allowed them to move into the new houses once redevelopment was 
completed. The existing community collapsed. Even though the CHR project 
was a public project, the housing rights of tenants were not considered. It 
was pointed out that there were no housing welfare contingencies for tenants. 
The claims of people concentrated on countermeasures for tenants. Single 
rooms in apartments were provided to tenants in 1987. Starting in 1989 
public rental housing was provided (Ha, 1998). 
The RA approach started in 1987. It was used to upgrade the housing 
facilities, as the housing became dilapidated. As the apartments, which were 
constructed in the 1970s became obsolete; a scheme of improvement was 
required. Its method was similar to CHR in that the profit was shared 
between owners and developers, even though it was implemented in 
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apartment complexes. However it was used as a method to secure lands for 
housing construction as its potential value increased. During the period from 
1995 to 2000, HR and RA functioned as the source of land supply. HR and 
RA accounted for 10% (HR: 3%, RA: 7%) a year of the total housing supply 
market (Kim, 2003:99). RA was a private project even though it was similar 
to CHR. Therefore there was no public regulation in RA. The Government 
did not intervene, other than giving approval of and permission for the 
projects, and the projects were operated totally by market forces. 
The issue of how to handle tenant’s concerns was raised in a systematic 
approach in the Mok-dong Public Development Project and long-term public 
rent housing for the tenants was offered for the first time. Because tickets to 
move into a new house after redevelopment were given to the owners only, 
this left the tenants nowhere to go. The main goal of the residential 
movement was to come up with measures for tenants, but no active measures 
were suggested by the Government. Local Government didn’t consider the 
tenants opinions, so tenants opposed projects or requested public rental 
housing. 
In the past, the residents had no part in the progress, and would sometimes 
resort to violent means to express their frustration. As demolition was 
carried out on a continual basis, more systematic and organized responses 
came from the people who lived in these urban squatter areas. This time, 
religious circles and students started to show interest in the areas for 
redevelopment. The movements of the people living in the demolished area 
combined with the social movements from time to time. 
Market-driven HR and RA revealed that the urban development project 
depends on economic forces. As HR associations and construction firms 
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focused on profits and the Government was just interested in the physical 
changes of the urban space, the negative effects on the residents and 
neighborhood emerged. Opinions of the local residents and local 
communities were not reflected in the course of market-driven 
redevelopment and the Government had a laissez-faire attitude. They were 
complacent with residential improvements being made by market forces. 
Most owners’ sold their tickets and left the community even though they 
were members of the HR association giving more power to the developers. 
Therefore the resettlement rate of those people who originally lived in the 
land before development project was very low. In addition, tenants had to 
leave the community after receiving a housing allowance. Therefore the 
reaction of tenants was severe, and sometimes raised a riot. 
 
4) Emergence of the Residential Environment Improvement Project and the  
Organization of Residential Movement (from 1987 to mid 1990)  
 
The Residential Environment Improvement (hereinafter REI) project was 
introduced in 1989. It focused on improving residential environments rather 
than profitability. It tried to promote resettlement in the local area by giving 
a free grant of public land, alleviating building code incongruencies, and 
providing financial funds from the Central Government. It was of great 
importance as a residential area improvement plan was established in 
advance and a social and economical redevelopment concept was introduced. 
There was a limit as the law was temporarily in force during a limited period 
until 1999. REI can be categorized into two sub categories: Site 
Improvement for Individual Buildings (hereinafter SII) and Multi-family 
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housing construction systems (hereinafter MHC). SII system is a project that 
was used to target those areas where old and inferior houses were 
concentrated. Here fire ways, community centers for the elderly, day care 
centers, and additional common parking spaces were established and 
improvements of ware supply and sewage were made in support of the local 
Government’s budget. MHC is a method that was used by a project 
implementer to purchase existing real estate, including buildings, and then 
rent or resell apartments or condominiums after constructing additional 
buildings, community centers, and roads within the districts. From 1989 to 
1999, on average, housing units increased by 117% compared to previous 
states and rates of ownership also increased. 
REI has had some positive effects in the amelioration of facilities and an 
increase in housing size. Housing size for one person has increased to 13.9㎡ 
from 12.6㎡ (KRIHS, 1997; 73).  Also the average income of residents is 
now 1,814,000 Won, it has increased 1.47 times compared to before move-in. 
(MOCT, 2000; 65-66) The REI project area has functioned as a growth 
position, and it has had the accompanying effect of improving neighboring 
areas. REI is valued as progressive because financial support is made from 
the Government. Socio-economic measures were considered and temporary 
dwellings were provided during project. 
The area developed on this scheme was transformed into a densely 
populated region as the SII system was adopted. Little progress was made 
and areas remained that still required residential improvements. Even though 
the public nature of the project was emphasized more than CHR, 
profitability was still very important. Consequently, development profits 
were distributed unevenly even among those people who lived in the same 
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community as where the project was launched. The tenants could not afford 
to live in the new houses due to high rent in the upgraded houses (Kim, 1996, 
1999). 
 
○ Measures for the tenants 
Some actions started to be taken for the tenants living in the area for 
redevelopment in 1985 and public rental housing was offered to the tenants 
in the Mok-dong Public Development for the first time. In addition it was 
institutionalized to provide public rental housing for the tenants, who lived 
in the area on which the CHR project was implemented, in 1989. 
The chart below highlights citizen advocacy (or lack of) from the 
government in the periods described. 
 
Table 11.  Actions for the Tenants by the Government 
Year Actions 
1970-early 
1980’s No actions were taken for the tenants by the Government 
1985 Single room or funding to get a place to live was provided for those tenants in the areas for HR 
Nov. 29, 1986
Housing allowance for two months in proportion to the number of the family 
members was provided to the tenants of buildings that were demolished in a 
public development project  
Jun. 1, 1987 Given an option of purchasing a right ticket for one room inside the area for redevelopment or housing allowance (two months) 
Jan. 24, 1989 Housing allowance increased to cover three months from two months 
May 1, 1989 Choice between the public rental housing or housing allowance 
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○ Formation of movement with regards to the demolition  
Residential and demolition-related movements started to form in the late 
1980’s and then the Coalition of Crumbly Man in Seoul (CCMS) was 
formed in 1987. As Resident Associations (RA) were formed in 1990, these 
movements focused on long term housing rights. With the Citizen’s 
Coalition for Economic Justice (CCEJ) being organized in 1990, civil 
movements started to focus on the creation of alternative civil societies. The 
National Council of Crumbly Man (NCCM) was formed in 1994 and it 
played the role as a headquarter organization of the residents’ organizations 
from each area of redevelopment. With the presence of these organizations, 
the core problem had changed from demolition to national housing rights. 
They criticized present policies and advocated new MRI policies. They tried 
to continue as an independent civil organization and made long-term plans of 
action. 
Participation by CCMS, Resident Associations, religious circles and 
academic and political circles, and a committee to enact a special law on the 
improvement of the urban squatter area was formed. Full-scale efforts started 
to be made to convert the movement for housing rights into one with the 
touch of a more generous social movement. Korean Private Forum for 
HABITATⅡ was formed and focused on housing rights movements as a 
universal social movement. 
 
5) Enactment of the Law on the Improvement of Urban and Housing and the  
Increased Role of the Civil Organizations (since late 1990’s) 
 
Since the late 1990’s MRI has managed to improve the quality of 
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developments. In case of Seoul, urban planning management was reinforced 
in CHR areas by restricting the floor area ratio. Also, the Act for the 
Improvement of Urban and Housing was introduced in 2002 and HR, RA 
and REI project were restructured into one act. 
 
○ Reinforced urban planning management for the areas of redevelopment 
In 1998, the standards for population density in the areas for 
redevelopment and reconstruction of apartments in Seoul were stepped up 
(SDI, 1998). This was intended to prevent the overloading of the 
infrastructure in the city and to promote environmentally friendly 
development. The role of the local Government for the MRI was improved 
and it was quite a meaningful development. 
 
○ Implementation of the Act on the Improvement of Urban and Housing (2002) 
Different MRI projects on urban residential areas were managed by 
various acts. The Urban Development Act was applied to CHR; the Housing 
Construction Promotion Act was applied to RA, and the Transitional 
Provision Act on the Residential Environment Improvement for the 
Low-Income Houses to the REI project. This situation led to inconsistencies 
in the application of policies. Implementation of different projects with no 
connection between them and without a master plan led to many urban 
problems. 
The Act for the Improvement of Urban and Housing focused on the 
establishment of a comprehensive urban area management system based on 
the principle of planning first, then followed by development activities. 
Basic guidelines were required and implementation of projects were pursued 
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in these guidelines. In addition, the opinion of residents was fully reflected 
and had gone through the process to get approval from the local authorities. 
The REI projects, which were forced by temporary acts, started to be 
implemented on a permanent basis. 
 
○ The launch of the Participatory Neighborhood Plan and Residential Participation 
In the late 1990’s, a new form of MRI program, “Participatory 
Neighborhood Planning” (hereinafter PNP) emerged, which represented the 
voluntary efforts made by the residents to upgrade their housing 
environment. Participatory Neighborhood Planning is implemented in 
smaller communities, achieving small-scale improvement such as upgrading 
pathways, demolishing fences, creating safe school zones, etc. However, it is 
an unsustainable movement as it is a voluntary movement led by the 
residents with no economic interests considered (KRIHS, 2000). 
People living in a certain local community develop a strong sense of 
community and what is growing in a community is the interest in the 
creation of the economic base and the preservation of local cultural resources. 
PNP movements reflect these changes. In the PNP movement, efforts are 
being made to create space and facilities for the community and changes in 
people’s awareness is seen and the possibility of making the movement a 
system will contribute to the active creation of other communities. Another 
important aspect of PNP is the recovery of the sense of community. In the 
urban life where people live a more independent life, recovering a 
relationship with the neighbors and realizing a good community is an 
important goal. Local agenda 21 also contributed to the MRI in communities. 
This led many cities to establish Agenda 21 at a private level and include 
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community-centered Residential Environment Improvement programs in 
their major agenda. Residents, enterprises and administration would share 
different roles with each other when it comes to the implementation of 
agendas. 
 
○ Active Involvement of Civil Organizations in the Housing Movement 
The late 1990s featured active involvement of civil organizations in the 
movement. Citizens for Decent Housing (2001), the Urban Reform Center of 
CCEJ (1997), Citizen’s Solidarity for a Walkable and Sustainable City 
(1994) were formed. Also the Confederation Conference of the Religious 
and Civil Organizations for the Realization of Housing Welfare was formed 
(2002). They play the role of coordinating the opinions of civil organizations 
with the Government policies and advocating alternatives. The second 
feature is that a new paradigm for the MRI started to emerge. With increased 
participation of the residents, PNP was activated. With the maturing of civil 
society, lots of civil organizations were formed and the Government was 
actively involved in RII. The Government tuned the systems and reinforced 
the focus of the public interest by introducing the Act on the Urban and 
Residential Environment Upgrading. 
 
○ Limits  
However, civil activities such as PNP find themselves faced with limits in 
terms of the impact that they can wield as the programs are implemented on 
a voluntary basis without support from the public sector. Activities are 
highly influenced by whether they have an active leader or not and it is 
difficult to maintain the organization until pending problems are resolved. 
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An organization like the CDC (Community Development Corporation) in the 
United Sates could be an alternative model, that can support activities like 
PNP. 
It is the local authorities that make the master plan for the MRI; however, 
neighborhood groups or civil organizations lead detailed activities to 
improve the residential environment. The resources required for this should 
be collaborated with the public sector. The Residential Environment 
Improvement needs to be pursued through public-private sector partnerships. 
 
3. Changes in the Relationship between the Main Players for MRI Program 
 
1) Government 
 
The role of Government had switched from a passive regulator to an active 
player. The local Government made the basic plan, designated the areas for 
CHR, issued various permits and licenses, and sold off national or public 
lands. Seoul played an important role by making the construction of the 
public housing for tenants and managing the areas for HR and RA a 
systematic process. The central Government also pursued the creation of a 
comprehensive urban management systems based on the principle of 
planning first, followed by development. Planned maintenance of the 
program is emphasized, and the role of Government and its recognition to 
the public nature of MRI is important. 
 
2) Neighborhood 
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In the initial phase of the MRI, residents were simply subjected to 
Government policies without input. Sometimes, in CHR or RA, residents 
played the role of the “leader” in title only. In the cases of PNP, however, 
residents became the actual main players in many cases. In 1960s and 1970s, 
the Government took leadership in implementing policies and the public had 
to accept them. Sometimes people presented their opinions through 
demons t ra t ion ,  bu t  tha t  was  only  temporary .  The  Government  
was  s t rong  and c ivi l  society  didn’ t  have any power to  balance 
or  chal lenge the policies of the Government. It was switched to a 
Government-private-developer-people relationship in the 1990’s. 
 
3) The advent of Civil Organizations 
 
MRI was lead by the Government and private developers, which had 
profit-making goals until the middle of the 1990s. However PNP appeared at 
the end of 1990 and was done by people’s organizations and civil 
organizations, which were not motivated by profit. Civil organizations 
became more actively involved in movements as the awareness of the people 
improved and they were highly affected from the decentralization of the 
Government and democratization of the society in general. 
  
4) Direction for Change 
 
Due to the growth of a civil society, the range of the main players 
increased including the local Government, non-profit organizations, profit 
organizations and people in the neighborhood. MRI is heading in a new 
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direction that regards Government, civil organizations and residents equally 
important 
 
Table 12. Main Programs of MRI and its characteristics. 
 1950- early 
1970’s 
1967- 
mid1970’s 
1980’s Mid 1990’s Since late 
1990’s 
Main Programs Settlement 
project for the 
people moving 
in Public  
apartments 
Self-redevelopm
ent 
Redevelopment 
on loan 
CHR 
RA 
CHR 
RA 
REI 
CHR 
RA 
REI 
PNP 
Main Laws 
Enacted 
Transitional 
Provision Act on 
the 
Promotion of 
Housing 
Renovation 
(1973) 
Urban 
Redevelopment 
Act 
(1976) 
Transitional 
Provision Act on 
the 
Neighborhood 
Environment 
Improvement 
for the 
Low-Income 
Houses in Urban 
Areas 
(1989) 
Term of 
Transitional 
Provision Act on 
the 
Neighborhood 
Environment 
Improvement 
for the 
Low-Income 
Houses 
extended (1999)
Act for 
Improvement of 
Urban and  
Housing (2002) 
Led by Government Government 
Resident 
Government 
Private 
construction 
firm 
Resident 
Government 
Private 
construction 
firm 
Civil 
organization 
(Formation 
Phase) 
Government 
Private 
construction 
firm 
Civil 
organization 
(Active 
involvement 
phase) 
 
Role of 
Government
Unilateral 
regulation 
Passive 
regulation 
Laissez faire Laissez faire 
Partial 
responsibility 
taking 
Active 
regulation 
Response of 
Neighborhood
Temporary 
response 
Temporary 
response, Partial 
systematization
Systematic and 
organized 
response 
Systematic and 
organized 
response 
Active 
participation in 
Residential 
Environment 
Improvement 
initiatives 
Form of Social 
Movement 
None Coalition with 
some religious 
organizations
Coalition with 
religious 
organizations 
and student 
movement 
Independent 
movement of 
civil 
organizations on 
housing 
Active support 
of the 
neighborhood 
protest groups 
and participation 
of various expert 
groups 
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. Thanks to the balancing in power between state and civil societies; the 
roles of the state, civil organizations and neighborhood are considered all 
important in state-led or market-driven projects. 
 
4. Governance as a New Model for the MRI 
 
1) Changes in Environment 
  
A new paradigm is required in MRI because socio-economic conditions 
and housing markets are rapidly changing. The number of people who live 
below the poverty line is declining due to economic growth and growing 
incomes. However the structure of distribution is deteriorating. Economic 
structures by free competition will deepen competition in every field and it 
will widen the gap between rich and poor. With the maturing of civil society, 
civil consciousness is growing. Therefore the importance of local areas is 
increasing and level of consciousness to the residential environment is also 
increasing. Also, characteristics of these people’s demand are also changing 
to quality of housing from sheer quantity. Convenience of the residential 
environments and amenities are considered important. Housing rights are 
also regarded as a universal right. 
The environment in urban spaces and housing markets has also changed. 
The problem of the housing shortage will be alleviated and the old, 
dilapidated housing areas will be reduced.  The problem of housing 
shortages is alleviated; therefore the goal of housing policy has switched to 
quality from quantity. Affordability is the new housing problem instead of 
housing provisions. The necessity to upgrade dilapidated housing areas, 
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which are not illegal, is increasing. The focus of MRI policies has shifted 
from the promotion of supply to the maintenance of the existing old 
housings and upgrading of the urban districts. When it comes to MRI 
programs, not only the physical upgrading but also taking measures to 
improve social and economical circumstances have become important. Both 
continuous securing of income and the conservation of community is 
important. It has become more necessary to be active in communities. MRI 
is also affected by enhancing a sense of housing issues. Housing policy is 
importantly recognized as welfare policy. 
 
2) Prerequisite to the Establishment of Governance for MRI initiative 
 
○ Community-focused MRI initiative 
MRI should be focused on the improvement of the living environment and 
promoting communities rather than profitability. Up to this date, MRI has 
had some problems; HR has caused speculation, breakdown of communities, 
conflict with tenants and associations, and insufficient public facilities. RA 
has caused a waste of resources, speculation, an unbalance with the view of 
neighboring regions, and an insufficiency of public facilities. MRI should 
implemented on community level and activate the potentiality of living 
environment. 
 
○ Establishment of a new role model for residents, NPO, local and central 
Government and formation of partnership 
The central Government provides funds through the MRI Fund, which is 
managed by them. The local Government plans, adjusts and manages local 
 152
MRI initiatives. Local Governments adjust the relations of various interested 
parties, and ensures that the development by land plot and business area is 
pursued within the context of the consistent blueprint of the city. Residents 
should play the role of the leader taking responsibility for the issues of the 
neighborhood. Non-profit organizations like the United States ’  CDC 
(Community Development Corporation) have been created to handle the 
issue of MRI in a certain neighborhood. The Neighborhood’s responsibility 
for the local issues should be emphasized. Nonprofit organizations should 
access MRI as a whole urban environment as well as from resident’s 
standpoints. Cooperation between different players is the most important 
factors. 
 
3) Detailed Implementation Strategy 
 
○ Switch to Neighborhood or Community-focused Upgrading from designated area. 
Communities need to be developed in a way that the overall living 
environment is improved in balance with the surrounding environment. This 
can be achieved by building a network in which close cooperation and 
partnership among different players in a local community is present. Also 
they have organic characteristics as they try to exist as individual realities. 
Therefore communities should develop in the direction where diverse 
subjects make a close partnership so as to consider neighboring environment 
and improve current living environments. 
In addition, by expanding project areas to cover neighboring regions, the 
concept of the upgrade should be changed to focus on the ‘community’ and 
the project should be in line with the existing life cycle of the region in 
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social, economic and cultural perspectives. Through the network-type 
development approach that combines neighboring areas in different forms, 
upgrade initiatives should focus on ‘neighborhood’ or ‘community.’ 
 
○ Proper urban facilities layout, coalition of residents and improved local identity  
The local infrastructure needs to be installed and upgraded in line with the 
size of the community in order to relieve traffic and maintain proper 
infrastructure in place. Residents need to have a leadership role in 
neighborhood upgrade initiatives. Also, creating public spaces such as plazas, 
resident’s halls, nearby sports facilities and kids playgrounds, allows the 
residents to contact each at other all times. That means actively securing the 
public space for the residents could create the conditions for the community 
life. Partnerships between the residents and Government should be formed, 
pursuing a healthy growth of cities and improving the quality of life by not 
focusing on selling houses or generating more profit. 
 
○ Securing basic self-reliance by maintaining the economic basis in the local community 
In order to create a true community, not only the physical infrastructure 
needs to be dealt with, but also some basis on which income can be 
generated should be built. When pursuing an MRI, not only the physical 
aspects of the area but also social and economic aspects of the residents 
should be fully considered. By locating small-scale businesses and industrial 
facilities inside a complex, basic self-reliance is secured and working places 
are provided near homes. For job creation and income, joint working spaces 
or credit union federations or small industrial facilities representing the 
features of the region should be secured to enable community economic 
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sustainability and allow working places to be near homes. Self-reliance and 
proximity of housing and office, and a sense of community are all important 
to activate regional community. 
 
○ Environmentally friendly upgrading considering the urban ecosystem 
Up to now, MRI has focused on improving the physical environments of 
designated areas, so it hasn’t been concerned with about the effects to 
neighboring areas. However, an environment friendly urban upgrade is 
required, minimizing the negative impact on the areas for development and 
its neighboring area while achieving the planned purposes. Away from the 
very approach of cutting hills and damaging the riverside, an approach that 
allows the region to be in harmony with the natural geography of the area 
while maximizing the usage of the land should be pursued. 
It is quite possible to have cities that look alike when an all-out demolition 
approach is adopted and it is not possible to curb the deterioration of the 
urban environment. Thus, re-adaptable and recyclable residential area 
upgrade approaches (redevelopment approaches that ensures longevity and 
happiness of people) needs to be utilized. To minimize the production of 
waste, using recycling resources that minimize the effects on the 
environment have become an important theme in the newly development 
project as well as existing urban areas. 
 
○ Creation of Proper Urban Management System 
In order to maintain the proper infrastructure, we need to cut costs by 
jointly utilizing public facilities and installing principal facilities. To prevent 
disorderly development, it is necessary to integrate the regions for upgrade 
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and establish plans for these integrated regions. This process should be 
pursued by forming a real and heartfelt cooperation system among the 
residents, enterprises, civil organizations, and administrative institutions 
(central and local Government). The MRI initiative must be based on 
partnership among resident organization, Government, civil organization, 
and enterprises. Mutual supplementation and cooperation of the players is 
required and its cooperation should develop to one that pursues a total profit.  
  
○ Combination of project and program approaches 
MRI projects in the past tended to plan one-time programs targeting a 
certain region, evaluate their input and output, and then wrap up. As a result, 
connectivity with the neighboring regions was not fully considered and costs 
and profits were the important element that determined whether an initiative 
was to be carried out or not. A project implemented on the community level 
is different from the existing redevelopment system. 
In order to activate communities by encouraging the participation of 
residents and for improvement of residential environment, a programming 
course that creates detailed and various implementation programs is required. 
In the past, the all-out demolition approach was adopted such as CHR, and 
RA for dilapidated housing. In the future, a new program for environmental 
upgrade should include all the residential areas that require upgrading. 
While the MRI schemes in the past adopted a project-type approach, the 
community development should be implemented in a programming approach 
in which opinions of the residents are reflected in the development process 
and related initiatives are organically connected and implemented. 
Examples of program-type approaches include the ones allowing people to 
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feel or have a regional identity, a sense of community, resident festivals, etc. 
The program approach attaches great importance to the continuous 
implementation of a program in which the feedback of the outcome of 
implementation is fully reflected to modify the program in a fully continuous 
cycle. This program approach can be used to form leadership in a 
community. 
 
○ Organization and specialization of residents  
Resident’s organizations are required to induce the participation of the 
residents in the full process of planning, installing and operating community 
facilities. In the political perspective, community development should evolve 
in a way that self-rule of the residents is promoted by guaranteeing the 
power of self-resolution not forced by the central Government or large 
enterprises. In the process, organization and specialization of resident’s 
organizations become very important as agreements can be reached on the 
social issues in a community once the resident organization is formed and 
work in cooperative relationship with the administrative authorities. 
Furthermore, it can aim at making a professional resident organization that 
allows the residents to resolve problems of the community with the expert 
and skills that they have learned themselves. 
For this end, a non-profit organization that educates residents is required. 
It is desirable for experts in the areas of urban planning, urban society issues 
and urban culture, etc to participate in neighborhood organizations to help 
educate people. Promotion of civil movements and activities of non-profit 
organizations are essential for this. 
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Table 13. Example of the Residential Environment Improvement Program   
Classification Details Subject 
Put commercial sector in good 
operation  
Enhance commercial facilities 
near the supplementary trunk 
roads 
Public 
Resident 
Neighboring 
Commercial 
Sector  
Put traditional market in good 
operation  
Improvement street vendors 
near markets 
Public 
Resident 
Secure open space Secure playgrounds for kids and 
pocket parks 
Public 
Improve traffic facilities and flow Establish and carry out Traffic 
Improvement Plan (TIP) by 
district 
Public 
Resident 
Secure and enhance green area Utilize the sidewalk as a green 
space 
Public 
Resident 
Secure parking lot Let the City Authority purchase 
the parking lot area and recover 
the original functions of the 
roads 
Public 
Housing renovation Partial renovation, painting, 
expansion 
Resident 
Secure sidewalk Use the wide roads as roads for 
cars and others as sidewalk 
Public 
Resident 
Pull down fence, 
Create shared yard 
Induce people to pull down 
fences and create a shared yard
Resident 
Improvement 
of 
Residential 
Environment  
Embellish pathway Pathway decoration and 
gardening, wall painting on the 
fence 
Resident 
Public and 
Welfare 
Facilities 
Community center,  
Daycare center for the elderly or 
pre-school children, Nursery school, 
After-school center 
Government support to secure 
the space but let the residents 
operate the facilities in 
cooperation among themselves. 
Utilize the human resources in 
the neighborhood as teachers 
for the daycare center and 
after-school centers 
Public  
Resident  
  
Secure cultural and sports facilities Creating a waterfront space at 
river to use as recreational 
space, Making a sports center 
Public 
Resident festivals Hold resident festivals on a 
regular basis 
Resident 
Social 
Economic 
Sector  
Secure shared working space Secure working space to allow 
people to work near home 
Public 
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Establish employment agency 
(non-profit) 
Establish employment agency 
that recommends maintenance 
workers to those people who 
need their skills 
Public 
Private 
 
Create self –governing organizations 
for residents 
Promote resident-led 
Residential Environment 
Improvement 
Public 
Resident 
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CHAPTER 6 
 
Nonprofit Organizations and Housing Rights in Urban 
Redevelopment in S. Korea  
 
 
 
Mun Su Park24 
 
 
 
1. Introduction: a Problem of Values  
 
Allow me to begin by relating a personal experience. In 2003 the head of 
the Ministry of Construction and Transportation invited members of housing 
rights organizations to comment on the ministry's new plan for housing 
construction.  We were first given an outline presentation of a mammoth 
long-range plan that would purportedly reduce housing poverty in 
Korea.  The head of the ministry then invited us to make recommendations 
on how to better implement the plan.  Due to the tremendous scale of the 
plan we were all put in a difficult situation.  The author was the second 
speaker.  When I began my statement with a reference to the history of 
                                            
24 Former professor of sociology, Sogang University, Seoul. Presently pastor of a Catholic Church 
in a district of Seoul that underwent urban development.  This research is carried out as policy 
research, with the intended aim of seeking ways to institutionalize certain values, rather than the 
more typical outsider objectivity of the social scientist. 
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violence in urban redevelopment the head of the ministry interrupted me and 
requested that I limit my remarks to practical suggestions for 
implementation.  I wanted to stress the need for participation of all the 
affected local residents, but I lacked the expertise necessary to express this 
need in terms that could be called "practical suggestions for 
implementation."  
The author perceives his lack of expertise to be symptomatic of a broad 
problem.  Voluntary nonprofit organizations in the housing rights movement 
promote values of local community, common good, fairness, and human 
rights.  The legal framework for urban redevelopment, on the other hand, 
limits its basis to efficiency in land use and public services, and protection of 
property rights, narrowly perceived.  
The author believes that failure to incorporate concepts of local 
community, common good (especially, here, the concept of housing rights), 
and fairness into the urban redevelopment law allows the projects to become 
more contentious and even violent.  There is a need to incorporate such 
concepts into the legal framework and the implementation of urban 
redevelopment projects.  
In this research the author has chosen for analysis three case studies where 
voluntary nonprofit organizations intervened in urban redevelopment 
projects to promote housing rights.  The purpose in analyzing these case 
studies is to see in what ways the organizations and the mobilized residents 
felt that residents were being treated unfairly, to see how the government 
tried to resolve the disputes, or failed to try, and to show how the lack of a 
legal expression of the 'common good' in terms of 'housing rights' hindered 
the government from acting as an arbiter in the disputes.  Two of the case 
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studies were recommended by a researcher at the Korea Center for City and 
Environment Research as having been objectively researched and 
summarized. The third case has no published research, only a copy-machine 
production of the documents relating to the renters organization.  The author 
has been a participant observer for the whole course of this redevelopment 
project.  
 
2. Concept Definitions 
 
1) Local community/ neighborhood  
 
Local community has been variously defined in the social sciences, but a 
thorough comparison of the definitions, shows three common points of 
agreement, namely, a sense of identity, cooperation, and residence in a 
common locality. The weakest binding force among these characteristics is 
the locality. (Hillery, 1968) On this basis, it would be misleading to consider 
local community to be a territorial unit.  It is much more true to the data to 
understand local community to be an ideal that is created and maintained 
through intentional action. The ideal may become apparent through the 
spoken myths of community identity, making a neighborhood a combination 
of myth and reality, the reality being the array of public and private services 
that are located nearby. (Angotti. 1993)  Emphasizing the aspect of 
conscious intention even to the point of highlighting protest action a 
neo-Marxist view sees communities as ideologically formed as a defense 
against the community scattering forces of capitalism. (Mollenkopf, 1983)  
In this research the author defines local community to be the sense of 
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identity that at least some of the residents of a given area maintain among 
themselves through cooperation and intentional action.  This definition 
considers local community to be a kind of intentional community that has 
residential area as a part of its sense of identity.  It also distinguishes local 
community from local complexes of public and private services resulting 
from urban planning and administered by local government.  Local 
communities certainly rely on such services and their identity and interaction 
is aided by such services,  but it is much clearer to conceptualize the 
phenomenon of local community by the sense of identity and the 
interpersonal relationships among the members.  Thus there may be many 
local public services and a local administration that people may call a 
'neighborhood' , but if there is little interaction among neighbors and no 
sense of identity as belonging to a neighborhood it is best to say that the 
phenomenon of local community is very weak, at least temporarily. In the 
third case study of this research, for example, there was almost no 
neighborly cooperation among renters in the area until the urban 
redevelopment project came. The threat to their homes from urban 
redevelopment helped create a 'defended neighborhood'. (concept taken from 
Suttles, 1972) From the viewpoint of housing adequacy the lack of local 
community should be regarded as a deficiency in security and a drawback to 
pleasant environment. Middle class apartments with restricted access and 
24-hour security guards exemplify a technological response to the difficulty 
of maintaining local community in an urban setting. 
A neighborhood is a relatively small local community based on 
relationships among persons who have a sense of living in close 
proximity.  In neighborhoods face-to-face relationships play a very 
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important role.  In the case of cooperative urban housing redevelopment 
projects" (those regulated by the hapdong jaekaebalbob) the mere 
designation of an area for urban redevelopment should be assumed to 
instigate neighborhood phenomena. 
Distinguishing in this way the concept of neighborhood from the 
structured facilities and services of a local administration allows one to 
consider various models of citizen participation in urban management (for 
example, Abbott, 1996; Schmid, 2001) to be scientifically developed ways 
of building local community in an urban setting.  
 
2) Common good, housing rights, fairness  
 
Are everyone's rights of equal validity? If in some public project the rights 
of all those affected cannot be assured, by what criteria can the ensuing 
competition for rights be resolved? The concept of the common good may be 
employed as an aid.  In one strong tradition of social ethics, that of the 
Catholic Church, the common good may be defined as "the sum total of 
those conditions of social life which enable persons to achieve a fuller 
measure of perfection with greater ease.  It consists especially in 
safeguarding the rights and duties of the human person." (Charles. 1982) 
This is obviously an ideal definition, and is useless until defined in a legal 
framework made applicable to a particular type of situation. In this research 
The author uses 'common good' only as a general concept expressing the 
ideal that public projects should have legal frameworks that safeguard as 
much as possible the rights and duties of the people affected by the projects. 
The particular legal framework that is absent from urban redevelopment 
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laws in S. Korea and needs to be adopted to safeguard as much as possible 
the rights and duties of the people affected by the projects is that of housing 
rights and local community.  
It goes beyond the scope of this research to try to suggest legal 
frameworks for housing rights and local community.  However, the 
elements that should be incorporated into such legal frameworks have been 
indicated in the "Habitat Agenda".  The right to adequate housing is there 
described as  
"an obligation of Governments to enable people to obtain shelter and to 
protect and improve dwellings and neighborhoods.  We commit ourselves to 
the goal of improving living and working conditions on an equitable and 
sustainable basis, so that everyone will have adequate shelter that is healthy, 
safe, secure, accessible and affordable and that includes basic services, 
facilities and amenities and the enjoyment of freedom from discrimination in 
housing and legal security of tenure." (Paragraph 24)  
The concept of local community is included in the Habitat Agenda's 
definition of 'sustainable human settlements.'   
"Sustainable human settlements are those that, inter alia, generate a sense 
of citizenship and identity, cooperation and dialogue for the common good, 
and a spirit of voluntarism and civic engagement, where all people are 
encouraged and have an equal opportunity to participate in decision-making 
and development." (Paragraph 30)  
Since S. Korea is signatory to the Habitat Agenda it can be taken as a 
starting point for molding a legal framework for the relevant public projects 
in this country.  
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Since the context of urban development in S. Korea is democracy and 
since urban development affects many people of different interests the 
author will define fairness in a public project as the opportunity for all whose 
interests are affected by the project to participate equally in the negotiated 
outcomes of the project.  The outcomes of the project should be decided 
through a negotiated process wherein methods of excluding affected persons 
are legally prohibited.  
 
3) Urban Redevelopment  
 
The author assumes that urban redevelopment should take account of local 
community.  Therefore urban redevelopment is defined here as the 
restructuring of the built environment of the local community or 
communities in a designated urban area.  The legal concept of urban 
redevelopment in Korea would designate a construction district ('gonggu', or 
'jigu'), its land and buildings, and the affected persons, based on ownership 
criteria.  The reason to add local community to this concept is that local 
community needs to be positively fostered in urban areas and because it is so 
gravely disrupted by the restructuring of its built environment.  For example, 
just as large construction projects require an environmental impact 
evaluation before they are carried out, urban redevelopment projects could 
require an evaluation of the impact on the local communities.  Under the 
present administration of urban redevelopment projects there is only a 
beginning of such an impact evaluation through the requirement of some 
fraction (e.g. 2/3) of the homeowners to agree to carry out redevelopment.  
If one accepts the concept of urban development to apply to local 
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communities rather than merely to a set of buildings and infrastructure, then 
the projects may be considered in three phases:  the preparatory phase 
(establishing acceptance by the local population and formation of a legally 
responsible body), the construction phase (planning, financing, construction 
proper), and the residential phase (taking up residence, fostering new local 
communities).  
Using the local community concept of urban redevelopment the author has 
included in the research a case study that includes promotion of local 
community in public rental housing built in an urban reconstruction project.  
 
3. The major types of housing redevelopment in Korea  
 
Several different laws govern urban housing redevelopment projects in S. 
Korea.  The two most commonly employed laws regarding redevelopment 
of housing districts are the Housing Redevelopment Law (Hapdong 
jaekaebal) and the Residential Environment Improvement Law.  The latter 
law allows for two very different methods of implementation, the 'site 
improvement method' and the 'multi-family housing' (=apartment) method. 
The points of contrast in the two methods are as follows.  Under the 
multi-family housing method the homeowners receive compensation for the 
land they own as well as a right to buy into the apartments to be built.  This 
allows them to avoid competition for the right to buy, a competition that 
usually involves paying a premium for priority in the selection of 
buyers.  They may also receive a housing loan if their apartment would be 
smaller than 85 sq. m.  In contrast, under the site improvement method the 
city designs a network of roads that allow fire fighting equipment access to 
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all facilities.  Owners of homes that must be demolished for new roads are 
compensated, while other homeowners may reconstruct their homes 
whenever it becomes financially feasible for them to do so.  Although these 
two methods contrast on the above points they both have the local 
government or a government agency as the project director and they both 
restrict the building of spacious homes that would attract outside speculators.  
The form of housing redevelopment that has been largely financed by 
outside speculators is the housing redevelopment form called 
'cooperative'.  Such projects are carried out by private developers, under 
contract to the homeowners association, proceeding with local government 
permission at each stage.  The private developers provide the capital, and in 
order to gain a profit pressure the homeowners and the government to allow 
the construction of spacious apartments.  In this type of redevelopment the 
rate of resettlement of the original homeowners has been only 10% to 
15%.  Most of the new apartment buyers are outside investors.  
 
4. The case of Songnim-dong, Incheon. Local community versus the profit motive  
 
1) The circumstances of Songnim-dong 
 
This case study report is based on a summary presented as part of a report 
to a presidential commission on societal integration (President's Commission, 
2003), and brought up to date through my own visit to the 
district.  Songnim-dong is made up mainly of illegal housing occupied by 
some of the original inhabitants, who were refugees from N. Korea, and a 
later influx of poor migrants from S. Korea. The area officially defined for 
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redevelopment is 52,484 sq. m. with 462 households.  
 
2) The issues that divided the residents  
 
In the Songnim-dong, Incheon, urban redevelopment district the residents 
were  divided over which method of redevelopment to pursue even very 
early in the process, between 1990 and 1995.  However, the choice of 
method in 1997 occurred not by objective evaluation, but rather by the 
ability of a private developer and one of the local leaders of the residents to 
convince enough homeowners to pursue the cooperative redevelopment 
form.  It may be assumed that the profit motive was the strongest factor in 
this choice.  However, many residents, with encouragement from some key 
members of the housing rights movement, saw that under that law's 
provisions most of the residents would sell their land and houses to outside 
investors, as usually happens under that type of redevelopment.  These 
residents wanted the redevelopment project to provide improved facilities for 
the local residents, rather than profit for outside investors.   
In Songnim-dong there was clearly a clash of values, whether to pursue 
truly local development for infrastructure and housing improvements with 
little or no monetary profit, or to pursue development with more profit, most 
of it going to outside investors or the private developer.  Most of the 
residents favoring improvement for local residents, however, had only a 
hazy notion of the concept.  Their deeper commitment to oppose the 
officials of the homeowners' association grew out of the struggles over 
issues of transparency and voting rights in the association of 
homeowners.  Raising these issues was good strategy that the 
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'pro-community' leaders employed to gain a legal advantage in their struggle 
for local community, since the law did not provide principles on which to 
settle the clash of values itself.  The researcher of this case study has 
pointed out that the government did not take steps to clarify the different 
purposes of the various housing redevelopment methods, nor evaluate which 
method would be most appropriate for this particular district, most of whose 
residents were poor.  
The residents who opposed the joint redevelopment project and wanted to 
change it to a housing environment improvement project received an 
opportunity to challenge the status quo when in 2001 the private developer 
that had in fact been the major promoter suffered financial setbacks and 
abandoned pursuit of the joint redevelopment project. The opposition at that 
time began to press for a change to redevelopment under the Residential 
Environment Improvement law.  Since many of the original homeowners 
(30%) had by that time already sold their property to outside investors the 
homeowners association was already divided into two different factions of 
local residents and a third faction of outside investors with very different 
interests and cultural background.  In terms of the phenomenon of local 
community some of the resident homeowners were hoping to gain some 
individual profit while leaving the neighborhood, while others felt they were 
protecting their community against outside exploitation.  
 
3) The role of nonprofit organizations  
 
In this case nonprofit organizations as such did not participate.  Rather, 
certain key members of the organizations provided indirect support by 
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giving encouragement, advice, helping with publicity, carrying out research, 
advocacy with the local government, helping with educational programs, and 
the like.  The link between nonprofit organizations and the residents was 
mainly one Presbyterian church whose minister has been a long-term leader 
in the urban poor movement and the housing rights movement, and a 
spokesman for human rights.  Since he is a homeowner in the district he is a 
member of the homeowners' association and exercised his membership to 
promote local community and housing rights.  He has often spoken of the 
need to build and protect local community against the threat of outside 
speculative investment.  Although some of the nonprofit organizations 
involved had connections with a political party the organizations all believed 
in helping to form local resident leadership with the ability to make their 
own decisions, namely, 'empowerment of the local residents'.  They did not 
try to pursue their own agendas.  From this viewpoint, the strategy of legally 
challenging the authoritarian, non-transparent actions of the officials of the 
homeowners association (failure to provide clear financial reports)  was not 
only a way to legally block progress of the joint redevelopment project, it 
was at the same time consistent with the goals of empowering a local 
community.  
 
4) The role of local government  
 
The law on cooperative redevelopment gives local government (in this 
case Dong-Gu, Incheon) responsibility to give permissions for each stage of 
the project based on its  compliance with the legal requirements.  According 
to the summary provided by the researcher of this case study the local 
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government interpreted its responsibility narrowly, that is, to wait for the 
homeowners' association to take decisions at plenary assemblies and provide 
the legally required applications for permission.  There was no attempt to be 
'proactive' through explanatory or educational programs, only a role of 
overseer, to know enough of the situation to pass judgement on its 
compliance or non-compliance with the law.  However, the fact that the 
project was delayed for many years by lawsuits and counter lawsuits shows 
the local government was not active enough in its role of overseer.  In 
contrast, the private developer, as is usual in this form of redevelopment, 
was proactive, actively promoting the residents to adopt the cooperative 
redevelopment method, and providing initial plans.  This contrast in 
attitudes accords with the basic dynamic of the cooperative redevelopment 
type, namely a private developer provides the capital for the project 
motivated by the opportunity for profit.  
 
5) The outcome of the clash of values 
 
In 2002 the opposition group led by the minister of the Presbyterian 
church  challenged the legitimacy of the homeowners association plenary 
assembly that had passed the project management plan.  They charged the 
officials of the homeowners' association of failing to provide a transparent 
account of the plan for the use of funds, and of failing to reveal the results of 
the official land and housing evaluation.  Before the court decision on this 
legal challenge the officials of the homeowners' association agreed to hold 
another plenary assembly, and in July of 2003 the opposition gained the 
majority of votes at the assembly, passing a resolution not to re-appoint the 
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association chairman, and to require a new project management plan.  
After a year of lawsuits over the project management plan, and with no 
elected association chairman, the homeowners' association finally held a 
plenary assembly in July of 2004, and the opposition group's candidate was 
elected to be the new chairman.  
The success of the opposition group in this election did not bring about a 
change in the type of redevelopment, however.  During the long struggle 
against the association leadership about 100 of the opposition homeowners 
sold their rights to outside investors, leaving the opposition group in the 
minority.  The group's candidate won the election nevertheless, based on the 
belief that he would more likely not fall into corruption.  Given the large 
number of outside investors already members of the homeowners' 
association it was too late to try to change the type of redevelopment project.  
 
5. Yongdu-dong, Daejeon.  Forced eviction and the right to livelihood  
 
1) Circumstances  
 
This case study has been published in the bi-monthly journal of the Korea 
Center for City and Environment Research. (Park. 2003) The Yongdu-dong 
redevelopment district #1 was approved for redevelopment of the 'residential 
environment improvement' type by the Jung-gu local government of Daejeon 
in 1994.  In 1996 the local government approved the redevelopment plan, a 
combination of the site improvement method and the multi-family housing 
method, and the Daejeon metropolitan government gave permission to build 
in October of 2000.  The redevelopment district is 57,385 sq. m. in area with 
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571 structures and 744 households.  
 
2) Conflict over compensation 
  
The redevelopment plan proceeded without major incident and without 
involvement of nonprofit organizations until the plan for compensation was 
announced.  The compensation was based on the land and housing 
evaluation carried out by the national government's official evaluation 
agency.  The major shock to many of the residents was that the evaluation 
set a much lower unit price than the going market price of nearby property, 
and as a result the amount of compensation for small property holders was 
too small to continue residence within the city, forcing them to move far 
outside the city to find housing at lower cost.  As a result 230 households 
out of the 587 households eligible for compensation banded together and 
formed an organization to press their demands.  They demanded 
compensation for land at the current market price, setting the cost of the 
apartments to be built at the current market value, allowing all registered 
property owners to move into the new apartments at no additional expense, 
and to apply the above criteria even to those whose property ownership is 
unregistered.  The Korean Housing Authority (KHA), the developer for this 
project, said it was impossible to accept these demands.  The Korean 
Housing Authority does not have the authority to carry out projects where 
there is government investment without expecting a return on the 
investment.  From that viewpoint KHA could hardly accede to the peoples' 
demands, since these demands allowed no way for the KHA to cover the 
costs of construction.  This knotty problem between the residents and the 
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KHA directly demonstrates a severe limitation imposed by the 
redevelopment law that doesn't include the concept of housing rights, only 
that of property rights.  
 
3) Involvement of nonprofit organizations  
 
In March of 2002 the KHA decided to carry out demolition of housing by 
force.  Two companies of riot police and 300 eviction agents were 
mobilized for the confrontation.  The residents resisted but could not block 
the demolition.  MBC TV was on hand to film the clash and broadcast the 
conflict on April 23, 2002.  
Many civil society organizations and religious organizations became 
aware of the violent eviction in Yongdu-dong and formed a coalition in 
solidarity with the residents.  After some months of planning the coalition 
was inaugurated at a cultural festival in the redevelopment district in 
September of 2002.  Under the influence of the nonprofit organizations the 
residents modified their demands to play down the aspect of personal gain 
and stress the more general principles of the right to adequate compensation 
for property loss and the right to livelihood, namely housing rights. 
  
4) Resolution of the conflict 
  
After a second forced eviction in July of 2002 brought on a response of a 
continuing 24-hour sit-in demonstration at the KHA headquarters in 
Chungnam Province and at the Jung-gu government offices, the KHA 
offered some compromises while still claiming the legality of their actions, 
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and called for an end to the demonstrations.  A continuing sticking point in 
the negotiations, however, was the residents' demand that the KHA reveal 
the actual construction costs of the project.  The KHA responded that it 
couldn't do so because that would invite similar demands by other residents 
of KHA housing and would undermine their projects.  
The sit-in demonstration dragged on for a year before a compromise was 
reached.  Mediation by experts finally led to the KHA allowing an 
exceptional granting of project apartment purchasing rights to the 
demonstrating residents.  The residents sold these purchasing rights on the 
undercover market, and their income was enough to allow them to obtain 
alternate housing within the city.  
 
5) Reflection  
 
This case study shows that the lack of a principle of housing rights in the 
redevelopment law limits the ability of the government to negotiate broadly, 
and invites resorting to forced eviction.  Lacking a housing rights concept 
the authorities had to agree to overlook the illegal sale of apartment 
purchasing rights to reach a compromise.  The case also shows the 
importance of the concept of fairness.  The forced eviction shocked the 
nonprofit organizations into action not only because of the violence involved, 
but because the residents were patently being excluded from participating in 
negotiations over the level of compensation they were to receive.  The 
refusal of the KHA to reveal actual construction costs is also a breach of 
fairness, in that it intentionally limits the information available in order that 
the residents may not truly become negotiating partners.  
 178
6. Renters' organization in the Muak-dong, Seoul redevelopment district. 
Community building, community fatigue, community rebuilding  
 
This case does not have a published report, but it has been documented by 
the renters' organization and by the author, who has been an active 
participant on the side of the renters during the whole course of this 
redevelopment project, and still lives in the district.  The presentation will 
focus only on the concern for local community, being careful at the same 
time not to distort the realities of the redevelopment project.  
 
1) Circumstances 
 
The Muak-dong urban redevelopment began with the public 
announcement of its designation in September of 1993 and the process of 
moving into the new apartments occurred early in the year 2000.  There 
were 950 renter households in the district, of which 550 opted for the right to 
public rental housing, while the remaining 400 households received 4 
million won compensation to cover moving costs.  
 
2) The renters' organization 
  
Under the law on cooperative redevelopment at that time renters were 
promised the right to move into public rental housing that the local 
government required the developer to build, and which would be 
administered by the city's development corporation.  The city was not bound 
by law at that time to provide such rental housing, the promise was only 
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codified in directives to city officials.  Also, the renters had rights only to 
move into the public rental housing which would be built in the 
redevelopment district.  This would require them to make two moves, the 
first at the start of the redevelopment process and the second, five or six 
years later when the public rental housing would be completed.  To avoid 
this hardship many of the renters formed an organization demanding that the 
city include on-site temporary housing in the redevelopment plan.  Up to 
200 households signed a statement of intent to join this organization, but 
when the renters organization was official launched on November 20, 1994 
it was composed of 121 households.  Many of the members at that time 
reported considerable pressure from their house owners to move out quickly, 
and this is the most likely cause of the decrease in membership.  The 
character of this organization was therefore partly a self-interest group, but 
partly a group committed to defending their local community.  The 
members for the most part had little personal contact with each other before 
forming the organization, but in the 6-month period of organization 
formation they had already developed close neighbor relations.  Also, 
among their motives for demanding on-site temporary housing was the need 
to avoid loss of neighborhood advantages, such as access to their jobs and 
economic opportunities, the friendships formed among their children at 
school, and the like.  
 
3) Nonprofit organizations 
  
A leader of the housing rights movement had made his family home in this 
district in 1989, with a view to protecting housing rights when urban 
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redevelopment would be undertaken.  Once redevelopment was officially 
announced he and a few members of his organization, the Korean Coalition 
for Housing Rights, began to make personal contact with renters to explain 
their housing rights in this redevelopment project.  In 1994 members of 
three other nonprofit organizations, all affiliated with the Catholic Church, 
joined in the educational effort.  
At that time the Korean Coalition for Housing Rights considered the 
demand for on-site temporary housing for renters in redevelopment districts 
to be one of their most important strategies.  The first reason was that 
compensation to renters did not consider the hardships imposed on them by 
loss of neighborhood advantages or accessibility.  The second reason was 
that on-site temporary housing would provide a good opportunity to 
strengthen local community that could carry over into the public rental 
housing.  The third reason was that the promise of public rental housing had 
a weak legal binding force, and residence on the site would assure that the 
residents would not be deceived.  These reasons provided strong motivation 
for many of the renter households.  On the other hand some members of the 
nonprofit organizations and some of the renters organization leaders 
apparently made the unfounded claim that if the renters moved away they 
would not be able to claim their right to public rental housing.  This claim, 
or the renters' misunderstanding that this claim had been made, led many of 
the renters to later feel they had been deceived, and that they had struggled 
vainly, when they saw that former neighbor renters who moved out before 
the struggle received the same public rental housing as those who 
struggled.  This contributed to the community fatigue phenomenon 
described in the next section.  
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4) Community fatigue  
 
Threats against the renters' organization made by members of the 
homeowners' association began as soon as education programs became 
public.  Violent attacks began as early as August of 1994, three months 
before the formal launching of the organization.  The violence, however, 
tended to increase the solidarity of most of the members in the short run, 
instigating the phenomenon of 'defended neighborhood'.  Amid official 
refusals to authorize on-site temporary housing the local administration 
finally gave tacit approval in 1996 for the renters to cooperate with the 
developer to build the temporary structures, as a move to break a continuing 
sit-down demonstration in the administrative offices.  
The renters gave the name 'Muak Maul' (=village) to their temporary 
housing, expressing the community identity they felt.  However, the 
solidarity they had experienced diminished during their period of 
residence.  The author will use the name 'community fatigue' for this 
phenomenon.  The first aspect of this is that after two years of living under 
constant threat of violence many residents refused to take part in the housing 
rights movement or even in local community activities, saying they just 
wanted to have quiet and recuperate.  The second aspect is that there were 
frequently rumors of corruption among community leaders, only a few of 
which were true, and this rumor-mongering coincided with the formation of 
factions, leading to disappointment with the community ideal.  Thirdly, their 
living quarters were packed close to each other with little sound-proofing, 
creating conditions more appropriate to a military barracks than to a local 
community in an urban area.  
 182
This phenomenon of community fatigue became most evident when 
almost no households would cooperate with the plan the leaders made for 
preparing their move into the public rental housing.  After the move into 
public rental housing one  of the leaders, along with a Catholic 
Church-sponsored social center, tried to convince other residents who had 
come from Muak Maul to form a 'renters representative association' as 
provided by law, but the response was only "If you campaign to be chairman 
we will support you from behind."  
 
5) Community rebuilding 
 
The Catholic Church social center has as one of its goals to support the 
residents' efforts at building local community.  This center became the 
recipient of funding for a Community Chest of Korea project in 2002.  The 
project has four objectives: 1) To promote the 'renters representative 
association' in public rental housing 2) Help form a welfare network 
available to the renters 3) Improve the sense of identity and cooperation in 
the vicinity 4) Connect the renters with professionals who can be of 
assistance.  In short, the objective is the empowerment of the residents of 
public rental housing, and at the same time building local community.  
After two years of increasing welfare opportunities for residents, 
promoting more enjoyable contact among neighbors, and sponsoring 
educational programs, the  project and the social action it sponsors are 
beginning to show results.  In July and August of 2004 a movement to 
demand provision for a senior citizens meeting room in the public rental 
housing led to the formation of a senior citizens organization and the 
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establishment of their meeting room in October.  A wives club has formed 
since then, and the residents have officially formed an election management 
committee to oversee the election of representatives for the renters 
representative association.  Residents from Muak Maul are playing 
important roles, though not exclusive roles, in this development, perhaps 
indicating the passing of the 'community fatigue' phenomenon.  
 
7. Summary  
 
This research is based on the assumption that local community is a value 
that must be actively promoted in urban areas, and therefore that urban 
housing redevelopment projects should have a legal framework for assessing 
its impact on local community and on planning to promote and rebuild local 
community.  It has also assumed that in order for the arbiter to have 
leverage in arbitrating conflicts of interest in urban redevelopment projects 
the legal framework should incorporate a concept of the common good, in 
this case best represented by protecting the housing rights of the 
residents.  The research used case studies to exemplify the kinds of 
considerations that will be needed to construct such a legal 
framework.  Therefore, it is not possible to draw conclusions from the study, 
only to indicate what the case studies have suggested.  
The first two cases studied show the profit motive challenging, or 
overcoming, motivation for building community.  This indicates that the 
legal framework should design a win-win situation where the benefits of 
local community can be enhanced in the project at the same time that 
participants are protected against loss, and the chance for outside investors to 
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reap large gains is minimized.  
The Incheon case shows that the low income families could not hold out 
for long without enhancing their incomes, and therefore they abandoned 
local community by selling out to outside investors.  Promoting local 
community requires that the project not be dragged out too 
long.  Small-scale projects would seem preferable to large-scale projects.  
The cases show that the residents share in the very strong widespread 
expectation of making landfall profits in land and housing.  Unless the 
chance for such profits is much reduced even a good legal framework 
protecting housing rights would probably be manipulated to be used for 
profit-taking.  Because people tend to judge their wins and losses based on 
the expectations they had when investing, as long as this expectation for 
large profits exists it probably would not be possible to design a win-win 
situation for both local community building and redevelopment project 
profit.  
The cases show that people are powerfully motivated to protest when they 
perceive they are being excluded or treated unfairly or threatened.  For an 
arbiter to be able to play a good role in arbitrating conflicts there must be not 
only an ideal of the common good that is defined by law, but also a 
procedure for carrying out the project that allows all affected persons to 
sense that they are included in the negotiation process.  There is a consistent 
finding in the case studies that the local administration or the police do not 
take on the role of arbiter in redevelopment conflicts.  The research here 
would indicate that since the law does not provide for the common good nor 
include a procedure that enhances fairness, the administrators and police lack 
meaningful ways to arbitrate conflicts.  The assumption in this research has 
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been that urban redevelopment takes place in a democratic arena of 
negotiations.  There is clearly a need to establish arbitration procedures 
other than the court system, which necessarily takes a long time.  The 
arbiter could be an ombudsman or a commission composed of a variety of 
knowledgeable persons, or a part of local administration. This research does 
not indicate what body would best act as arbiter.  
Since local community and housing rights have value for the common 
good but their benefits are not as apparent to individual residents as 
expectations of profit, when local community and housing rights will be 
included in the legal framework of redevelopment projects it will be 
necessary to have specially trained persons available, such as community 
organizers or community welfare workers, to aid in communications, 
information dispersal, education programs, consensus formation strategies 
and the like.  
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CHAPTER 7 
 
PRIVATE SECTOR HOUSING RENEWAL IN 
ENGLAND AND WALES: the impact of changing 
legislation 
 
 
 
By Richard Groves 
 
 
 
1. Introduction 
 
An earlier paper in this series outlined the way in which housing and 
urban regeneration programmes had evolved in the United Kingdom up to 
new legislation proposed in 200225.  The paper highlighted the distinctions 
between private sector housing renewal programmes and the much broader 
programmes of urban regeneration which have been taking place in the UK.  
It drew attention to the fact that private sector housing renewal programmes 
are increasingly seen as but one of a number of different policies necessary 
for the implementation of effective urban regeneration initiatives.  
Additional policies which are often seen as necessary for  urban 
                                            
25Rick Groves and Christopher Watson, (2002) Housing and Urban Regeneration Programmes in the 
United Kingdom in Urban Squatter Policies: the case of Korea and UK, Korea Research Institute 
for Human Settlements in collaboration with CURS, University of Birmingham.  
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regeneration programmes are likely to include, training and local economic 
development opportunities, crime prevention measures, measures to 
eliminate fuel poverty and improve energy efficiency, a variety of social 
development programmes, community safety initiatives, etc.  This paper 
focuses on measures for private sector housing renewal.  In 2002 the two 
governments in England and Wales introduced significant changes in the 
way that local authorities should administer private sector renewal 
programmes. Accordingly, this paper not only seeks to update the earlier one 
by outlining the principles underpinning the ‘new’ policy, but also to 
compare these principles with those of the ‘old’ policy and finally, to draw 
some conclusions relevant to circumstances in Korea.  
 
2. Principles underpinning private sector housing renewal programmes in 
England and Wales prior to 2002 – the ‘old’ system 
 
The principles underpinning private sector housing renewal policies in 
England and Wales up to 2002 were relatively simple.  For many years 
there has been a statutory minimum standard for the housing stock (both 
public and private) known as the ‘fitness standard’, (see Groves and Watson, 
2002).  This standard has evolved over time, but in recent years especially 
has been criticised for not having kept pace with public aspirations for an 
improvement in the quality of accommodation, particularly as the new 
millennium approached.  Local authorities had a statutory duty to survey 
housing conditions in their area and to draw up policies for maintaining 
standards, not only in ‘social housing’, (owned by local authorities and 
housing associations or Registered Social Landlords – RSLs), but also in 
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accommodation which was privately owned (both owner-occupied property 
and that owned by private landlords).  The latter now accounts for 80% of 
the housing stock in England.  When a local authority housing department 
(LHA) identified ‘unfitness’, i.e. properties which failed to meet the ‘fitness 
standard’, the LHA had a statutory duty to tackle the problem without delay.  
The authority had three options, firstly, to improve the property using an 
array of different types of means-tested grant aid; secondly, to take 
‘enforcement action’ over the property, (i.e. to require the necessary works 
to be undertaken through the use of legal procedures); or thirdly, to include 
the property or properties within an area-based initiative of one sort or 
another so that its condition was likely to be addressed within the 
foreseeable future.  By bringing these different elements of their local 
programmes together, LHAs were compiling local private sector housing 
renewal strategies and these were included within the overall housing 
strategies which local authorities were required to produce annually in order 
to bid for funds from central government. 
 
During the latter part of the 1990s especially, government funding for 
grant aid towards the improvement of private sector housing diminished 
quite rapidly and this had three consequences.  Firstly, there was a 
movement away from area-based approaches to the improvement of 
individual properties.  Secondly, the objectives of private sector renewal 
programmes were broadened to take on new concerns, such as the energy 
efficiency of the dwelling, or the installation of special measures (e.g. aids 
and adaptations) to encourage the elderly and disabled to remain in their own 
homes rather than move on to institutional accommodation.  Thirdly, there 
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was a growing recognition that effective renewal programmes needed a 
‘neighbourhood management’ focus in order to sustain levels of investment 
already made in an area.  The impact of these trends was to create a 
situation where there were increasing demands on government for funds to 
help support private owners maintain their properties.  This, the Labour 
government clearly felt was too costly and in reviewing its commitment to 
home-owners concluded that its objectives towards the private sector were as 
follows 
 
h The government wished to encourage the opportunity of a decent 
home for all 
h It recognised that by no means all home-owners were affluent, but 
that many were elderly or disabled and unable to maintain their 
properties without some form of assistance and that others lacked the 
financial means to keep their properties in reasonable condition – 
hence it recognised the need to provide support in order to sustain 
home-ownership, especially amongst some groups of the population 
h It re-asserted the fact, however, that property-owners were 
responsible for the maintenance of their dwellings and not the 
government, and 
h Concluded that the government was willing to intervene to assist 
owners financially in order to improve access to the sector, (for key 
workers, etc.); to protect the vulnerable; and to prevent the collapse 
of private markets in areas of falling demand.26 
                                            
26 These observations were made by a senior civil servant from the Office of the Deputy Prime 
Minister (ODPM) in a formal presentation given at the University of Birmingham in November 
2002 
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There were four elements to the government’s new proposals for tackling 
the problems of private sector housing renewal.  These were, firstly, the 
declaration of a programme of nine Housing Market Renewal Area 
Pathfinder projects (HMRAs).  These were much larger and more 
ambitious than previous area-based programmes aimed at addressing the 
issue of ‘low demand’ in parts of the midlands and north of England.  A 
separate paper27 will be presented outlining the aims and characteristics of 
these particular projects.  Secondly, the government introduced new 
legislation in 2002 which gave local authorities a great deal of discretion in 
providing “assistance” to home-owners and private landlords for the 
purposes of maintaining and improving their properties.  This legislation 
was called the Regulatory Reform (Housing Assistance) Order (RRO) and 
related to England and Wales.  The third element to the government’s new 
package of measures was the adoption of a new ‘Decent Homes’ standard.  
This will replace the ‘fitness standard’ and is outlined in Appendix 1.  It 
will be accompanied by a new method of assessing the condition of a 
property, the Housing Health and Safety Rating System, (HHSRS) which is 
outlined in principle below.  The final element of the government’s 
proposals includes a new Housing Bill which is expected to be approved by 
government very shortly and to become law during 2005.  The Housing Bill 
contains several measures which will strengthen local authorities’ powers to 
assist private owners, but most significantly it includes measures to 
introduce a mandatory licensing scheme for private rented properties called 
Houses in Multiple Occupation (HMOs).  HMOs are properties in which 
the facilities are shared by more than one household and these often 
                                            
27 See, Bailey, P. (2004) Housing Market Renewal: a strategic approach to changing housing 
demand. 
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constitute a high risk in terms of fire prevention.  With the exception of the 
HMRA programme each of these proposals will be considered in turn. 
 
3. The Regulatory Reform Order 2002   
 
The RRO swept away much of the prescriptive legislation relating to grant 
aid and gave local authorities almost complete discretion in the way they 
choose to assist home-owners and private landlords.  It introduced a general 
power enabling an LHA to provide assistance “in any form” to “ any person” 
for the following purposes 
 
h To acquire living accommodation  
h To adapt or improve living accommodation  
h To repair living accommodation  
h To demolish buildings comprising living accommodation and to 
construct replacement accommodation  
 
The general power was subject to a number of safeguards; firstly, that an 
LHA has not only adopted but has also published its private sector housing 
renewal policy.  Secondly, local authorities were to ensure that individual 
householders received appropriate advice and guidance about the nature of 
the assistance available and thirdly, that any conditionality surrounding the 
availability of assistance was made in writing to the individual householder.  
These powers gave considerable discretion to LHAs over the use of what by 
now are very modest public funds to assist with the maintenance of private 
housing standards.  
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There were a number of key principles underpinning the RRO.  First and 
foremost, the RRO saw a continuation of the principle of ‘enabling’ for local 
authorities.  This follows the assumption that local authorities are best 
placed to provide a strategic policy framework for private sector housing 
within their local area, but other agencies are comparatively better placed to 
implement this strategy.  The opportunity for local authorities to prepare 
local strategies for their area is undoubtedly a strength of the new approach 
and the fact that they now have greater discretion over the way in which they 
tackle local problems should also be an advantage under the new system. 
 
Perhaps the second most significant principle was the notion of ‘leverage’ 
built into the RRO.  As mentioned above, the public resources committed 
to assist private owners diminished rapidly during the 1990s and the 
government wished to see the majority of private owners taking full 
responsibility for the maintenance and repair of their properties.  Hence, for 
some years now, successive governments have encouraged local authorities 
to try to generate more private sector investment into private sector housing 
renewal programmes.  This may seem somewhat ironic, but the problem in 
the UK has been that private lenders (the banks and building societies) have 
often been reluctant to lend relatively small sums for repair and maintenance, 
or indeed to lend at all in some areas of ‘high risk’ housing (which may 
perhaps be 100 years old).  One of the most important innovations 
introduced under the RRO was the emphasis on loans rather than grants – a 
very significant shift in policy.  The key mechanism for encouraging more 
private investment was seen to be the ‘equity release loan’ 28 .  
                                            
28 ‘Equity release loans’ are loans which draw on the ‘equity’ (the proportion of the total value of a 
property which is owned by the home-owner).  Various types of equity release loan exist but the 
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Unfortunately, private lenders have been reluctant to introduce these new 
forms of loan because they are deemed to be high risk and other ‘not for 
profit’ financial intermediaries are also taking some time to develop these 
products.  The RRO aims to reduce the dependence on grants rather than 
abandon them completely, but local authorities have found the task of 
encouraging private sector loans alongside the availability of grants to be a 
very challenging aspect of the new approach  
 
A third principle is that where public funds are employed they should be 
used in the most cost effective way by being targeted on ‘vulnerable’ 
households.  This also constitutes an important change in approach because 
the previous system was based rather more on the condition of the property.  
The RRO requires local authorities to identify vulnerable households and to 
focus their efforts on these households, so that over time there is a marked 
reduction in the number of vulnerable households living in properties that do 
not meet the ‘Decent Homes’ standard.  
 
From the initial premise that the RRO is to encourage an enabling 
approach it follows that local authorities must work in partnership with other 
agencies in order to deliver such programmes effectively.  The most likely 
partners envisaged at the outset of the policy were the major lenders (banks 
and building societies) and Home Improvement Agencies (HIAs)29.  Many 
local authorities and RSLs have indeed established HIAs, but very few local 
                                                                                                      
simplest type is administratively very efficient because it does not involve regular loan repayments 
and is repaid as a single sum on the sale or transfer of ownership of the property.  In some cases 
this can be on the death of the owner. 
29 HIAs  may be run directly by local authorities, but they are more likely to be ‘not for profit’ 
agencies set up by a housing association or RSL.  HIAs usually provide services to the elderly or 
disabled and they are often jointly funded by central government and the local authority or an RSL.    
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authorities have been successful in forging partnerships with commercial 
lenders. 
 
Because of the explicit requirement on local authorities to provide 
appropriate advice and guidance to householders, it was anticipated that a 
further strength of policies under the RRO would be a re-emphasis on 
preventive approaches.  Hence, local authorities would be expected to 
encourage home-owners to undertake timely repairs to their properties and 
would encourage and develop publicity materials, guidance and training 
programmes that would enable owners to do so.  These programmes would 
be introduced as a complement to more ‘remedial’ approaches involving 
major repairs and improvements and in some instances, where properties are 
badly deteriorated, clearance programmes. 
 
Every five years the government undertakes a national survey of house 
condition.  Consistently, over many surveys, the worst housing conditions 
in England and Wales have been found in the private rented sector (PRS).  
The last house condition survey in 2001 was no exception and it found that 
49% of the PRS stock failed the ‘Decent Homes’ standard and almost a third 
of private tenants constituted ‘vulnerable households’ (ODPM, 2003a).  For 
these reasons targeting improvement action on the PRS is a government 
priority.  Even under the previous system where grants were available to 
private landlords, however, they remained the least receptive group to house 
improvement programmes.  As a result, the government’s ‘new’ approach 
is to encourage ‘responsible landlords’ but to introduce greater powers to 
deal with those who are less scrupulous.  To deal especially with the latter, 
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the Housing Bill contains two proposals, firstly, powers to register 
accommodation in the PRS which is most at risk, i.e. Houses in Multiple 
Occupation (HMOs) and secondly, the discretion to serve a Management 
Order, (i.e. to take over the management of a private rented property), where 
the property is being inadequately managed by a landlord or his agent.   
 
4. The introduction of the ‘Decent Homes’ standard  
 
The Labour administration responded to criticisms that the ‘fitness 
standard’ no longer provided an adequate standard for housing in the UK in 
the new millennium and it introduced a new standard, the ‘Decent Homes’ 
standard in 2000.  The new standard was first introduced into the public 
sector, but was subsequently extended to the private sector housing stock in 
2002.  The aim of the standard is to create a property, “.. which is wind and 
weather tight, warm and has modern facilities”, (ODPM, 2004a).  The 
standard is outlined in more detail in Appendix 1, but broadly there are four 
criteria that a decent home is required to meet.  These are 
 
h It meets the current ‘fitness standard’ 
h It is in a ‘reasonable’ state of repair  
h It has ‘reasonably’ modern facilities and services, and  
h It provides a ‘reasonable’ degree of thermal comfort. 
 
Henceforth, LHAs will be expected to identify properties which fail to 
meet these standards and to draw up appropriate local policies, either for 
clearing such properties, or for bringing them up to a standard which is 
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either equivalent to, or better than, the ‘decent homes’ specification.  As far 
as government priorities regarding the expenditure of subsidies are 
concerned, however, local authorities are expected to target ‘vulnerable’ 
households living within the properties that fail to meet this standard.   
 
5. The Housing, Health and Safety Rating System (HHSRS) 
 
At the same time that the government is introducing a new standard it has 
also chosen to introduce a new system of assessment for the condition of the 
housing stock.  Under the ‘fitness’ standard there were a series of nine 
criteria, (structural stability, freedom from serious disrepair, freedom from 
dampness prejudicial to health, etc), and these criteria were subjectively 
interpreted by Environmental Health Officers (EHOs) to determine whether 
a property was ‘unfit’ and therefore in need of action or not.   Under the 
HHSRS, the aim will be, not simply to record these defects in a property, but 
to evaluate the effect of the defect on the inhabitants of the property.  
Hence, 29 potential hazards have been identified in connection with the 
residential environment and these have been grouped into four different 
types of hazard, namely, ‘physiological requirements’ including the impact 
of excessive cold (or heat), the effects of dampness and mould growth, etc; 
‘psychological requirements’ such as overcrowding or the effects of noise; 
‘protection against infection’ including food safety and domestic hygiene, 
etc. and ‘protection against accidents’ such as falls, the danger of fire, or the 
hazard posed by hot surfaces and materials.  A full list of the hazards is set 
out in Appendix 2.  Once a hazard is identified the EHO must assess how 
dangerous it is and what is the likelihood of the hazard causing harm to the 
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occupants.  This is then scored by a software system and banded into 
different scores from A – J.  Bands A-C constitute a property with 
‘Category 1’ hazards and the LHA will have a statutory duty to address these 
hazards without delay, as in the ‘old system’.  Bands D-J will constitute 
‘Category II’ hazards and the LHA has discretion as to whether it wishes to 
take any action against such properties.  A ‘decent home’ will be one that is 
free of all Category 1 hazards. 
 
A range of actions will be available to LHAs in order to deal with 
Category 1 and Category II hazards.  These will range from the serving of a 
Hazard Awareness Notice where an owner will be notified of the presence of 
a hazard but no further action will be taken, through to a Demolition Order, 
where, because of the condition of the property, it is deemed to be unsafe. 
 
6. The Housing Bill 
 
The final set of measures which constitute part of the reform of the 
statutory provisions for private sector housing renewal are those contained 
within the Housing Bill which is currently proceeding through Parliament.  
The Bill contains a number of provisions relating to the private sector, but 
the most significant are those dealing with the private rented sector (PRS).  
When the Labour government came to power in 1997 it included within its 
manifesto the commitment to introduce a mandatory licensing scheme for 
Houses in Multiple Occupation (HMOs) in the PRS.  The Housing Bill 
finally fulfils that commitment.  It intends to introduce powers which 
require landlords of HMOs, or their managing agents, to seek a licence in 
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order to let their premises.  Mandatory licensing will apply to HMO 
properties of three storeys or more, occupied by five or more persons 
comprising two or more households.  Discretionary powers will also exist 
for local authorities to adopt an additional licensing scheme for smaller 
properties but in these circumstances an LHA will have to secure the 
approval of the Secretary of State. The licence will seek to ensure that 
 
h The licence holder is a ‘fit and proper’ person to manage the 
property  
h The HMO must be reasonably suitable for the number of persons 
living there  
h The management arrangements must accord with standards 
prescribed in an accompanying Code of Practice  
 
The license would normally be for five years and conditions may be 
attached in respect of any of the above, or for additional reasons, (e.g. 
training for the landlord or the manager).  It will be unlawful for the 
landlord to receive rent for the property if it is not licensed. 
Where a local authority, or its agent, refuses to grant a license or 
subsequently revokes a license for whatever reason, the LHA has the power 
to serve either an Interim Management Order (for 12 months), or a Full 
Management Order on the premises.  The local authority may then manage 
the property directly or pass it over to a qualified managing agent to manage 
on behalf of the landlord. 
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7. A comparison of the ‘new’ and ‘old’ systems of private sector housing renewal 
 
These provisions, the HMRA Pathfinder programme, the RRO, the 
introduction of the ‘Decent Homes’ standard, the adoption of the HHSRS 
and, finally, the innovation of  mandatory and discretionary licensing 
schemes for HMOs in the private rented sector, constitute the government’s 
new provisions for maintaining housing standards in the private sector.  
Whilst there are many technical and procedural modifications, the main 
strategic changes from the previous approach are as follows 
 
h A much greater dependence on private funds than hitherto to secure 
improvements in the private sector stock.  In 2001 the English 
House Condition Survey, (ODPM, 2003a), estimated that the total 
expenditure of all private owners on their properties was £24 billion 
and this compared with an overall estimated cost of £41 billion to 
make good the repairs necessary for all the non-decent housing stock 
in the private sector.  The government clearly hopes that, through 
greater advice and guidance and the development of innovative 
financial products in order to ‘release’ the equity in the housing 
stock, a greater proportion of this private investment will help to 
remedy conditions in the ‘non-decent’ stock in particular. 
h A greater reliance on partnership with other agencies than hitherto.  
Local authorities have always relied on private building contractors 
to carry out the actual building works, but up to now they have 
played a major part in the implementation of private sector house 
improvement programmes.  It is clear by the encouragement and 
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funding being given by the government to independent agencies 
(HIAs) that, henceforth, local authorities will be expected to take 
more of a strategic role and less of a role in the implementation of 
programmes. 
h Having said this, the government has strengthened local authorities’ 
powers for dealing with recalcitrant landlords as far as high risk 
HMO properties are concerned.  Unfortunately many authorities 
see these measures as highly problematic since they deal only with a 
very small part of the PRS rather than the sector as a whole.  This 
is likely to mean that landlords seek to evade the legislation by 
arguing about the definition of an HMO, rather than being willing to 
acknowledge the merits of a licensing scheme. 
h The government’s continued emphasis on targeting vulnerable 
households in non-decent accommodation is likely to consolidate 
further the move away from area-based programmes.  This would 
be of little consequence but for the fact that many of the larger 
urban authorities contend that the ‘pepper-potting approach’ (of 
scattering investment into individual properties) is a much less cost 
effective way of maintaining standards in the private sector than 
improving whole blocks or streets of properties at the same time. 
h The RRO has re-focussed attention, however, on the issue of 
preventative maintenance.  This was an area of policy which was 
important prior to the changes introduced by the Housing Act of 
1989, but was virtually excluded thereafter.  The specific 
requirement in the RRO to provide advice and guidance to 
householders over the maintenance and repair of their properties, 
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however, was regarded as likely to ensure local authorities gave 
more emphasis to prevention as part of their local policies. 
 
8. Progress so far: the initial impact of the RRO 
 
The RRO was approved in July 2002 and actually came into force in July 
2003.   It is important to acknowledge therefore that it remains ‘early days’ 
in the implementation of the new legislation.  What is clear already, 
however, is that it has involved a major change in the way that local 
authorities are expected to deliver their private sector housing policies.  The 
RRO is a reform which embodies a significant change in the organisational 
‘culture’ of local authorities and it is evident that this is likely to be 
extremely challenging. 
 
At the core of the new policy is the expectation that local authorities will 
be able to attract a significant amount of private finance to their programmes.  
Without this increase in ‘gearing’ it is acknowledged that policy measures 
will only ‘scratch the surface’ of the problem of housing conditions for 
vulnerable households.  This has presented difficulties at a number of levels 
for local authorities.  Firstly, it was originally envisaged that private lenders 
would be willing partners in this venture.  But the risks involved with the 
lending30, the relatively high costs associated with the administration of 
modest individual loans and the need for product development, have all 
tended to dissuade ‘High Street’ lenders that this is likely to be a profitable 
area of activity for them.  In anticipation of these difficulties, a number of 
                                            
30 Such risks include low-income borrowers; the fact that properties may fall in value over time; that 
properties may be subject to local authority policies, such as clearance programmes, etc 
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‘not for profit’ agencies have emerged acting in the capacity as financial 
intermediaries.  These agencies have sought to borrow private finance on a 
‘wholesale’ basis and to use local authority subsidies to offer low-cost and 
equity release loans to consumers via local authorities and their Home 
Improvement Agencies (HIAs).  These financial intermediaries are 
relatively modest organisations, however, and are not yet able to offer a 
comprehensive service on a national basis.  As a result, many local 
authorities have been frustrated in their attempts to secure private finance 
and are proceeding to offer loans using their own sources of public finance.  
Unfortunately, under current funding regulations this carries the 
disadvantage that they cannot increase the gearing of the funding available 
through the attraction of private finance.  It also means that many local 
authorities are seeking to develop products and procedures for which they 
lack both the experience and the necessary resources. 
The whole process of attracting private finance has therefore been much 
more protracted than originally envisaged and the requirement on all 
authorities to prepare and publicise their policies with the expectation that 
they would incorporate policy changes recognising the need for private 
finance has proved problematic.  It has also meant that the scaling-up of 
resources, which was to have accompanied the availability of private finance, 
has yet to take place.  This has exposed the fact that many authorities 
actually employ very few staff in this area of work, (Groves and Sankey, 
2004).  Hence, the scope for genuinely innovative programmes involving 
radical approaches and a scaling-up of activity has, so far, been limited. 
 
Despite the slow progress, it is evident that many local authorities remain 
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supportive of the policy changes made by government.  The recent rapid 
inflation in house prices has also tended to support the shift in policy31.  
But the challenge of delivering loans, or a package involving subsidised 
loans as opposed to grants, is clearly a significant one and there is currently 
something of a hiatus in the delivery of private sector renewal programmes.  
There is, nonetheless, some innovation taking place under the RRO, but 
these difficulties over private finance mean that this is generally in areas 
which remain subject to grant aid.  Hence, the area of policy most actively 
pursued by local authorities is that involving measures to improve energy 
efficiency and to tackle fuel poverty amongst private householders.  This is 
an area in which virtually all authorities are active, where partnerships are 
commonplace and energetic, and expenditure levels are high.  The 
increased opportunities afforded by the RRO for providing re-housing have 
also led to innovative activity for the disabled in particular and for those 
affected by clearance programmes.  Many local authorities have also used 
their increased discretion under the RRO to revise their grant policies and to 
seek to make them more adaptable and flexible to respond to local problems.  
A pattern has emerged, therefore, in which authorities are introducing small, 
but very flexible grants to cover a wide range of circumstances including 
small repairs works, energy efficiency top-up grants, security measures, 
grants to expedite hospital release for elderly people, etc.  Local authorities 
are also exploring partnerships more thoroughly than they were, not only 
with RSLs, but often with neighbouring local authorities, to form consortia 
in order to access private finance, to deliver energy efficiency programmes, 
                                            
31 Research undertaken by the IMF shows an increase in house prices in the UK between 1997 and 
2003 at over 80% amongst the highest in Europe over the same period, (Financial Times, 
23/09/2004).  According to the article, the average price of a house in the UK at that time was 
£177,474. 
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to encourage the adoption of unified RRO policies and to tackle problems in 
the PRS. There is an increasing incidence of local authorities coming 
together to collaborate over the development and implementation of private 
sector policies.             
 
There are also some less positive outcomes of the RRO.  The most 
obvious of these is the likely shift in emphasis away from area-based 
programmes.  Whilst the RRO has removed the requirement for local 
authorities to meet certain criteria in declaring Renewal Areas and ODPM 
guidance continues to advocate area-based approaches, (ODPM, 2003b), 
diminishing public resources may mean that LHAs are increasingly reluctant 
to consider area designations.  Excluding the HMRA Pathfinder 
programme, the government’s current emphasis on targeting vulnerable 
households, the increasing demand for the use of public funds for aids and 
adaptations for the elderly and disabled, and the need to negotiate financial 
contributions with individual home-owners, are all likely to mean that fewer 
resources are available for area based programmes.   A second area where 
developments so far have been disappointing is in the promotion of 
preventative measures, (see above) .  Some authorities had impressive 
programmes of preventive care before the RRO, but the development of a 
much more pro-active approach towards preventative measures has yet to be 
taken on board by most LHAs.  
 
9. Implications of this discussion for Korea 
 
These legislative and technical changes to the way in which private sector 
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renewal programmes are being undertaken in England and Wales do not 
intrinsically mean that the ‘new’ policy is more or less relevant to similar 
policies in Korea.  At one level the greater discretion and autonomy 
available to local authorities in Britain is probably likely to have less 
relevance for local authorities in Korea, but in another important respect, the 
greater role envisaged for the private sector, or for other partners, in 
implementing private sector housing renewal in England and Wales, does 
suggest a measure of convergence in the nature of the policy between the 
two countries. 
 
In our original paper (Groves and Watson, 2002), we highlighted eight 
areas of consideration for comparisons between the policies of the two 
countries, several of these issues would seem worth revisiting in the light of 
the discussions in the interim and as a result of the policy changes made. 
 
1) Different approaches for different problems 
 
The changes to policy in England and Wales outlined above give even 
greater emphasis to local authorities to analyse the problems of the local 
housing market in their areas and to devise appropriate local solutions.  
This is a major strength of these policies in England and Wales.  It is also 
apparent, however, that local policies need to be located within the context 
of regional economic developments and other strategic policy instruments at 
city level.  Hence, private sector renewal programmes need to be 
considered in the context of a local authority’s overall housing strategy and 
they need to link closely with other related areas of activity, e.g. policies for 
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increasing the energy efficiency of the residential stock, or strategic 
priorities for the care of the elderly.  Housing issues cannot be considered 
in isolation and different approaches to different problems are both features 
of the ‘new’ as well as the ‘old’ policy in England and Wales. 
 
2) The sustainability of low-income home ownership 
 
Private ownership now accounts for 80% of the housing stock in England.  
Whilst the government appreciates that owner occupation is the preferred 
tenure of most of the population in England and Wales it is also aware that 
because of the age of the stock, demographic trends and income profiles the 
government is obliged to intervene in the market if standards are to be 
maintained amongst low-income home-owners.  The recent policy changes 
in England outlined the government’s willingness to invest heavily in failing 
markets through the HMRA programme in order to ‘turn these markets 
round’ and to help support vulnerable groups living in the worst housing 
conditions in the private sector.  But, in essence, the government is seeking 
to minimise its interventions by re-affirming that home-owners are 
responsible for the maintenance and repair of their own properties and 
through the use of equity release mechanisms to try to ensure they assume an 
increasing responsibility for the costs associated with ownership.  It 
remains to be seen whether this approach will be successful, but it does 
indicate that government support is essential to ensure the sustainability of 
low-income home-ownership and that where local markets are vulnerable, 
the role of the state becomes highly significant. 
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3) Lead agencies and partnerships 
 
The changes to private sector housing renewal policies in England and 
Wales have also confirmed the government’s wish that local authorities 
should assume a more strategic enabling role in relation to the housing 
market and rely increasingly on other partner agencies in order to oversee 
the actual implementation of maintenance and repair works.  The exception 
to this is where the powers available to local authorities are being enhanced 
with respect to unscrupulous private landlords of Houses in Multiple 
Occupation.  Whilst the encouragement of partnerships appears to be 
succeeding in the development of Home Improvement Agencies, in 
circumstances where RSLs and local authorities have now been working 
together for some years, it has been much more problematic over 
arrangements involving private finance.  It is also the case that new 
partnerships often take a long time to work through in practice. 
 
4) Upgrading and improvement versus clearance and re-building 
 
Despite the fact that market circumstances in Korea and the UK are 
markedly different this remains a politically contentious issue in both 
countries.  In England and Wales, those households subject to clearance 
activity retain a right to re-housing by a social housing agency (i.e. a local 
authority or an RSL) as well as financial compensation.  In recent years, 
however, attempts have been made to ensure that owners are not 
disadvantaged by the clearance process and the RRO has strengthened the 
opportunities to provide some degree of re-housing choice to those affected 
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by clearance programmes by bridging the gap between the amount of 
compensation payable and the costs associated with a replacement dwelling 
of a similar kind but in better condition.  This could well be difficult in a 
Korean context where tenants are often displaced as a result of clearance 
activity.  It does mean, however, that there should be clear and transparent 
methods for decision-making about the choice of clearance programmes and 
their impacts on the disadvantaged. 
 
5) Consultation and the involvement of the local community 
 
Our earlier paper, (Groves and Watson, 2002), concluded, “Community 
involvement and capacity building have become integral features of 
area-based programmes in the UK.  This is one of the main lessons from 
the UK experience …”  Whilst this remains true, it is conceivable (and a 
little ironic) that the RRO may result in less community consultation than 
hitherto because of the nature of the programmes and the fact that they give 
less emphasis to area-based programmes than to the improvement of 
individual premises which fail to meet the ‘decent homes’ standard.  
Nonetheless, it remains the case that community empowerment remains a 
key feature of area-based improvement and regeneration programmes in 
England and Wales. 
 
6) Financial support for neighbourhood renewal programmes 
 
The policy changes in England and Wales in respect of a mixed funding 
regime involving grant and loan packages in which loans would be secured 
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on the equity in the properties to be improved were forecast in our earlier 
paper, (Groves and Watson, 2002).  But as indicated above, the 
collaboration of the financial institutions and the development of equity 
release products has not yet proved successful in securing the financial 
changes envisaged by the government.  Of more strategic relevance is the 
question: how should urban renewal programmes be paid for?  Under the 
‘old’ system the British government was clearly concerned that 100% grant 
aid meant that residents were neither valuing the investment made to their 
properties as they should nor were they assuming sufficient responsibility for 
the maintenance and repair of their own homes.  A mixed funded system 
was seen, therefore, not only as a way of securing ‘leverage’ by attracting 
additional private funds, but also as a way of enhancing the responsibility of 
owners for the care of their properties.  As yet, however, this 
transformation has not been carried through in practice. 
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APPENDIX I 
Definition of a ‘Decent Home’ 
 
A decent home meets the following four criteria: 
 
A – It meets the current statutory minimum standard for housing 
     Dwellings below this standard are those defined as ‘unfit’ under  
     section 604 of the Housing Act 1985 as amended by Schedule 9  
     of the 1989 Local Government and Housing Act. 
 
B – It is in a reasonable state of repair     
        
   Dwellings which fail to meet this criterion are those where either: 
h One or more of the key building components are old and because of 
their condition, need replacing or major repair; or, 
h Two or more of the other building components are old, and because 
of their condition, need replacing or major repair. 
 
C – It has reasonably modern facilities 
 
   Dwellings which fail to meet this criterion are those which lack three  
   or more of the following: 
 
A reasonably modern kitchen (20 years old or less) 
 
A kitchen with adequate space and layout 
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A reasonably modern bathroom (30 years old or less) 
 
An appropriately located bathroom or WC 
 
Adequate insulation against external noise (where external noise is a 
problem) 
 
Adequate size and layout of common areas for blocks of flats. 
 
A home lacking two or less of the above is still classed as ‘decent’ 
therefore it is not necessary to modernise kitchens and bathrooms if a home 
passes the remaining criteria. 
 
D – It provides a reasonable degree of thermal comfort 
 
This criterion requires dwellings to have both effective insulation and 
efficient heating. 
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APPENDIX II 
Potential Domestic Hazards as defined by the Housing, 
Health and Safety Rating System (HHSRS) 
 
A – Physiological Requirements 
 
Damp and mould growth, etc  
Excessive cold 
Excessive heat 
Asbestos 
Biocides 
Carbon monoxide and fuel combustion products 
Lead 
Radiation 
Uncombusted fuel gas 
VOCs 
 
B – Psychological requirements 
 
Crowding and space 
Entry by intruders 
Lighting 
Noise 
 
C – Protection against infection 
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Domestic hygiene, pests and refuse 
Food safety 
Personal hygiene, sanitation and drainage 
Water supply 
 
D – Protection against accidents 
 
Falls associated with baths, etc 
Falls on the level 
Falls associated with stairs and steps 
Falls between levels (e.g. from windows) 
Electrical hazards 
Fire 
Hot surfaces and materials 
Collision and entrapment 
Explosions  
Poor ergonomics 
Structural collapse and falling elements 
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A strategic approach to changing housing demand in the 
UK 
 
 
 
Peter Bailey 
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1. Introduction and Background 
 
Much of the housing stock in the inner urban core of England’s northern 
towns and cities is a legacy of its 19th and 20th Century industrial past. This 
stock is typified by the high-density, grid pattern, pavement fronted, two up 
two down, terraced property that often informs perceptions of life in the 
region.  
 
In the mid 1990s, Local Authorities began to pick up on a new 
phenomenon in some of these areas. Properties that up until a few years 
earlier had been popular with a buoyant market began to sharply fall in value 
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and take longer and longer to sell. This weakness spread extraordinarily 
quickly and it was reported that the only market for properties soon came 
from private landlords looking for quick investment returns. In turn this led 
to further decreases in values, abandonment and increase in the number of 
empty properties. In Newcastle, for example, some whole neighbourhoods 
become abandoned over three years with houses being offered for sale for as 
little as £1, in areas of North Manchester private renting became the 
predominant tenure type compared to national levels of around 10% and in 
some areas of Liverpool vacancy rates rose to over 40%. 
 
To compound this problem, at the same time as some private sector 
markets were failing many northern urban Local Authorities were also 
reporting falling demand for their social housing stock. On large peripheral 
estates in particular levels of turnover and voids had markedly increased 
whilst demand fell. Research carried out for Government by Edinburgh 
University estimated that in 2000 over 850,000 properties were in low 
demand. 
 
The scale and pace of this problem was as unexpected as it was 
unparalleled. To better understand what was happening a collective of most 
severely effected Local Authorities, who were centred on the cross country 
M62 motorway, commissioned the Centre for Urban and Regional Studies at 
the University of Birmingham to research the drivers behind this market 
change and to try and examine its long term significance.  
 
The CURS work  “Changing Housing Markets and Urban Regeneration 
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in the M62 Corridor” was published in February 2001 and had an immediate 
impact on policy thinking. The “M62 Report” examined housing market 
change across 18 Local Authority areas and most significantly mapped areas 
at risk of future changing demand. It identified a number of factors and 
weakness indicators that appeared to be the significant drivers of area 
abandonment and falling demand using these to calculate the potential scale 
of the problem.  Within this research area alone it was estimated that 
around 280,000 properties were at risk 
 
The research confirmed the significance of the problems and large scale 
risk facing the core of older urban areas and identified that a new approach 
to regeneration and renewal would be needed.  The M62 Report started the 
debate about the need for the creation of a Housing Market Renewal policy 
and for large scale funding to support structural regeneration in the older 
industrial centres. 
 
This paper looks at how and why this policy has been developed and 
delivered with a particular focus on the North West of England.   
 
2. Market failure 
 
1) Causes of market failure 
 
In addition to mapping the extent of the problem, Government and Local 
Authorities needed to better understand the causes of market failure to 
ensure that the solutions developed were appropriate. 
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A constantly heard view made by those visiting low demand areas was “If 
these houses were in  (London, Bath etc) they would be worth millions”  It 
is in answering this point that Professors Ian Cole and Brendan Nevin, in a 
reflective paper for ODPM (Pause for Thoughts – June 2004), argue there 
are the three main reasons for the differences: 
 
ⅰ) Obsolescence of the stock - demand for the characteristics of the 
dominant property type have been overtaken by changing tastes, 
aspirations and income levels. This does not just mean physical 
obsolescence - the property may be in reasonable physical condition, it 
simply cannot offer the facilities demanded by modern communities. 
Most frequently this means the property is too small, there is no parking 
or garden and there is a poor internal layout.   
ⅱ) Over supply - a mismatch between supply and demand arises where the 
local population has fallen, often through the outward migration of 
economically active younger people.   
ⅲ) Neighbourhood characteristics - where a complex range of negative 
factors, such as unpopular property type, poor environment, stigma, a 
fear of crime and anti-social behaviour, insecure tenure and poor local 
amenities interact to cumulatively reduce demand and increase the desire 
of residents to leave.  
 
It may not be possible to disentangle cause from effect and a great many 
neighbourhoods suffer one of these characteristics but where the three come 
together, it is likely to lead to a fundamental market weakness and 
widespread neighbourhood abandonment.  
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2) Changing Policy Responses 
 
At the same time these changes in housing markets were becoming 
apparent there had been a shift in urban policy thinking. This is a complex 
area of which the following provides only a fleeting overview.   
 
Historically public resources for urban renewal had been focussed on 
making physical improvements on an area or neighbourhood basis. 
Successive renewal initiatives such as General Improvement Areas, Housing 
Action Areas, Renewal Areas, Estate Action and City Challenge were all 
capital intensive programmes to improve the condition of housing stock and 
local environments. Over time, sometimes relatively short periods, it was 
found, however, that whilst the appearance of these relatively small areas 
may have been temporarily improved the underlying long term problems of 
deprivation and sustainability remained.  
 
Towards the end of the 20th Century there was a movement away from 
investing in physical improvements towards investing directly in 
communities. Programmes such as the Single Regeneration Budget and New 
Deal for Communities placed an increased emphasis on the provision of 
skills and training, improving education and health all aligned with greater 
community empowerment. Although it is difficult to argue that these are not 
vital to the regeneration of neighbourhoods, the problem facing areas with 
the three characteristics outlined above was that once residents improved 
their skills or found better employment they simply voted with their feet and 
moved to areas that better met their aspirations.  (Kleinman and Whitehead, 1999). 
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3) The Sustainable Communities Plan 
 
At the same time as the problems of low demand were manifesting 
themselves in the North of England, areas of the South were facing the 
converse problem – an acute shortage of affordable housing. The UKs most 
sustained period of economic growth in 50 years has been accompanied by 
even higher house price inflation leading to extraordinarily high house price/ 
income ratios in some areas. In regions of economic strength, the South East 
in particular, demand far outstrips supply forcing prices ever higher and 
resulting in serious affordability problems for low and middle income 
households.    
 
All of these factors: finding a balance between investing in people and 
“bricks and mortar”, appropriate scale and recognising regional variations 
have crystallised the thinking behind current Government policy thinking in 
the Sustainable Communities Plan. This is summarised well by the Office of 
the Deputy Prime Minister  
(http://www.odpm.gov.uk/stellent/groups/odpm_communities): 
 
“The Deputy Prime Minister launched the Communities Plan (Sustainable 
Communities: Building for the future) on 5 February 2003. The Plan sets out 
a long-term programme of action for delivering sustainable communities in 
both urban and rural areas. It aims to tackle housing supply issues in the 
South East, low demand in other parts of the country, and the quality of our 
public spaces.  
The Plan includes not just a significant increase in resources and major 
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reforms of housing and planning, but a new approach to how we build and what 
we build.  
 
This £22 billion programme of action aims to focus the attention and 
co-ordinate the efforts of all levels of Government and stakeholders in 
bringing about development that meets the economic, social and 
environmental needs of future generations as well as succeeding now. 
 
Key Themes 
 
The Plan consists of several key elements:  
 
h Addressing the housing shortage, which is comprised of:  
 
1. Accelerating the provision of housing. This includes: ensuring that 
housing numbers set out in planning guidance for the South East 
(RPG 9) are delivered; accelerating growth in the four "growth areas" 
(Thames Gateway, London-Stansted-Cambridge corridor, Ashford, 
and Milton Keynes-South Midlands); and ensuring that the 
construction industry has the right skills to deliver.  
2. Affordable Housing. £5 billion has been allocated for the provision of 
affordable housing over the next three years (2003/4  -  2005/6). 
This includes £1 billion for housing "key workers" in the public 
sector, to aid recruitment and retention.  
3. Tackling Homelessness. Including ensuring ending the use of bed and 
breakfast hostels for homeless families by March 2004.  
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hAddressing low demand and abandonment. Around one million homes in 
parts of the North and Midlands are suffering from low demand and 
abandonment. Nine ‘Pathfinder’ schemes have been established in the areas 
worst affected to put in place action programmes to turn this problem around.  
 
hDecent homes. The Plan sets out an action programme to ensure that all social 
housing is brought up to a decent standard by 2010, alongside targeted action 
to improve conditions for vulnerable people in private housing.  
 
hLiveability. The Plan sets out how the Government intends to intensify efforts 
to improve the local environment of all communities. This includes cleaner 
streets, improved parks and better public spaces.  
 
hProtecting the countryside. The Plan outlines how land will be used more 
effectively. The majority of new housing will be on previously developed 
land, rather than on greenfield. The area of land designated as greenbelt land 
will be increased or maintained in each area. Developments not meeting 
density standards in the South East will be called in.”  
 
3. Housing Market Renewal  
 
The Housing Market Renewal (HMR) forms a central part of the 
Sustainable Communities Plan programme and is the flagship response to 
the political, economic and social significance of the rapid changes to 
northern urban housing markets. 
One of the most remarkable features of HMR is how quickly it has moved 
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from identification and analysis of a problem, through the development of 
policy thinking through to large-scale delivery. Many feel this pace of 
development of a programme of this significance to be unprecedented. 
Following the publication of the M62 report, throughout 2001/2002 a high 
level and highly energised partnership of academics, practitioners, senior 
civil servants, MPs, and local authority elected members and senior officers 
met to shape the policy framework. This enabled the Deputy Prime Minister 
to announce the creation of nine Market Renewal Pathfinders in April 2002 
followed by the confirmation of Housing Market Renewal Funding (HMRF) 
of £500m in February 2003.  Eight of these nine Pathfinders have now 
successfully submitted and negotiated prospectuses with ODPM  
 
The 9 Pathfinders do not cover all the areas identified as being at risk of 
market failure, however, they do cover the greatest spatial concentrations of 
low demand where large scale intervention is likely to make the most 
significant large scale impact. The Government’s Spending Review of 2004 
has recognised the importance of tackling low demand outside the 9 areas, 
however, this work is at a very early stage. 
 
Reflecting the importance placed on this element of the Communities Plan 
by Government, each Pathfinder was allocated an initial £2.6m to fund 
development and early activities as part of the 2002 announcement. In return, 
each Pathfinder had to establish a Board made up of key local and regional 
agencies, agree the precise boundaries for it’s intervention strategies and 
identify the timescale in which they would pull together their prospectus.  
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Understanding the framework in which the 9 Pathfinders developed their 
strategic thinking and delivery proposals in these prospectuses is important 
and there are a number of unusual features: 
 
 
hLocal policy and strategy development was “guidance free” and highly 
flexible – in recognition of the diversity of issues facing each Pathfinder 
and the need to develop tailored solutions, central Government did not 
issue guidance notes. This is in sharp contrast to other policy areas such as 
New Deal for Communities where partnerships had to show how they 
would deliver programmes to meet clearly defined outputs and to meet 
common outcomes or objectives but the freedoms offered are in keeping 
with the modernising local government agenda. 
  
hPartnerships were encouraged to bring about transformational change through 
innovative and radical approaches. New thinking was actively supported to 
ensure strategy reflected the needs, demands and aspirations of future 
communities rather than simply reacting to current pressures. 
 
hThe Pathfinder intervention boundaries were determined by tenure blind 
housing markets rather than existing administrative ones. This led to 
unprecedented cross- local authority working and increased their regional 
significance.  
 
hThe programme is predominantly a capital one reflecting the costs of 
restructuring housing markets. Pathfinders were charged with ensuring 
mainstream revenue and other capital investment streams were aligned with 
this.    
 
 227 
hNo guidance was given on the scale of resources to be made available other 
than a figure for the whole of the national programme – each Pathfinder was 
expected to assess what they needed and could deliver in the first 2-3 years.    
  
Working within this ideology each Pathfinder had to produce a prospectus 
that was able to demonstrate to Government that there was a clear 
understanding of local housing markets and that a deliverable 
transformational strategy had been developed with buy in from key delivery 
agencies and communities. This was a substantial piece of work requiring 
the establishment of dedicated teams, new partnerships and ways of working 
as well as probably unprecedented amounts of primary research and analysis. 
Government played a dual role in this process – supporting development 
through the provision of advice and information, establishing networks, 
commissioning cross-cutting research etc – as well as a regulatory 
negotiating role in assessing the adequacy of the prospectus to enable access 
to HMRF. Each prospectus was also independently scrutinised by the Audit 
Commission to ensure consistency. At the time of writing 8 of the 9 have 
been successfully negotiated – several are now available on Pathfinder 
websites.  
 
In the majority of prospectuses and in broad terms, 3 typical spatial levels 
emerged: 
 
hA Pathfinder wide area outlined the future economic and social vision, 
function and form for the overall area. This reflected it’s role in the wider 
sub-region or region as a whole and considers the result of proposed activity 
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on adjacent areas. 
hWithin each pathfinder, significantly sized and influential areas, typically the 
size of a small town, worked up specific development frameworks (ADFs). 
These reflected how proposed activity would impact on the lives of current 
and future communities in a wider context than simply housing conditions – 
looking at school, transport, employment and leisure provision amongst 
others. 
hTo varying degrees these proposals within the ADFs were then translated to a 
much smaller neighbourhood level identifying blocks for improvement or 
clearance. This varied depending on the level of community consultation and 
confidence in being able to take out sensitive proposals to a much wider 
audience who may be adversely affected.     
 
1) Housing Market Renewal in the North West of England  
 
The North West contains the greatest numbers of properties at risk of 
market failure in the country. Four of the nine national Pathfinders lie within 
this region containing a total of approximately 400,000 properties, all 
located within a 35-mile radius of the centre of the Greater Manchester 
conurbation. Over £330m of the initial tranch of £500m HMRF has been 
allocated in the North West. The four Pathfinders are: 
 
hManchester Salford - the first of the Pathfinders nationally to receive 
funding in October 2003 - £125m to 2006  
hNew Heartlands in Merseyside covering Liverpool, Sefton and Wirral  
received £86m in February 2004 
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hElevate in East Lancashire covering Burney, Pendle, Blackburn with 
Darwen, Rossendale and Hyndburn received £68m in March 2004  
hOldham Rochdale received £53.5m also in March 2004.  
  
The Sustainable Communities Plan also enabled the development of 
Regional Housing Boards (RHB) to create tailored housing strategies for 
regions ( see http://www.odpm.gov.uk/stellent/groups/odpm_communities/documents ). 
Sitting on the Board are the key regional agencies, NW Development 
Agency, NW Regional Assembly, Government Office, English Partnerships, 
Housing Corporation and NW Housing Forum. Between them these agencies 
have responsibility at a regional level for economic development, planning 
and representing Government. The Regional Housing Strategy therefore 
comes with teeth, partly through the joining up of these agencies but also 
because it brings with it resources that the Board influence and prioritise.  
 
The North West Housing Strategy is widely consulted and publicly 
available on the website of the NW RHB (see - www.NWRB.org). One of 
it’s 4 priorities is urban renaissance to be spatially achieved principally 
through the activities of the 4 Pathfinders. Through this prioritisation the 
Board have allocated additional capital resources to further supplement 
HMRF. The North West Development Agency have prioritised support for 
the Pathfinder areas in their Housing Policy (see - http://www.nwda.co.uk) . 
At the time of writing research is being undertaken by the Regional 
Assembly to consider how the revision of the Regional Spatial Strategy will 
take account of the significance of the Pathfinders. 
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4. Future Activity 
 
Housing markets in the UK are extremely dynamic and in recent years 
prices have risen considerably – in the North West, for example, between 
1996 – 2003 the average property rose in value by 86%. Even as HMR 
strategies were being developed to tackle areas where properties had been 
valued for as little as 50 pence the market was moving upwards nearly as 
quickly as it had fallen. Research carried out by CURS for the NW RHB, 
and available on their website, showed that prices in Pathfinder areas had 
risen but nothing like as quickly as in non-Pathfinder areas and that the 
structural weaknesses remained in the housing markets dominated by high 
density terraced stock. Some of the prices rises were attributable to short 
term investors looking to either rent out the properties or to make a quick 
capital gain in a rising market rather than being bought by owners looking to 
live in previously low demand areas. The results of this work published in 
September 2004 are yet to be fully analysed by the RHB, however, they are 
likely to strengthen rather than question the priority given to supporting 
Pathfinder activity.    
 
Whilst the Government’s Spending Review of 2004 announced in July 
that there would be continued support for the Pathfinder programme in the 
form of a further £500m funding package, one of the most significant 
developments has been the creation of a new pan-regional growth strategy – 
“The Northern Way”. This is an evolving economic strategy led by the 3 
Northern Development Agencies that was submitted to Government in 
September for detailed consideration.   
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Details of this can be found at http://www.thenorthernway.co.uk/ – in 
essence the strategy is arguing that were economic activity in the North to be 
brought up to the national average it would be worth some £350b pa to the 
UK economy. From a housing perspective, the strategy considers that the 
relatively poor stock in the North acts as a barrier to economic development 
and requires restructuring beyond the scale envisaged by even HMR. The 
significance of this lies in the fact that the transformational nature of HMR 
has been adopted on an even larger scale and in the recognition of the 
importance of good housing to realising economic well being.          
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